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Although I am sure she has no recollection of this, the initial idea for this
book occurred during a conversation I had with Regenia Gagnier many
years ago. At that time, I had the pleasure of having her as a colleague at
Stanford. Maybe it was partially because we both had been trained at
Berkeley and shared some sense of displacement in Silicon Valley, but
for some reason Regenia started talking about rational choice theory.
Not only was she speaking about it with regard to her research interests,
but she was also commenting on how, after having been what she felt a
long time at Stanford, she sensed that this way of accounting for human
behavior had become pervasive on campus. Eventually I came to feel
that along with rational choice theory came an implicit set of values,
which I later dubbed ‘‘rational choice thinking.’’ By that I meant the
belief that not only could human decision-making be formalized in
rational choice’s parsimonious and elegant formula, but also that its
various manifestations could be widely articulated as ‘‘common sense’’
—‘‘people’’ act on the basis of common ways of reasoning, and, what is
more, they should be treated according to that logic. This kind of
thinking undergirds our sense of how we behave toward each other and
think about the world. Two incidents, which occurred a decade apart,
illustrated this in a particularly dramatic fashion.
The first was Larry Summers’s infamous World Bank memo of 1991.∞
During his tenure as chief economist for the World Bank, Summers is-
sued a memo suggesting that there was indeed a problem with pollution
—the First World had too much of it, and the Third World too little. He
proffered a number of rational-choice type arguments, among them the
rationale that since the life expectancy of those living in the Third World
was so far below that of those living in the First World, the human cost
of breathing toxic fumes and consuming toxic food and water would be
much greater in the First World than in the Third. After all, those living
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in the Third World couldn’t expect to live as long as ‘‘we’’ do, so what
would be wrong with reducing their lifetimes by a minuscule amount,
when, on the other hand, if we ourselves were to breathe in the by-
products of our First World lifestyle, it would decrease our lifetimes by a
much greater proportion? As Summers puts it,
‘‘Dirty’’ Industries: Just between you and me, shouldn’t the World Bank
be encouraging more migration of the dirty industries to the ldcs
[Less Developed Countries]? . . . The demand for a clean environment
for aesthetic and health reasons is likely to have very high income
elasticity. The concern over an agent that causes a one in a million
change in the odds of prostrate cancer is obviously going to be much
higher in a country where people survive to get prostrate cancer than
in a country where under 5 mortality is 200 per thousand. Also, much
of the concern over industrial atmosphere discharge is about visibil-
ity impairing particulates. These discharges may have very little direct
health impact. Clearly trade in goods that embody aesthetic pollution
concerns could be welfare enhancing. While production is mobile the
consumption of pretty air is a non-tradable.≤
The response of Jose Lutzenberger, the Brazilian minister of the en-
vironment, on reading this leaked memo seems to sum it up well:
Your reasoning is perfectly logical but totally insane. . . . Your thoughts
[provide] a concrete example of the unbelievable alienation, reduction-
ist thinking, social ruthlessness and the arrogant ignorance of many
conventional ‘‘economists’’ concerning the nature of the world we live
in. . . . If the World Bank keeps you as vice president it will lose all
credibility. To me it would confirm what I often said . . . the best thing
that could happen would be for the Bank to disappear.≥
While one might applaud such a sentiment, Lutzenberger appears to
offer a contradiction: aren’t logic and sanity deeply affiliated? What
could be their possible point of separation? Glossing the terms helps
untease the ‘‘rational’’ from the sociopathic, the ‘‘impeccable’’ ethics of
business based on some utilitarian notion of ‘‘the greater good’’ (par-
ticularly construed, of course) from the notion of an ethical system
based on some sense of global community and the goal of a more
democratic, just, and equal modality of interdependence. What were
the respective fates of Summers and Lutzenberger? Lutzenberger was
fired after sending his riposte, while Summers became President Bill
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Clinton’s secretary of the Treasury, then president of Harvard Univer-
sity, and then a chief economic advisor to President Barack Obama.
The second example took place shortly after 9/11: the Pentagon’s
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (darpa) proposed a ‘‘ter-
rorism futures market.’’ As one news article put it,
It sounds jaw-droppingly callous, not to mention absurd: An Internet
gambling parlor, sponsored by the U.S. government, on politics in the
Middle East. Anyone, from Osama bin Laden to your grandmother, can
bet over the Web on such questions as whether Yasser Arafat will be
assassinated or Turkey’s government will be overthrown.
If the bettors are right, they’ll win money; if they’re wrong, they’ll lose
their wagers. The site itself will keep numerical tallies of the current
‘‘odds’’ for various events.
Why not just ask the guys at the corner bar whether or not we should
invade Jordan, or play SimCity to make foreign policy decisions? But
experts say the darpa-backed Policy Analysis Market . . . is based on a
legitimate theory, the Efficient Market Hypothesis, that has a proven
track record in predicting outcomes. Basically, the idea is that the col-
lective consciousness is smarter than any single person. By forcing peo-
ple to put their money where their mouth is, the wagers help weed
out know-nothings and give more weight to the opinions of those in
the know.
‘‘Markets are a great way of aggregating information that a lot of
different people have,’’ said Eric Zitzewitz, an assistant professor of
economics at the Stanford Graduate School of Business. ‘‘One of the big
issues with intelligence that was gathered before 9/11 was that infor-
mation wasn’t aggregated within the intelligence community. This is
directly aimed at addressing that.’’∂
Although the idea sounds offensive to some, ‘‘to the extent this has
even a small probability of using valuable information to help prevent
tragedies, that’s got to be the overriding ethical concern,’’ he said.∑
Nevertheless, what led to the scheme’s downfall was not its sheer
weirdness, but the fact that it was broadly publicized. Even Fox News
commented,
When the plan was disclosed Monday by Democratic Sens. Ron Wyden
of Oregon and Byron Dorgan of North Dakota, the Pentagon defended
it as a way to gain intelligence about potential terrorists’ plans. Wyden
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called it ‘‘a federal betting parlor on atrocities and terrorism.’’ Dorgan
described it as ‘‘unbelievably stupid.’’
Criticism mounted Tuesday. On the Senate floor, Democratic Leader
Thomas Daschle of South Dakota denounced the program as ‘‘an incen-
tive actually to commit acts of terrorism.’’ ‘‘This is just wrong,’’ declared
Daschle, D-S.D. At an Armed Services Committee hearing, Sen. Hillary
Rodham Clinton called it ‘‘a futures market in death.’’ At the Foreign Re-
lations hearing, [Deputy Defense Secretary Paul] Wolfowitz defended
darpa, saying ‘‘it is brilliantly imaginative in places where we want
them to be imaginative. It sounds like maybe they got too imaginative,’’
he said, smiling.∏
While there is much here to comment on, I focus on two aspects that
relate to the main concerns of this book. First, there were the rival
metrics of the various cost-benefit analyses—moral, ethical, practical,
and ‘‘aesthetic’’ (it just sounded wrong). The Deliverance of Others is
intimately concerned with how literary aesthetics in particular help us
meditate on the ways we are connected to, and act in relation to, others.
Second, there was Wolfowitz’s chilling suggestion that the notion of a
terrorism futures market was perhaps just a case of too much imagina-
tion. Really? Where did darpa cross the line? And do we really want to
harness the imagination of the world in this way?π In this volume I tackle
the problematic of what drives our imaginations, especially of others,
and what limits our imagination, for both good and bad reasons. In-
deed, I am interested in how literature helps us think through these
judgments.
In these pages I look at the various modes of representing and analyz-
ing how humans behave, make choices, express preferences, achieve
goals, and assess their place in the world vis-à-vis their goals. However,
The Deliverance of Others addresses not only rational choice theory, but
also other modes of defining human commonality and interaction—the
discourse of the human body and how bodies can interpenetrate in
(even) nonsexual ways; the discourse of the emotions and sentiments,
and how both are common properties of humans, yet flow between us as
well. These questions form the building blocks of my reassessment of
the role of contemporary narrative literature in imagining this ‘‘togeth-
erness’’ in and with the other in a critical fashion that I believe should be
central to any reading of and any teaching of what we now call ‘‘world
literature.’’ Let me provide another anecdote—a more generic one.
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One of the first rites of being welcomed into a new community is
often the cocktail party. I am sure what I am about to relate has hap-
pened, for example, to every teacher of literature. You are nibbling on
your curried shrimp, swilling your chardonnay, and a nice person comes
and asks what you do. You say, ‘‘I teach at X.’’ You feel secure—you have a
job, it’s a good school, people like schools. But you don’t feel that way
for long. ‘‘Oh? What do you teach?’’ Here I would say, ‘‘Comparative
literature.’’ My new friend’s eyes start scanning for an escape route—
where is there a venture capitalist or engineer or, even better, both in the
same body? I can see reeling through my soon-to-disappear friend’s
mind a flashback to the English A.P. exam: ‘‘Lord, he’s going to ask me
what I have been reading, and even worse, to discuss my thoughts on it!’’
OK, I feel the same way when I meet engineers. That’s why we have
cocktails, and lovely weather to point to here in the Valley.
For twenty-odd years now, I have been trying to see how certain
powerful ways of describing how we are bound together have taken
hold: we are the same because we all define, rationalize, and reach for
our economic preferences and utilities in the same way; we all have a
human body; we all have human emotions. These are baseline assump-
tions, and they help keep us talking to each other. But what has hap-
pened now, in this age of increased globalization, when more and more
people—closer to us in real and virtual ways than before—need to be
vetted on whether or not they are actually the same as us in these ways,
precisely? Furthermore, what happens when we try to imagine the
genesis and consequences of seeing others through the systems that
deliver them to us? And how can the humanities, and literature in
particular, aid us in understanding these new sets of problems of ‘‘deliv-
erance’’ in this newly interconnected world?
I admit that the phrase ‘‘the deliverance of others’’ has a strong biblical
air and tradition, as it refers to how others can be lead into ‘‘the light.’’
While this volume does not emphasize that connotation of the phrase,
because of the import of its clear ethical connotations, neither does it
disavow it. What happens when we take on the call to embrace others
and take responsibility for them? Put more precisely, this book seeks to
delve into the shape, nature, and structure of systems that deliver other-
ness to us—taking people from ‘‘different’’ worlds and importing them
into ours—and analyze those systems when even the most benign and
seemingly neutral ones of them actually work to filter out ‘‘excessive’’
otherness for the sake of the functioning of the system. The questions
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then come to be about what ‘‘difference’’ gets siphoned off and where it
goes, and, more important, what stays in to change the system, showing
its limitations when it comes to actually presenting others to us and
creating an ethical global community. I look to literature—specifically,
modern and contemporary prose narratives—as a unique mode of un-
derstanding a world comprised of new peoples, new choices, new data,
all seeking to interact in the best way possible. It would be my hope that,
at the cocktail party, I would pull out a literary example and show how
its treatment of some issue about which my interlocutor surely knows
(economics, choice theory, healthcare, biomedicine, advertising, infor-
mation, media) not only describes how those systems work (or don’t),
but also how the literary imagination and literary art sees, from a point
outside the system, another way of conceiving of those relations be-
tween people in those delivery systems. In my most hopeful moments,
and if my friend is still there, I would close with some discussion of what
this experience has tried to teach us about living together ethically. This
is a short book, meant to be almost a kind of primer. I hope you find it
useful.
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Introduction
One of the chief aims of this study is to help us arrive at a sense of
responsibility toward others by learning to read contemporary litera-
ture in a way that includes a critical reappraisal of systems and dis-
courses of ‘‘sameness’’ that deliver others to us. Specifically, I look to
ideas of rationality, of the family, of the body, and of affect—each of
these notions holds within it some sign of human commonality and
communicability, or ‘‘deliverance.’’ I show how these discursive ‘‘delivery
systems’’ imply commensurate relations between selves and others, and
yet how these relatively simple systems become less and less stable as
they interact with, and try to accommodate, a more radical type of
otherness produced in contemporary historical contexts. Each of the
novels treated in this book rigorously tests the faith these systems place
in commonality and commensurateness; each text offers a vivid and
often troubling view of the disruption of such a belief in our contempo-
rary age. Nonetheless, there is in each of these novels also a redemptive
moment that, while certainly not unproblematic, gives a different view
of each ‘‘delivery system,’’ and this vision resides precisely in the deliv-
erance available through the literary aesthetic. However, and critically, I
update the idea of the aesthetic to include the specific problems literary
aesthetics face in this age of increased ‘‘otherness’’ and virtual proximity.
I begin, in this introduction, by showing how the notion of empathy
has defined the relation between self and other in rhetorical, social-
philosophical, and finally literary discourses. The first two of these argue
that similarity and identification are necessary between orator and lis-
tener, or between social actors. I juxtapose this to modern literature’s
valorization of difference—the aim of literature is precisely to deliver to
us ‘‘others’’ with lives unlike our own. This makes literature qualitatively
different in aim and scope. However, this also presents a historical
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problem today. The notion that literature should mobilize (or even
instantiate) empathy for others and enhance our ethical capabilities is
rooted in the early modern period, wherein ‘‘otherness,’’ while certainly
increasingly present, was not nearly as immediately, insistently, and in-
tensely pressing itself into the here and now of everyday social, cultural,
and political life. This voluminous influx, quantitatively and qualitatively
new, is a distinct feature of the late-twentieth- and early-twenty-first-
century age of globalization. We now have to deal with this question: if
we still adhere to the modern valorization of literature as bringing the
lives of others to us in a vivid way, once we admit ‘‘others’’ into ‘‘our’’
world and place value in the difference they bring into our lives, where
do we set the limit of how much otherness is required, as opposed to how
much is excessive, disruptive, disturbing, in ways that damage us, rather
than enhance our lives? This forces us into taking an ethical position,
and calls on us to address another kind of ‘‘selfishness’’: we take so much
and then leave the rest, but at what cost? How have we learned anything
more about ‘‘us’’ and the situation in which we find ourselves? Contem-
porary literary narratives generate worlds in which we must puzzle out
these questions in particular manners.
Previously, people were thought to be able to identify with each other
according to the fact they could ‘‘feel’’ as if they too could be in ‘‘the
situation’’ of the other depicted in the orator’s speech, in the social
imaginary, or the narrator’s text. In the present study I update that
understanding. Aren’t we all living in the same global ‘‘situation’’? Don’t
we all perform rationally as economic subjects in the global economy
that transfers goods, materials, bodies, images to all of us across real
time and huge distances? Don’t we now all ingest materials that we find
from the same sources, transported laterally across the world without
absolute regard to borders? Not only food, but also drugs and medical
practices have become nearly universal. In the most intense form of
sharing human experience, organ transplants disclose the new com-
monness, as elements from one body can be inserted into another. And
haven’t global media fed on and produced similar human affect? Don’t
people share a common register and repertoire in the realm of feelings,
feelings that are touched and produced by worldwide representations of
contemporary lives? Finally, hasn’t the political world incorporated all
sorts of previously disenfranchised people? ‘‘Our’’ situation now cannot
so easily bracket off more distant parts of the planet or deny the par-
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ticipation of those close to us, even though separated by race, gender,
sexual preference, religion.
Globalization has delivered to us far more distant spaces and peoples
than ever before, with greater regularity and integration on multiple
fronts—economic, political, social, cultural, ecological, epidemiologi-
cal, and so on. ‘‘Otherness’’ is thus not only increasingly in contact with
the ‘‘same,’’ but the points of contact and contagion with otherness are
far more numerous. Therefore, the degree to which we are the same as
or different from others is discernible only in very specific manners that
demand to be carefully and critically scrutinized. I am thus interested
in otherness as both a ‘‘thing,’’ manifested in various forms, and as a
relation.
Essentially, the problems of otherness press up against the mainstays
of Western liberal thought. The primacy of the individual, the safe-
guarding of her prerogatives to act freely in the world so as to manifest
in the fullest way possible her distinctive humanity, is negotiated against
the recognition of our being together as social creatures. The problem-
atics of otherness, as taken up in the course of this study, are therefore
played out in the realms of rationality and choice-making, the integrity
of the body, the freedom to feel. And yet ‘‘sameness’’ (and ‘‘equality’’),
though declared, is not guaranteed, and calling attention not only to
inequality, but also to its sources, is as old as liberalism. However, events
of the postwar era set the stage for ever more potent insistence on
‘‘otherness,’’ which paralleled the emergence of new structures that drew
people together.
The seeds of enfranchisement sown in the eighteenth century were
more fully manifested in the postwar era of decolonization and even-
tually in the anti-apartheid era, bringing forth widespread tension over
the distribution of wealth and resources not only in terms of the ‘‘Third
World,’’ but also according to the different mappings of hemispheres
and peripheries. Widespread liberatory movements called up issues of
race, gender, and sexuality. One example of the crisis of expanding and
disruptive otherness was evident in the seventies, as described in a
report by the Trilateral Commission, The Crisis of Democracy: Report on
the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission (1975). In
it, Samuel Huntington remarks, ‘‘The essence of the democratic surge
of the 1960s was a general challenge to existing systems of authority,
public and private. In one form or another, the challenge manifested
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itself in the family, the university, business, public and private institu-
tions, politics, the government bureaucracy, and the military service.
People no longer felt the same obligation to obey those whom they had
previously considered superior to themselves in age, rank, status, exper-
tise, character, or talents. . . . Each group claimed its right to participate
equally—in the decision which affected itself.’’∞ In short, while lauding
the active participation of an increasing number of diverse populations
on the one hand, Huntington is concerned that there may be too much
of a good thing (or, in the language of this volume, too much other-
ness): ‘‘The vitality of democracy in the 1960s raised questions about
the governability of democracy in the 1970s.’’≤ This increase in political
participation is ‘‘primarily the result of the increased salience which
citizens perceive politics to have for their own immediate concerns.’’≥
So what’s wrong with that? Isn’t this precisely the picture of a robust
democratic society? Not exactly, for this vigor is largely made up of
minority voices and viewpoints demanding attention to their particular
needs, and acted on the basis of other kinds of rationality. This puts
pressure on the political institutions of the state: ‘‘In the United States,
the strength of democracy poses a problem for the governability of
democracy. . . . We have come to recognize that there are potentially
desirable limits to the indefinite extension of political democracy. De-
mocracy will have a longer life if it has a more balanced existence.’’∂ This
ominous phrase is indeed Huntington’s concluding statement, and is
emblematic of the kind of swelling up of anti-authoritarian ‘‘otherness’’
that shows the tipping point of liberalism that occurred not only in the
United States, but globally. Where were those limits to be drawn? How
was ‘‘balance’’ going to be achieved? Liberal values, seen both in the
ethos of modern literature’s role in diversifying our frames of reference
and in liberal democratic rule, become challenged by others who insist
on entering the system as full participants, with their otherness fully
intact. Hence the crisis of governability. This hugely revealing statement
from the mid-seventies signals the historical instantiation of a problem-
atic of otherness that spreads into other realms as well, and has only
intensified as new technologies have created both the promise of new
kinds of commonality and new ethical dilemmas. In today’s world, the
hierarchical recognition of some rationalities as existing below the
threshold of the rational, of some bodies as harvestable and commodi-
fiable, and of some affects as dangerous to the psychic and somatic
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health of the self occur precisely within global delivery systems that owe
their existence to contemporary politics and technologies.
Today we find new political economies of organs, tissues, genetic
materials that build on and indeed reinforce preexisting structures of
inequality, affluence, need. The value placed on ‘‘the body’’ is now
negotiated in ways once unheard of; now what is up for sale is not only a
cadaver, but parts of living beings. The very psychic equilibrium of the
‘‘self ’’ is put into greater and greater affect of contact, virtually and in
face-to-face encounters with others who now appear on our everyday
communications apparatuses. The sale and transfer of goods and com-
modities is premised on continually produced affect in a global market.
Given these imperatives, which are facilitated by the logic of neoliberal-
ism, how do we regulate the influx of otherness so as not to destabilize
the system? How much of this goes beyond the pale of what liberal
ideology, so protective of the self, can allow? How much variance in the
exercise of rational acts can we tolerate? How do we both facilitate the
transfer and mobilization of bodies and body parts across borders (to
satisfy our needs for labor and bodily rejuvenation, even survival), and
create walls and barriers to stop autonomous flows of bodies across
borders? How do we hope to tap into an ‘‘oceanic feeling,’’ so as to
instantiate need and desire for the products we wish to sell, yet stem
the influx of affect that emanates from disruptive others and circulates
back to us?
This study shows how contemporary literary texts register this new
historical ‘‘situation’’ differently and asks us to reexamine more closely
the grounds for those claims of commonness and to see the still vital
resistance of otherness to it. Not only do the texts I have selected for this
study vividly illustrate the precise ways that globalization today differs
from that of the past, but reading them in the ways I undertake to do
helps us to critically reflect on how we negotiate this new being with
otherness.
That others occupy the ‘‘system’’ differently is not hard to recognize.
Despite the celebratory gestures of ‘‘globalization,’’ this occupation dis-
closes the fissures and residual differences that remain beneath the
surface of systems of sameness. Literary aesthetics today thus involve a
recombinatory poetics that would not have been possible without the
friction, resistance, autonomy that otherness still insinuates into the
‘‘same.’’ In this study I show how the selected novels each reveal the
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effort to deliver others to us within the contingencies of our historical
condition. I start by examining closely how ‘‘sameness’’ has been a
linchpin in social thought, variously evident in rhetorical treatises and
social philosophical writings, and then consider the premium modern
literature has placed on ‘‘difference.’’ I then move to a discussion of the
relation between the notion of ‘‘situation’’ that englobes self and other
in classical rhetoric and in Adam Smith’s social philosophy, and adapt
that notion to my idea of contemporary ‘‘delivery systems.’’
The Sameness Requirement
‘‘Stepping into the other guy’s shoes works best when you resemble
him. . . . If you are structurally analogous to the empathee, then accurate
inputs generate accurate outputs—The greater the isomorphism, the
more dependable and precise the results.’’ Or so says Ray Sorensen,
writing on what he calls ‘‘Self-Strengthening Empathy’’ in the journal
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Thank goodness, then, that
Sorensen believes ‘‘Mother Nature has made your mind isomorphic to
mine,’’ because this isomorphism aids in the perpetuation of the spe-
cies.∑ To put it another way: we empathize, therefore we survive. The
pragmatic aspect of empathy has not been lost to thinkers from the
classical age on. Empathy—feeling the pain or joy or fear experienced by
others—is useful, whether it be to convince one’s audience of the right-
ness of one’s position, or as a key element in fostering moral sentiment
and social equilibrium, or, indeed, in propagating human kind.
In The Rhetoric we find Aristotle claiming that effective acts of rheto-
ric rely on the listener feeling that he could find himself in the very
situation being described in the speech of the orator. Chapters 1 through
10 of the Second Book of The Rhetoric are devoted to discussing the
emotions and the way they may be enlisted in rhetorical argumentation.
The eighth chapter takes as its subject Pity, and Aristotle’s discussion
seems to touch on familiar ground: ‘‘We pity those who are like us in age,
character, disposition, social standing, or birth; for in all these cases
it appears more likely that the same misfortune might befall us also’’
(114). Self-interest and indeed self-empathy is not slightly a part of this
receptivity.
In their discussion of The Rhetoric, William K. Wimsatt and Cleanth
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Brooks raise three useful points. First, they say, one should regard the
text as ‘‘an approach to knowledge.’’∏ I will argue that a large part of this
knowledge is eminently social; Aristotle’s meditation on language and
discourse has everything to do with how members of a social group
present themselves—their ideas, desires, needs, fears—to others, and
how that presentation can be best effected. This notion is supported by
another claim Wimsatt and Brooks make, that The Rhetoric can be
regarded as an offshoot of dialectic and also of ethical studies.π In that
respect the logic attending The Rhetoric is embedded in both dialectical
thinking—reasoning out the exchanges of assertions and responses—
and a consideration of the ethical and moral bases and implications of
taking certain positions vis-à-vis the orator’s discourse. Finally, Wimsatt
and Brooks point out that The Rhetoric ‘‘presents alternatives, things
that might have been.’’∫ In that sense the epistemological and ethical
realms are enriched by a set of data that exceeds the empirical. So we
might raise the question anew—the imagination of ‘‘things that might
have been’’ seems in The Rhetoric tightly bonded to a realist logic—as to
whether ‘‘things that might be’’ are contained within the scope of experi-
ences we might plausibly imagine happening to us. Simply put, if we
cannot ‘‘relate’’ to it, the situation the speaker puts before us falls flat. We
might well react to it, but Aristotle says that our response and our
receptivity will be less than if it were something we could imagine
happening to us. Now what kind of moral does that teach, what kind of
action can take place, given this new requirement for identification?
Aristotle’s basic premise regarding rhetorical effect and the emotions
in the classical age—that we feel most strongly about and are most
receptive to the stories or topoi that we could imagine inhabiting—is
found as well in Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. Indeed,
Smith’s text likewise connects this topic to the issue of social exchange
and norms—feeling ‘‘the same’’ is a powerful force in social interaction.
And Smith also turns his attention to the imagination and the kinds of
imaginings made possible solely by feeling that one could be affected in
similar ways that others are. Critically, in the course of his disquisition,
the ‘‘original’’ situation that prompts our identification with the sufferer
recedes into the background as our imaginations latch onto that event
in order to launch a separate set of sensations in our own bodies. We
can never actually feel the pain of others, but we can imagine what
it must feel like. Smith even goes so far as to say that since we can
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never empirically verify what the other is feeling, it really doesn’t mat-
ter what he or she feels. We dwell instead in our own imagined sense
of what we, in the situation of the other, would feel. Indeed, in the
following passage, ‘‘we’’ are channeled into the imagined body of the
other person.
As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can
form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiv-
ing what we ourselves should feel in the like situation. Though our
brother is upon the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our
senses will never inform us of what he suffers. They never did, and never
can, carry us beyond our own person, and it is by the imagination only
that we can form any conception of what are his sensations. Neither can
that faculty help us to this any other way, than by representing to us
what would be our own, if we were in his case. It is the impressions of
our own senses only, not those of his, which our imaginations copy. By
the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive our-
selves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his
body, and become in some measure the same person with him, and
thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which,
though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them. His agonies,
when they are thus brought home to ourselves, when we have adopted
and made them our own, begin at last to affect us, and we then tremble
and shudder at the thought of what he feels.Ω
One notes how this passage ends in sketching out the grey areas of this
merging of self and other. This points to a key element in the problem-
atic examined in this study and which achieves full force in this concise
statement from Smith’s text: ‘‘Sympathy, therefore, does not arise so
much from the view of the passion, as from that of the situation which
excites it. We sometimes feel for another; because, when we put our-
selves in his case, that passion arises in our breast from the imagination,
though it does not in his from the reality.’’∞≠ We cannot be the other, but
we can try to imagine what her or his situation would make us feel like.
However, we then need to ask, on what basis do we assume to be able to
feel anything like they are feeling? What norms, assumptions, presump-
tions, what notions of mimesis, what norms of ‘‘human behavior’’ do we
intuitively draw on to make sense of our bold statement that ‘‘we feel
your pain’’? Let me be clear—I am not suggesting that we should or that
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we even could avoid such attempts at sympathy and empathy. My point,
rather, is to examine closely the ethical and political nature of those acts
of empathy, and conversely, those moments when we assume we cannot
‘‘relate.’’
These concerns are evident as well (though not expressed in that
fashion) in the social pragmatic of Smith’s treatise, which is made clear
in the title of section 1: ‘‘Of the Sense of Propriety.’’ The key use to which
these insights into sympathy are put is not unlike the one found in The
Rhetoric: emotions, intersubjective feeling, identification are all consid-
ered in light of what kinds of social norms need to be maintained among
individual emotions. Smith describes in detail how individual emotions
are to be contained and disciplined by social norms—without this mod-
eration, emotions can run amok in their excessive difference. And it is
precisely through a complex process of imagining what others might
think of our emotions that social emotional norms are installed in indi-
viduals. The following passage from The Theory of Moral Sentiments
reminds us not a little of Sartre’s notion of the ‘‘gaze’’: it is not that we
actually believe someone is looking at us and hence we adjust our
behavior, but rather that as social beings we have internalized the gaze of
others and act as if someone were always watching us, as through a
keyhole. Smith’s subject finds himself watching himself and ‘‘abating’’
the power of his emotions, abashedly, under the gaze of others.
As they are constantly considering what they themselves would feel, if
they actually were the sufferers, so he is constantly led to imagine
in what manner he would be affected if he was only one of the specta-
tors of his own situation. As their sympathy makes them look at it in
some measure with his eyes, so his sympathy makes him look at it, in
some measure, with theirs, especially when in their presence, and acting
under their observation: and, as the reflected passion which he thus
conceives is much weaker than the original one, it necessarily abates the
violence of what he felt before he came into their presence, before he
began to recollect in what manner they would be affected by it, and to
view his situation in this candid and impartial light.∞∞
All this is to enable the individual to ascertain the correct level at
which to express his emotions. As with Aristotle, this has a pragmatic
purpose—too much or too little will result in the individual not gaining
the empathy of his audience: ‘‘He can only hope to obtain this by
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lowering his passion to that pitch, in which the spectators are capable of
going along with him. He must flatten, if I may be allowed to say so, the
sharpness of its natural tone, in order to reduce it to harmony and
concord with the emotions of those who are about him.’’∞≤
Smith expresses the desired outcome of all this as being therapeutic
for the individual, emanating from a Freudian super-ego: ‘‘Society and
conversation, therefore, are the most powerful remedies for restoring
the mind to its tranquility.’’∞≥ And yet the barely concealed complement
to this curative imagined negotiation is also social tranquility. Individ-
ual emotions circulate dynamically and also smoothly; encounters, real
or imagined, with an other’s pain, suffering, joy, happiness are, after an
initial expansion, ultimately contracted, drawn back into the ‘‘proper’’
register. In the terms of this book, we find here a ‘‘delivery system’’: a
social discourse—that set of conventions for both communication and
behavior—creates and maintains norms that convert otherness to same-
ness. Extreme behavior on the part of the individual is tamped down
and readjusted to the system of behaviors and emotional expression
proper to society.
The Difference Requirement
The valuing of sameness in Aristotle and Smith contrasts sharply with
literature’s privileging of difference, which gives the literary work of art
an opposite role to play. Rather than holding to the values of rhetoric,
which relies on sameness to realize its persuasive force, or those of
Smith’s moral sentiments, which rely on sameness to understand and
facilitate practical moral action, or even those of Sorenson’s ‘‘preserva-
tion of the species’’ theory, in which sameness is required for the empa-
thy that will continue, precisely, ‘‘us,’’ literature is supposed to deliver us
out of our ‘‘comfort zone.’’ Literature has another purpose—to become
something else, something better: ‘‘The sole advantage in possessing
great works of literature lies in what they can help us become.’’∞∂
The tradition of regarding literature as a particularly powerful vehicle
for conveying a sense of another’s life, and of believing that being put in
touch with that dissimilar life is important for one’s moral growth, is
well established and specifically attached to realist narrative. One of the
most famous statements on the matter comes from George Eliot’s re-
view essay on The Natural History of German Life (1895).
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The greatest benefit we owe to the artist, whether painter, poet, or
novelist, is the extension of our sympathies. Appeals founded upon
generalizations and statistics require a sympathy ready-made, a moral
sentiment already in activity; but a picture of human life such as a great
artist can give, surprises even the trivial and the selfish into that atten-
tion to what is apart from themselves, which may be called the nearest
thing to life; it is a mode of amplifying experience and extending our
contact with our fellow-men beyond the bounds of our personal lot.∞∑
What is noteworthy here is the manner in which Eliot uses this distinc-
tion in tandem with another distinction, this time between two different
kinds of sympathy. Generalizations and statistics seem to belong to the
conventional, learned forms of moral sentiment—they produce predict-
able results.∞∏ Indeed, one almost gets the sense that they tap into a
universal affective register: when presented with this or that statistic,
one will likely react in this or that fashion, manifesting an already exist-
ing and eminently shared feeling. This is not so far from what we find in
Theory of Moral Sentiments, where Smith very plainly states the need to
‘‘abate’’ excessive and potentially damaging emotional expression in
order to adjust one’s emotional register to the social norm. However, the
picture shifts with Eliot’s discussion of ‘‘great’’ art.
In the case of great art, there is nothing ready-made, already existing,
part of a sentimental consensus, so to speak. Instead, we are presented
with something outside ourselves and outside our conventional be-
havior. This is a potent force, affecting ‘‘even the trivial,’’ even ‘‘the
selfish.’’ What are we presented with in great art, and why is this good?
What we obtain through reading is a life not like our own and a life
specifically beyond ‘‘our lot.’’ Not only does it not seem like what we
have experienced, it also comes from experiences that are not likely ever
to be ours at all. And that is the point of great art—it stirs in us a sense of
difference, and this difference, if delivered well, in turn prompts us to
reach beyond the ordinary sphere of our proper existence. This tran-
scendence leads to a deeper and broader sort of empathy. And at that
moment, we ‘‘become’’ something different, something inflected with
otherness.
One of the most notable contemporary proponents of this view is of
course Martha Nussbaum, who writes, ‘‘Literary works typically invite
their readers to put themselves in the place of people of many different
kinds.’’∞π Literature can help us appreciate ‘‘what is it like to live the life
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of another person who might, given changes in circumstance, be one-
self.’’∞∫ While there is an unmistakable liberal tone to all this—literature
puts us in touch with a wider range of experience, which causes us to be
more tolerant because we now understand the lives of others as being
imaginable as ours—there is also and no less a sense of acquisition and
agglomeration. We are getting more out of this encounter.
Indeed, these sentiments reach a crescendo in a passage from Wayne
Booth that sounds like nothing so much as the Twenty-third Psalm.
To dwell with you is to share the improvements you have managed to
make in your ‘‘self ’’ by perfecting your narrative world. You lead me first
to practice ways of living that are more profound, more sensitive, more
intense, and in a curious way more fully generous than I am likely to
meet anywhere else in the world. You correct my faults, rebuke my
insensitivities. You mold me into patterns of longing and fulfillment that
make my ordinary dreams seem petty and absurd.∞Ω
In each of these pronouncements we are led to the same conclusion—
great works of literature deliver difference, otherness, that which is
nonsimilar to us, all with the effect of making us better, richer, more
moral, more tolerant, more sensitive to the world and the lives it con-
tains. Critically, there seems to be a convergence of two different sorts of
otherness: literature presents the worlds of others to us, leading us
to inhabit those worlds and live those lives; concomitantly, the re-
presentation of this otherness is itself of a nature entirely different from
the world of experience, and while it brings us closer to others, it cannot
or does not reach complete deliverance, so to speak. It stands alongside,
or apart from, life. As Eliot puts it, it is ‘‘the nearest thing to life.’’ In that
sense, literature itself is otherness.
The Problem of Otherness
Even the most ardent proponents of the school that would have us read
the lives of others radically different from ourselves are confronted by an
essential problem: how much otherness is required? How much con-
founds us, rather than enriches us? How ‘‘different’’ can their ‘‘lot’’ be
from ours before it recedes into unintelligibility? We become caught in a
oscillating movement, identifying and de-identifying, weighing what we
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can, and cannot, learn from. The encounter provided by literary texts
involves both sameness and difference in an unpredictable relation. We
cannot know in advance what this ‘‘other’’ actually is, or the circum-
stances in which they find themselves. Both similarity and difference
may be deceptive, and in the working out of this ratio, we extend
generosity, empathy, pity, but also perhaps distain, even contempt. This
is not only, as Nussbaum says, ‘‘the political promise’’ of literature, but
also the political problematic of literature. When she says, ‘‘It is the
political promise of literature that it can transport us while remaining
ourselves, into the life of another, revealing similarities but also pro-
found differences between the life and thought of that other and myself
and making them comprehensible or at least more nearly comprehen-
sible,’’ the question I want to ask is, how are ‘‘they’’ comprehensible?≤≠ If
so, how so? How much? These are precisely political problems, and they
just grow larger when we take it to the next level—that of the effect that
this literary encounter is supposed to have on how we sense ourselves
anew in the world and how we act given this new sensibility.
The adjudication of how much otherness we need to encounter and
grapple with in order to be better people and how much will prove to be
our undoing is, again, both a logistical one and a political problem.
Booth himself finds a tension between otherness of a degree sufficient
to present the occasion for learning, growth, and revaluing the world,
and too much otherness. On the one hand, he openly acknowledges that
‘‘surely no beast [that] will prove genuinely other will fail to bite, and the
otherness that bites, the otherness that changes us, must have sufficient
definition, sufficient identity, to threaten us where we live.’’≤∞ Yet, on the
other hand, that threat has to be tamed. Four hundred pages later in his
stunning book, Booth admits, ‘‘I have had to play both sides of this
street throughout these chapters: we must both open ourselves to ‘oth-
ers’ that look initially dangerous or worthless, and yet prepare ourselves
to cast them off whenever, after keeping company with them, we con-
clude that they are potentially harmful.’’≤≤ Indeed, as Booth says, we are
playing both sides—of similarity of ‘‘situation’’ and lives beyond our lot.
The line between the requirements of, on the one hand, similarity
(rhetoric and Smith’s social theory) and, on the other hand, difference
(modern literature) is not at all as clear as I have initially drawn it, for
literature, it seems, demands both identification and difference at once.
We find a vacillating dynamic between empathy and critique, sameness
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and difference, that creates in the texts I examine a particular image of
what it is to live with others in the contemporary world.
Let me sum up what we’ve learned thus far and then offer another
possibility. First, there is the notion that we read to open ourselves to
experiences that are not ours and will most likely never be ours, but by
acknowledging that otherness as otherness, we both see its difference
from us and are thereby enriched, and we also appreciate the complexity
of the world. Second, there is the belief that we also may be presented
with an otherness that, as true and formidable otherness, knocks us off
our feet, sweeps away what Ricoeur calls ‘‘the stability of the same,’’ and
leaves us on the canvas. How to know when to keep reading and when to
close the book? The literary text will not tell us. It is itself of another
world and is not constrained to make sense in the ways we are used to
expecting of communicative objects. So why read?
Perhaps the search to find the ‘‘right’’ or necessary balance for the
encounter with otherness, along with the related issue of transparency of
meaning (‘‘Once I have established the necessary and tolerable balance
point of sameness/otherness, how do I know that I am actually under-
standing what is going on?’’), is indeed an abysmal task and a question
impossible to resolve. How does one codify and set conventions for
encounters with others? What protocols can anticipate every kind of
meeting between such vaguely defined entities as ‘‘same’’ and ‘‘other’’?
I suggest that rather than focusing entirely on meaning-making, and
whether we get it or not, we should think of how literature engenders a
space for imagining our relation to others and thinking through why and
how that relation exists, historically, politically, ideologically. This in
turn creates new forms of narration and representation, which I will put
forward in analyses of four novels. Reading with this in mind would
attempt to ascertain how and why our relationship to others is not
natural or immutable, but rather the result of a number of complex and
often contradictory forces, some that draw us closer, others that drive us
apart. Notions of radical alterity are herein considered just as tentative
as notions of universalism and unproblematic commonality. Ethically
and politically we can imagine—indeed, we must imagine—that the les-
sening of otherness can be and is often not only desirable but also
necessary—in fact, it happens all the time (and is often called coalition
politics, or politics in general)—and that encountering difficult things
can be crippling, again, not only spiritually but politically as well.
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Put concisely, there is no way to say in advance what the proper
response to alterity should be or what would be the grounds on which
to judge the proper or complete deciphering of meaning. Rather, it is
important to turn our attention to the purchase we make in the names
of sameness, otherness, commonality, radical incommensurability, and
so on. This gesture might well be called deconstructive. And it is in a
careful attention to a newly invented, contemporary literary form that
such imaginings and meditations are made possible, as the literary text,
in refusing or at least deferring meaning, gives us pause to see more
precisely our relationship to others—what enables or disables certain
modes of connection and meaning-making. We should better attend to
the historicity and contingency of social and collective identities as
precisely intersections of both proximate and distant identities. The
task is not only to measure the distance, but also to try to account for it.
Literature, and more specifically reading literature, helps us fess up to
our standards of measurement, our yardsticks, because the text takes us
outside our usual habitations of meaning, sense-making, self-assurance.
In this process, the way literature comes to be written in different,
difficult ways shows its elastic powers, but also its breaking points.
Sometimes the system is overwhelmed by the task of delivering too
much otherness, of reconciling radically disparate actions that can-
not be made into sense. We then are forced to ask why and how we set
those limits.
For example, I regularly teach a course titled ‘‘Comparative Fictions
of Ethnicity,’’ in which we read a number of different narratives, many
autobiographical; we discuss how the authors articulate the idea of
ethnic identity. We consider things like the difference genre makes when
we read John Wideman’s Brothers and Keepers, which vacillates between
the voice of the award-winning novelist John and his attempts to repre-
sent the voice of his convict brother, Robby, who is serving a life sen-
tence for murder. We talk about how this attempt to convey otherness
challenges the author to both convey it and let it remain a place of
incommensurable difference. Having the class accept that doubleness
was hard enough. But then we turned to read an autobiography titled
Restavec, by a Haitian man named Jean-Robert Cadet. Cadet was born
the bastard child of a Haitian prostitute and one of her white French
clients. The narrative is harrowing, dwelling in poverty and disgrace and
loathing and illiteracy. It is crudely written, and while we might sym-
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pathize with the author, a real experiential distance is insisted on, mak-
ing identification impossible. He comes to the United States, but no
immigrant narrative of self-improvement takes place. After he enlists, he
finds comradeship among African American servicemen, but he in-
forms on them after they start smoking dope. How is this an admirable
character? Many in the class simply hated the novel, despite all my
attempts to get them to suspend their assumptions about what made a
good piece of writing.
I could have insisted that the students read the story closely, and I
did, but the usual way of reading for content left them unenthused. A
different world was depicted in Restavec, and they didn’t like it, and
they were glad Cadet’s lot was not theirs. I changed tack, asking them
to consider what this dissonance could tell us about our relationship
to otherness, to consider how that relationship was not inevitable, to
consider what assumptions about narrative, about value, about ethics,
about what a family is, about what an immigrant narrative was were
overturned, or at least stymied, by Cadet’s book, by both its form
and content.
Yet the questions raised by this particular classroom experience—
which, I think one has to admit, are often ours as well as we encounter
particularly ‘‘difficult’’ texts—force us to revisit Aristotle, Smith, and
others who place such emphasis on the notion that the situation of the
character, speaker, audience, reader, and so on is the determining factor
of the degree of empathy available and the launching point of the imagi-
nation as well, that is, that we must be able to imagine being in another’s
situation, and that imagining itself will then spur our imaginations in
new directions. And literature ups the ante. In it, we are no longer
seeking only common ground—situations we, too, might find ourselves
in—but now also situations beyond our individual lots. This, again, is
the oscillating dynamic engendered and problematized by literature.
Furthermore, the degree to which these ‘‘situations’’ are similar or not
is hard to discern these days, precisely because ‘‘globalization’’ seems
to have ‘‘flattened’’ things out such that significant (in the minds of
Friedman and his disciples) markers of difference no longer remain.
More important, perhaps, the ‘‘situations’’ others find themselves in
are often regarded by inhabitants of the First World, northern hemi-
spheric regions as either indecipherable or negligible, that is to say, they
are either beyond our ken, too saturated with difference, or that differ-
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ence is not insurmountable under the logic of what I am calling our
contemporary ‘‘delivery systems.’’ These systems either finally relin-
quish the notion of commonality and consider these particularly obdu-
rate others to be unassimilable to our logic and reason, or they winnow
out difference and bring the other to us in some now recognizable form.
My focus thus shifts from the enrichment literature is supposed to bring
into our lives by presenting us with the lives of others, and the sup-
posedly enhanced empathetic powers it gives us, to the grounds on
which we strike that encounter—how are such terms as same and dif-
ferent secured?
Both Aristotle and Smith, in their respective domains, consider situa-
tions to be critical for self-other identifications, but both are vague as to
what would qualify as a situation. Does it simply refer to a plot element,
like the loss of a parent or a perceived injustice? If so, how much detail
has to be omitted for the situation to be general enough to solicit
identification? In the next section I connect this problem to the ways in
which contemporary thinkers have revisited Smith and deployed the
imagination as the faculty by which to see in another’s life a ‘‘situation’’
that one might find oneself in, but in these cases that act of imagination
is anchored in global material history, ethical action, and political prac-
tice. In the same spirit I examine closely the dynamic between the self
and ‘‘others’’ (both in terms of characters and ‘‘other’’ situations) as read
against and delivered through ready-made, already existing codified
structures, discourses, and institutions. More specifically, I am inter-
ested in the ways certain assumptions about ‘‘all people’’ are embedded
and manifested in institutional practices, and, critically, how literary
narratives both comment on these assumptions and present variants,
countermodels, critiques that thereby challenge ‘‘global’’ conceptualiza-
tions of ‘‘we humans.’’ This has, of course, a powerful effect on how we
perceive others and act toward and with them.
Rethinking ‘‘Situation,’’ Delivering across Structures
Richard Sennett’s study of respect, Respect in a World of Inequality,
draws on the sociological work of C. Wright Mills and Hans Gerth in an
important manner. Specifically, he notes how their idea of ‘‘character’’ is
based on ‘‘a person’s communication with others through shared ‘social
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instruments’—laws, rituals, the media, codes of religious beliefs, politi-
cal doctrines.’’≤≥ For Mills and Gerth, character ‘‘is a capacity to engage
the larger world which defines a person’s character; character can be
thought of as the relational side of personality, and transcends the
dictum that only face-to-face relations are emotionally gripping.’’≤∂ We
might thus trace the formation of literary ‘‘characters’’ as developing
from the mobilization and instrumentalization of these and other dis-
courses and belief systems, not only as they interact with these struc-
tures and systems as individuals, but also as they interact with dis-
tant others in non-face-to-face encounters and imaginings, having these
structures and discursive systems as mediating forms. We can thus have
a clearer sense of not only how but also why others differ from us, or not,
and when, precisely, we are to award ‘‘respect.’’
This question is especially difficult, and important, when it comes to
globalization. Luc Boltanski’s study of ‘‘distant others’’ makes this espe-
cially clear. He declares that in today’s world ‘‘distance is a fundamental
dimension of politics which has the specific task of a unification which
overcomes dispersion.’’≤∑ This ‘‘dispersion’’ is precisely the disunified
world, the nonequivalent material histories of those unlike (to one
degree or another) ourselves. Politics must bring together particular
(and particularly different) situations, conveying them across a dis-
tance. And yet while Boltanski is emphatic about the need for an ‘‘imagi-
nary demonstration’’ of unfortunates, he is scrupulously wary of this
process. He notes two contradictory requirements: ‘‘On the one hand
there is a requirement of impartiality, detachment (no prior commit-
ment) and a distinction between the moment of observation, that is to
say, of knowledge, and the moment of action. This requirement points
towards the possibility of generalisation. On the other hand there is a
requirement of affective, sentimental or emotional investment which is
needed to arouse political commitment.’’≤∏ In other words, the lives and
situations of others have to be regarded impartially, lest the prejudices,
desires, blind spots of the observer skew her reading and assessment and
actions one way or the other. But at the same time, regarding the other
at such a distance might well obviate any affect, affect that would be
necessary to compel the observer to act. We need both—but how can
we arrive at a noncontradictory formula? Once again we find the fluc-
tuation between identification and disidentification.
In order to get out of this quandary, Boltanski marshals forward two
concepts. The first is ‘‘aperspectival objectivity’’:
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The relevance of the demand for public speech is due to the existence of
a public sphere which is progressively constituted along with the con-
ception of a politics of pity such that it is sometimes difficult to separate
historically the two analytically distinct processes. The constitution of a
public sphere and a definition of political legitimacy based on a concep-
tion of objectivity that emphasizes the possibility of an observation
without any particular perspective are strictly interdependent. We know
today that, among other possible conceptions of objectivity, this con-
ception [aperspectival objectivity] which is often associated with the
development of the sciences, and of the experimental sciences in par-
ticular, actually originates in the political and moral philosophy of the
eighteenth century—from where science will take it fifty years later—
and especially in Adam Smith’s attempt to reconstruct morality, to-
gether with the foundations of a morally acceptable politics, around the
double figure of an unfortunate and an impartial spectator who ob-
serves him from a distance. Thus we turn now to an examination of the
relationship between public sphere, spectacle, and aperspectival objec-
tivity. We will then take up again the position of the spectator and
endeavour to understand how we might reduce the tension between the
demand for public speech and the prohibition of a description without
perspective.≤π
What Boltanski is seeking is a way to affect and leave open the pos-
sibility for public speech, a source of authorizing such an activity even as
the constraint of objectivity remains. But if we are talking about ‘‘aper-
spectival’’ objectivity, then from where does the voice make its utter-
ance, and, concomitantly, what kind of space is imagined in which that
voice is heard? Boltanski remains within this spatial metaphor (of loca-
tion, direction, perspective) to articulate his response to those contra-
dictory demands.
Coupled with aperspectival objectivity we find something different,
something deeply rooted to the subjective and now seen to enable
an ethical intersubjectivity—it is the imagination, but the imagination
tethered in a particular way.
The obstacle this distance creates can be overcome by means of a
faculty however: the imagination. In the original situation the spectator
is not involved in the scene of suffering he observes. Like the specta-
tor affected by the sentiment of the sublime in the account given by
Burke . . . , he is sheltered and fears nothing for himself. It is by incor-
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porating distance that the possibility of aesthetic sentiments and moral
sentiments (still partially mixed up with each other in Hutcheson) must
be understood. In Smith, as in Hume, distance is overcome by a deliber-
ate act of imagination. The spectator represents to himself the senti-
ments and sensations of the suffering. He does not identify with him
and does not imagine himself to be in the same situation. As Smith
remarks in the chapter of The Theory of Moral Sentiments in which
he criticizes Hobbes and Mandeville, the spectator imagines what the
woman in child-bed may feel, but does not imagine himself actually in
the process of giving birth, and this excludes a Hobbesian interpretation
of pity which is based upon the possibility of experiencing the same-
reversals of fortune oneself and consequently on selfish interest. The
mediation of the imagination is important because it supports the moral
and social edifice without recourse to communal identification or to an
Edenic fusion.≤∫
What we find is not a focus on ‘‘fusion,’’ the evaporation of the walls that
separate self and others, but rather a meditation on the mediation of
that relationship. That meditation is imaginative, but not fantastic. It
takes into consideration the real, material circumstances in which the
event is embedded and reflects back on the relation the sufferer and the
observer have to it. This meditation takes place within an engagement—
various forms of communication, among which is literature.
In order for imagination to play its role in the coordination of emotional
commitments, different persons must be able to nourish their imagina-
tion from the same source. To illustrate this topic, Smith frequently
refers to works of fiction and, in particular, to the feelings inspired in us
by the heroes of tragedies and romances.≤Ω In an article devoted to the
links between impartiality, imagination and compassion, Adrian Piper
calls modal imagination that ability to imagine what is impossible and
not only what actually exists (or what has been directly experienced),
and he considers this ability indispensable to the formation and sharing
of pity in the face of the suffering of someone else.≥≠ To understand this
ability we must have recourse to the ‘‘forms of expression’’ of myths,
tales, historical narratives, novels, autobiographies, songs, films, tele-
vision reports or fictions, etc., in which in particular we find descriptions
of the internal states of other people to which we can have no direct
access and which by that fact nourish the imagination of spectators when
faced with distant suffering.≥∞
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Once again it is precisely the imagination that fills the gap between self
and other; specifically, the imagination seems to finesse the require-
ment that, on the one hand, the situation of the other be imaginable to
the self for its own habitation, and, on the other hand, that the situation
of the other be beyond our lot. Once again, literature tests the condi-
tions of each side of the coin, and I once again maintain the political
ramifications of this vacillation. I return to the mediation of the discur-
sive and material systems that argue that they can ‘‘deliver’’ others to us
in a less problematic fashion. Contemporary literature, read in the ways
I will suggest and illustrate, says that it’s not that easy, these days. I will
specify a set of frames of reference, frames that seem to be neutral and
natural, disclosing a common ‘‘form’’ of all human beings. I examine
literary works of fiction to show how literature, read with specific ideas
in mind, elaborates, extends, complicates, redefines, and sometimes
even explodes these common forms as it discloses the poetics and
politics of the vacillation between self and other across and in these
delivery systems.
In what follows I show how discursive ‘‘delivery systems’’ precisely
imagine relations between selves and others, and then how their rela-
tively simple systems become less and less firm and stable as they inter-
act with, and try to accommodate, a more radical sense of otherness
produced in contemporary historical contexts. For example, I consider
how, after all, one of the main things that is said to distinguish human
beings from other living creatures is that we possess rationality, that is,
that we can process the world and reflect on our place in it. Importantly,
we can make choices informed by that rationality. So doesn’t ‘‘reason’’
provide us with an empirically verifiable commonness, and aren’t ra-
tional systems that work equally well for all people proof again of that
common ground? If we can bracket all those minor differences that
might complicate the system—like history, culture, gender, race—then
we should have a powerfully efficient way of talking to each other and
negotiating our preferences. But that pure formula for economic be-
havior, which I take as my example here, becomes sorely tested when
different notions about rationality and reason start to compromise that
model, and that splitting apart is evident in the very world of language
saturated with the voices of newly enfranchised others.
I examine the notion that all human behavior can be understood
according to notions of reason and rationality in chapter 1, ‘‘When
Otherness Overcomes Reason.’’ In it I counterpose the powerful for-
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mula of ‘‘economic behavior’’ that we find in rational choice theory to
the history of literary realism, specifically as it has involved the incor-
poration of new, diverse, ‘‘other’’ peoples. How have both our ideas of
rational choice and action and our modes of presenting them in litera-
ture been disrupted by new populations? After providing a short discus-
sion of rationality, rational choice, and literary realism, I move to a
discussion of how in his novel Elizabeth Costello J. M. Coetzee poses
rationality and choice as the linchpins of the realist novel, then proceeds
to methodically dismantle them, exposing them to ever increasing doses
of otherness, the otherness of the anti-aesthetic, the otherness of the
nonhuman, the otherness of race. The paradox here is how literature
can both present radical otherness and simultaneously be disarmed by
it. Following up on the questions ‘‘How much otherness is required for
literature to have any traction at all, and how much pushes it over the
edge?,’’ in this novel the answers to both are presented. The response
proffered by Elizabeth Costello puts into crisis not only literature, but
also literature’s ethical purpose (presenting the reader with otherness
and thereby widening her or his moral scope). If in Elizabeth Costello
the specifics of history and politics are muted, taking a back seat to a
discussion of aesthetics and ethics, Coetzee’s explicitly historical and
political novel, Disgrace, echoes exactly these issues in its representation
of and meditation on the new South Africa and the precise moment
when the balance of power shifts toward newly enfranchised blacks.
In chapter 2, ‘‘Whose Story Is It?,’’ I turn to the family, writ both at
the local and national levels, and see what happens when strangers,
particularly strangers of different races, enter and insinuate themselves
into these domestic spaces, both forming a common bond and yet
destabilizing as well those alliances built into family structures. In these
microcommunal spaces we are formed and act as subjects; ‘‘family val-
ues’’ are persistently alluded to for both the consensus they seem to
bring forward from national audiences that hear them every election
year, and the assumed transparency they evoke between the two scales
of social organization—what goes on in the family is a smaller version of
our national sense of belonging. But what happens when that common
ground of empathy and cohesion is shot through with otherness, and
the family drawn into a destructive yet inevitable relation with the
political world in the public domain? In chapter 2 I offer a reading of a
second South African novel, Nadine Gordimer’s My Son’s Story, wherein
Introduction 23
the empathetic is split and fissured, demanded at multiple and contra-
dictory levels, as the characters meditate on what holds new others to
themselves, and how familiar people, so similar to themselves, have
become alienated from them. Politics, gender, sexuality, and race all act
in concert to problematize this thing called coalition politics. In the end,
it is art that takes on, perhaps reluctantly, the task of reunifying and
conveying to the outside the new political world after apartheid.
The irony of My Son’s Story is that the story is told predominantly
from the point of view of the son, not the father. So why isn’t it titled,
simply, My Story? Gordimer asks precisely these questions: how do
stories circulate? Who takes ownership of them? How do they pass
through this otherness, and to what effect? The protagonists of this
novel are drawn together, despite differences of gender, class, age, and
race, by three common interests, interests that are counterposed to each
other: that of the family (and, by extension, the national collective), that
of sexual desire, and that of the political (specifically, liberation poli-
tics). The suppression and resurgence of difference under the force of
family loyalties, sexual desire, and liberation politics is presented via
very precise literary structure, language, and emplotment. I look care-
fully at the ways Gordimer, in her public speeches, in her literary essays,
and in this novel, outlines the hazards and necessity of crossing racial
lines during this period of uncertain historical shift, what she calls,
borrowing from Antonio Gramsci, ‘‘the interregnum.’’ It is precisely the
period with which Coetzee is concerned in Disgrace. But I argue that
the resolutions of the two novels are different in very important ways.
Whereas Coetzee seems to give up on realism, as the new historical
context has eroded the foundations of such a concept, Gordimer’s skep-
ticism gives way to a bifurcation of art and political action, assigning
each different roles.
My third example, Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go, comes from the
world of the body, and biotechnical and educational systems. Again, we
all seem to have corporeal forms that are not radically different. There is
enough commonness that medical students can use the same models to
learn the basic ways to diagnose and treat human bodies. But what
happens when the seemingly unbreachable ‘‘self ’’ of the individual hu-
man body gets intruded on by another’s body, part of which is inserted
into one’s own for the sake of one’s very life? Here we are talking about
organ transplants, as well as the delivery system that sets up that point
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of exchange—the industry for organ harvesting, and the biotechnologi-
cal, pharmaceutical, and medical systems that deliver an organ to its
new body.
In chapter 3, ‘‘Art: A Foreign Exchange,’’ I critique Never Let Me Go,
a sinister and morbid story of human cloning and unintended self-
sacrifice. Parts of bodies are intermingled, organs harvested and re-
planted in a radical and ethically problematic ‘‘encounter’’ with other-
ness. This particular delivery system has immediate connections to
both life and death. I look at how historical changes in medical tech-
nologies have changed the barriers between discrete bodies, and how
that technology opens up new understandings and imaginings of not
only being with other bodies, but also sharing bodies. I draw on medical
history and ethics, as well as the philosophy of Jean-Luc Nancy and his
remarkable essay on his own heart transplant, and compare its handling
of such concerns with that of Ishiguro’s novel. Yet even as we may be
seduced by the novel’s wild and wrenching plotline, and its seeming
artlessness (it is presented as simply the remembrances of a schoolgirl),
it turns out that Art is everything. It is both the sign of humanness and a
token of redemption.
Ishiguro himself makes this point, time and again, in his remarks on
the novel; for him, the story he tells in the novel presents not an apoca-
lyptic picture of an inhuman and dehumanizing brave new world, but
rather an argument that art can save us from even the worst horror
imaginable. I account for this discrepancy by bringing to the fore one
key idea found in both the novel and in Ishiguro’s pronouncements on
its composition—the idea of the contingency of history, and the ways in
which such contingency informs what we call ‘‘moral luck.’’ Ishiguro’s
famous notion is that there are no bad people, only people born with an
ethical system out of step with their historical age. I use Never Let Me Go
to explore this notion and the moral conundrum it offers. And just as
in Coetzee and Gordimer, the deliverance of others is contingent on
history; where in the latter cases this involved the rupture in apart-
heid, in Ishiguro it involves biomedical breakthroughs. In each instance,
interaction with others is radically altered, and ethical choices are put
into crisis.
This focus on art becomes more complicated in chapter 4, ‘‘Pacific
Oceanic Feeling: Affect, Otherness, Mediation.’’ The source text for this
chapter is the novel My Year of Meats, by the Japanese American author
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and filmmaker Ruth Ozeki. I tackle the issue of mass communication
and advertising, tracing how their particular schematizations of literacy,
desire, need, and behavior may be read in cross-cultural and gendered
manners, seeing how emotions and affect are wielded trans-Pacifically. I
show in particular how Ozeki’s novel and her film, Body of Correspon-
dence, share common concerns about affect and media. If we largely
know the world via mass media, how do the various delivery systems of
literature and television interact with the economic? In My Year of
Meats, the economic is explicitly set forward in long disquisitions about
the meat industry and pharmaceuticals, and I connect Ozeki’s concern
with the transnational Body that ingests these commonly circulating
and affecting materials to Ishiguro’s poetics and ethics of the body. I
place the penultimate phrase of Ozeki’s novel, ‘‘that is the modern thing
to do,’’ into strict scrutiny as a way to reflect back on all of the chapters of
this study—what is the status of the modern, of the realist novel, of the
pre-parcelized human body in today’s world and, specifically, in today’s
literature? How can we retain, or restore even, a sense of ethics that both
respects otherness and understands its complex residence in ‘‘common
ground’’? How can we then reimagine our own place there? In the
conclusion I elaborate the question of contemporary forms of com-
munication and make the case that it is a reading practice that can best
help us maintain a critical eye toward the discursive production of
‘‘sameness’’ and ‘‘otherness,’’ and the consequences thereof.
Let me here briefly allude to the essay that I treat at length in chapter
3, Jean-Luc Nancy’s ‘‘The Intruder.’’ In this essay, Nancy begins by
remarking on how he owes his very life to the fact that when his heart
failed, medical science had opened up a ‘‘slot’’ of technological possibili-
ties that included life-saving transplant techniques: ‘‘Less than twenty
years ago, one didn’t graft, especially not with the use of cyclosporin,
which protects against the rejection of the graft. Twenty years from now,
it will certainly be a matter of another sort of graft, with other methods.
A personal contingency thus crosses a contingency in the history of
techniques. In an earlier age, ‘I’ would be dead; in the future, I would be
a survivor by some other means. But always, ‘I’ finds itself tightly packed
into a narrow slot of technical possibilities.’’≥≤
In this volume I look at precisely the slot that is opened at a particular
moment in South African political history, that liminal period that saw
blacks and whites draw together in ways that put unprecedented pres-
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sure on racial, political, and family loyalties, of inherited notions of ‘‘us’’
and ‘‘them.’’ Coetzee parallels that historical moment by looking at the
tectonic shift that is created by conceptually and ethically displacing the
animal-human binary, wherein the ‘‘nonhuman,’’ marked by its lack of
reason, becomes less and less alien, and the possession of ‘‘reason’’ a
more and more problematic definition of humankind. Gordimer’s text
looks at how that same moment in South African history affected no-
tions of gender, sexuality, and the family, as the barriers between black
and white, public and private, opened up. In Ishiguro and Nancy, bio-
technology and bioeconomies come to open up the heretofore sacro-
sanct human body to synthetic (re)production and commodification;
within this ‘‘slot,’’ new possibilities of human trading in otherness, now
converted to sameness, takes place unfettered by ethics and barely rep-
resentable in the literary imagination. Finally, Ozeki’s text places us in
an era wherein affect is delivered globally via new hybrid media that
breach the barriers between private and public, information and enter-
tainment, text and image and sound. Given the ‘‘information age,’’ what
kind of glossy screen flattens our senses of dimension, depth, character
into eminently substitutable data? How does the common digital de-
nominator slot us into software-guided ‘‘social networks’’?
Fundamentally, I am drawn back to this question: if literary narratives
can still help us imagine others across global discourses regarding the
commonly held properties of human beings (the mind, the heart, and
the body), can they also exceed the ways those specific modes deter-
mine the shape and form of understanding, and, if so, does that offer us
any greater or more potent way of not only imagining, but also thinking
through being together in the world? How can we see both ‘‘others’’ and
ourselves differently, in ways that live up to the promise and rationale
for reading literature, at all? In that sense, we come back to and remain
with the idea that literature itself is a kind of otherness, something that
is, as George Eliot says, the ‘‘closest thing to life,’’ but not life itself. It is
precisely that empathetic, imaginative, and critical relation to that thing
outside itself that literature rehearses and models for our own selves.
∞
When Otherness Overcomes Reason
Realism is an issue not only for literature; it is a major political, philo-
sophical and practical issue that must be handled and explained as
such—as a matter of general human interest.—bertolt brecht,
‘‘On the Formalistic Character of the Theory of Realism,’’ 1938
There is first of all the problem of the opening, namely, how to get us
from where we are, which is, as yet, nowhere, to the far bank. It is a
simple bridging problem, a problem of knocking together a bridge.
People solve such problems every day. They solve them, and having
solved them push on.—j. m. coetzee, Elizabeth Costello
Precisely by drawing together the issues of literary realism and ra-
tionality we can get at the issues that Brecht notes: realism is attached to
notions of how things work, or don’t, how decisions to act in certain
ways are motivated by particular forces and have specific effects that are
of ‘‘general’’ human interest; it involves, as Coetzee says, not only getting
from A to B, but also situating ourselves ‘‘some place’’ in the first place,
to occupy a position from which to act. If we are successful, and do
move from A to B, we are then enabled and encouraged to ‘‘move on’’ in
life, dealing with the world according to those assumptions. Analysis of
literary realism allows us to diagnose the reputed commonality of be-
havior, how different people might act in concert with others, but also,
this literature, as literature, contains a critical, self-reflective element.
If literature has been charged with delivering the lives of others to
us for our enrichment and betterment, how, if at all, does this new other-
ness change our assumptions about what is realistic, about what is
common to all human beings in their behaviors, choices, actions, judg-
ments? Finally, does otherness challenge not only our assumptions
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about how people act in common, in accordance with the protocols of
rationality and realism to get from A to B, but also our ability to repre-
sent the real world?
Martha Nussbaum is one of the most prominent contemporary advo-
cates of the idea that literature should present us with the lives of others
unlike ourselves in order that we may have a fuller understanding of
both ourselves and our world. It is no coincidence that the literary
examples that she uses are exclusively drawn from realist literature, and
this choice of literary genre is indeed shared by most of the proponents
of the movement that we can call ‘‘ethics in literature.’’ For them, realist
literature attempts to describe a world directly, and to describe not only
the lives of others in details that we can recognize as part of that larger,
shared world, but also how they think, feel, and act in it. The choices
they make are reflections of values, capacities, desires, needs. The ques-
tions then become whether these needs are shared, whether the choices
‘‘they’’ make are the ones ‘‘we’’ would have. Realist literature, for these
critics, is the genre most concerned with the issues of representing
otherness accurately, as set within worlds that ground others in our
world. The other is delivered to us on that common ground.
In contrast, J. M. Coetzee’s novel Elizabeth Costello declares itself as
part of a postrealist era: things no longer lead inevitably to certain
effects; people do not behave in ways that reflect a common rationality
that can be transferred from one situation to the other. Just to get by in
life seems more difficult precisely because those sequences, those causes
and effects, no longer seem to work in tandem. ‘‘Bridges’’ are now fragile
things, if they exist at all. Issues of reason, of judgment, of values and
their achievement—things intimately attached to the genre of realist
literature—now seem impossible to deal with, once the scaffolding of
‘‘realism’’ is found to be unreliable. The political, philosophical, and
practical issues of which Brecht speaks are all now stalled, if not de-
stroyed. Why has this happened? What has brought about this inability
to successfully plot future action?
Elizabeth Costello is an example of what happens when, ironically,
language is too common, shared by too many undifferentiated people
and things, when reason and rationality are flawed and irregular. Other-
ness, the very thing that we look to realist literature to deliver to us,
causes this paralysis. More precisely, it is otherness of a degree that is
fatal to the realist project, and possibly to the project of ethics and
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literature. However, I do not advocate a move to postmodern literature.
That may, or may not, solve the problem. Rather, I want to see if any
literary narrative can be read in such a way as to both recognize the
problem of too much otherness, which instantiates a difference that
goes beyond a single, binding realism, and offer insight to an uncom-
monality that is understood through the uneven effects of what I have
named global ‘‘delivery systems.’’ In this way, the fraying of the fabric of
reality and reason brought about by an overload of otherness lays bare
the inadequacy of these delivery systems, which count on commonality
and the suppression of difference to function. How have their attempts
to make the heterogeneous homogeneous failed, unable to constrain
and neutralize that difference, and what are some of the consequences
of this implosion?
Before turning to realist literature, I briefly consider rational choice
theory, for this theory is premised on a highly influential formula that
informs the ways many in the fields of economics, political science,
psychology, and sociology think about human behavior, and can be seen
as an illuminating project outside literature. Those who subscribe to
rational choice theory believe that in it we have a tool for understanding
how all human beings, regardless of race, culture, gender, age, make
choices: rational choice theory posits a human commonality based on
reason and its deployment. According to this theory, people will not
only build bridges from here to there in a similar fashion, but will also, in
fact, see the need for bridges similarly and use them in similar ways.
They will, in short, see the world of choice and action, and behave in it
in accord with the same formula. Their stories, therefore, may be under-
stood as logically adhering to, or departing from, this basic formula of
rational choice-making. The connection between rational choice the-
ory and notions of storytelling, of accounting for behavior, is not hard to
see, and I will touch briefly on the nexus of these two subjects as they
appear in the work of Reid Hastie and Jon Elster.
I then discuss how storytelling attempts to ‘‘bridge’’ the distance
between self and other via the particular language of literary realism.
After a longer discussion of what, exactly, literary realism is with specific
regard to otherness, I turn to the novel itself for what I will call the dis-
ruption of literary realism by excessive otherness. In Elizabeth Costello
the nostalgia for realism and the diagnosis of its aftermath is brought on
by too high a degree of otherness, which invades and overcomes the
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novel and the bounds of literary realism. I locate the crisis of representa-
tion brought about by the overflow of otherness at a precise historical
moment created by technological and industrial change that exerts
great pressure on the line of otherness between the human and nonhu-
man in critical manners. I conclude by examining the political and
historical ramifications of this crisis of representation, tracing that prob-
lematic in another novel by Coetzee, Disgrace.
Rational Choice and the Imagination
If by ‘‘globalization’’ we mean a newly extensive and intensive con-
nectedness between formerly remote or disconnected peoples, then
certainly notions of such things as a ‘‘global economy,’’ ‘‘world culture,’’
and ‘‘human interaction’’ have to be newly assessed. Our customary
tools for comprehending and representing human behavior, both in the
social sciences and the humanities, no longer have the luxury of focus-
ing only on discrete and separate objects, phenomena, and behaviors,
since these are now mingling and cross-referencing each other in un-
precedented and sometimes discrepant manners. Ironically, knowledge
of others appears to have become only more problematic in an age when
the distance between others is continually shrinking.
Yet for some, especially those social scientists predisposed toward
rational choice theory, the matter seems uncomplicated. For instance,
Gary Becker writes,
The combined assumptions of maximizing behavior, market equilib-
rium, and stable preferences, used relentlessly and unflinchingly, form
the heart of the economic approach. . . . I have come to the position that
the economic approach is a comprehensive one that is applicable to all
human behavior, be it behavior involving money prices or imputed
shadow prices, repeated or infrequent decisions, large or minor deci-
sions, emotional or mechanical ends, rich or poor persons, men or
women, adults or children, brilliant or stupid persons, patients or thera-
pists, businessmen or politicians, teachers or students.∞
In short, the ‘‘economic approach’’ would seem to overcome the unruli-
ness of difference, subordinating it to a universally applicable analytic.
Peter Abell presents a useful sketch of rational choice theory in rela-
tion to sociology. As he describes it, rational choice theory strives ‘‘to
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understand individual actors (which in specified circumstances may be
collectivities of one sort or another) as acting, or more likely interact-
ing, in a manner such that they can be deemed to be doing the best they
can for themselves, given their objectives, resources, and circumstances,
as they see them.’’≤ Jon Elster argues,
Ideally, a fully satisfactory rational-choice explanation of an action
would have the following structure. It would show that the action is
the (unique) best way of satisfying the full set of the agent’s desires,
given the (uniquely) best beliefs the agent could form, relatively to the
(uniquely determined) optimal amount of evidence. We may refer to
this as the optimality part of the explanation. In addition the explanation
would show that the action was caused (in the right way) by the desires
and beliefs, and the beliefs caused (in the right way) by consideration of
the evidence. We may refer to this as the causal part of the explanation.
These two parts together yield a first-best rational-choice explanation of
the action.≥
He continues, however, by saying that ‘‘the optimality part by itself
yields a second-best explanation, which, however, for practical purposes
may have to suffice, given the difficulty of access to the psychic causality
of the agent.’’∂ This qualification is important, for my purpose is not
to test out rational choice theory as a particular delivery system, but
rather to examine the overlap between notions of rational behavior and
choice-making, and the imagination and fiction.
While Barthes portrays realist literature as certainly partaking of this
formula for moving forward, emphasizing the action- and decision-
driven motion of narrative, he notes as well: ‘‘The general structure of
narrative, at least as this has been analyzed at one time or another up to
the present, appears essentially predictive. . . . It can be said that, at each
juncture of the narrative syntax, someone says to the hero (or to the
reader, it does not matter which): if you act this way, if you choose this
alternative, then this is what will happen,’’ it is precisely the ‘‘psychic
causality of the agent,’’ so opaque within the operations of rational
choice theory, that, ‘‘exogeneously,’’ literature may be able to explore in
its complexity and dimensionality.∑ Otherwise, if ‘‘economic behavior’’
is shared by all humans in all endeavors, then how can literature do
anything but record the ceaseless rehearsal of the same formula, perhaps
with minor variations? It is in what is necessarily absented from the
calculations of rational choice theory that a literary account takes over,
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in the realm of the psychology of the other, in her or his reasons for
different kinds of choices, based on perhaps different sorts of rationality
and imagination.
In the process of choice-making, one of the main elements is informa-
tion. We need a certain amount of information on which to base our
choices. But from where do we derive this information? Aside from
objective sources of information, we also draw on our memory and
imagination. And our imagination is of course not completely unan-
chored from reality; we cannot simply imagine any kind of information
as being valuable. In fact too much information (like too much other-
ness) clouds the vision. On the other hand, having too narrow a scope
of imagination can also be detrimental—we cannot make an ‘‘informed’’
choice. Thus information (data) and the imagination (which data are
visible, viable) are joined together in rational choice-making.
If this is inevitable, Hastie notes that therein lie some serious prob-
lems: ‘‘Availability to the imagination influences the estimates of fre-
quency. The problem that arises, just as with the availability of actual
instances in our experience or availability of vicarious instances, is that
this availability is determined by many factors other than actual fre-
quency. It is quite clear that sometimes the thinking is ‘easier’ than
others and some ideas ‘come to mind’ more readily than others.’’∏ In
other words, as we attempt to make our choices, we may well draw on
information in very particular and perhaps unreasonable ways. What do
we imagine can happen (predictably) if we choose this course of action?
What are the chances our choice will yield this or that result? This is not
an idle speculation—it is a basic risk that informs choice-making. Right
or wrong, we tend to be swayed by what seems a plausible narrative,
what is ‘‘available’’ to our imagination about the world around us.
Critically, Hastie notes, ‘‘Scenarios are even more believable if the
components form a good gestalt because they fit into or exemplify some
familiar narrative schema.’’π Indeed, in choice-making we access our
capacity to sort the world into categories: ‘‘Many judgments are con-
cerned with the proper category into which to classify an object or
event.’’∫ We sift through data, slot it into categories, and act with regard
to our assumptions about how these categories name things, and indeed
how they ‘‘behave’’ in conjunction with each other. Hastie points to ‘‘the
common tendency to make judgments and decisions about category
membership based on similarity between our conception of the cate-
gory and our impression of the to-be-classified object, situation, or
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event.’’Ω In sum, overreliance on what is available to our imagination in
certain inherited or predisposed ways causes problems: ‘‘The primary
behavioral signature of relying on similarity is that people miss the criti-
cal statistical or logical structure of the situation and ignore relevant
information.’’∞≠ This echoes Elster’s designated weak point in rational
choice theory: the psychic disposition of the agent. This disposition,
going back to Aristotle, is produced at least in part by an intersubjective
encounter mediated by language—we are induced, through language to
act on ‘‘rational’’ desires.
To connect this explicitly to narrative, we can say that key constituent
elements of choice-making can often draw on biased or skewed data and
ignore salient information because of imperfect imaginations. We ignore
or discount information that falls outside our categorical schemata, or
what we are ‘‘induced’’ to want, to choose. In sorting out the world into
similar and dissimilar phenomena, we tend to shape our world to fit our
needs. To make the connection to otherness clear: by siphoning off the
dissimilar, the different, the other, we risk making essentially bad
choices. On the other hand, if we entertain too much information, we
will never be able to make a choice—we’ll be paralyzed. This is one facet
of cognitive dissonance theory, as Elster explains it: ‘‘Cognitive disso-
nance theory predicts that when one motivation is slightly stronger than
another, it will try to recruit allies so that the reasons on one side become
decisively stronger. The unconscious mind shops around, as it were, for
additional arguments in favor of the tentative conclusion reached by the
conscious mind.’’∞∞ He adds, ‘‘The theory states that when a person
experiences an internal inconsistency or dissonance among her beliefs
and values, we can expect some kind of mental adjustment that will
eliminate or reduce the dissonance. Typically, the adjustment will
choose the path of least resistance.’’∞≤ In short, we can unconsciously see
and shape choices in certain ways, according to our imagined needs,
categories, beliefs about causes and effects, objects and subjects. We are
predisposed, or ‘‘induced,’’ to see the world in certain ways. This seems
noncontroversial. What interests me here is how literary narrative may
perform this induction to rational desire and how that fact colors the
way we behave toward and with others who are ‘‘placed’’ into our sense
of what is ‘‘real’’ or ‘‘realistic’’ differently. Do we let them in, wary of the
narrowness of our imaginations? Or do we hold them at bay, wary of the
crippling effect too many choices might have on us?
To get at this problem, Elster explicitly turns to storytelling. In Nuts
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and Bolts for the Social Sciences, his discussions of storytelling and litera-
ture provide an important set of observations regarding the goals of
rational choice theory, as well as its limitations. He points to both the
benefits and dangers of literature (and the kind of thinking it engages)
within the rational choice enterprise. In all cases, Elster’s remarks bear
on the topic of this chapter. Seeming to echo Aristotle, he gives credit to
storytelling for its ability to present the individual with a set of choice
options and a particular imaginative space for weighing those choices:
‘‘Storytelling can suggest new, parsimonious explanations. Suppose that
someone asserts that self-sacrificing or helping behavior is conclusive
proof that not all action is rational. . . . Could it not be in one’s self-
interest to help others? Could it not be rational to be swayed by one’s
emotions? The first step toward finding a positive answer is telling a
plausible story to show how these possibilities could be realized.’’∞≥ But
he cautions, ‘‘With some ingenuity—and many scholars have a great
deal—one can always tell a story in which things are turned upside
down.’’∞∂ In sum, storytelling allows us to increase the body of informa-
tion on which we form our beliefs, but fiction also may be deployed to
support, or instantiate and indeed proliferate false or irrational beliefs.
On the other hand, if Hastie is correct, these things happen just as
well in the real world: people place limits on what is ‘‘available’’ to their
imaginations; choice is riddled with fictions we tell ourselves. And just
as in literature, where we have to decide how much otherness is required
for us to reap the full benefit of being presented with the lives of others,
in rational choice-making we have to ascertain how much information
we need and how much paralyzes our ability to make a choice. In either
case, these choices have clear effects on how we live with each other.
For Elster, storytelling allows the individual to speculate on a range of
possible scenarios, to weigh the cost-benefit of not enough, or too
much, otherness, to consider exactly how ‘‘other-oriented emotions’’
motivate stories in which the individual might feel the effect of actions
on a hypothetical stand-in for him- or herself. With fiction and affect on
the table for discussion, Elster completes the circle, speaking of justice
and the correlate issue of ethics.
The . . . feeling of being unfairly treated deserves special mention.
Sufficient conditions for the occurrence of this powerful emotion are
the following. First, the situation is perceived as morally wrong; second,
it has been brought about intentionally, not as the byproduct of natural
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causality or the invisible hand of social causality; third, it can be rectified
by social intervention. Thus the feeling of injustice rests on the com-
bination of ‘‘It ought to be otherwise,’’ ‘‘It is someone’s fault that it is not
otherwise,’’ and ‘‘It could have been made otherwise,’’ in addition to the
general counterfactual condition ‘‘It could have been otherwise.’’∞∑
Note that the conditional elements (‘‘ought,’’ ‘‘could’’) are linked to
both the ethics and narrative, better behavior and different stories. The
speaker is imagining not a single fact, but a set of interconnected cir-
cumstances in which others might live justly. Within this set of dis-
cussions of storytelling, affect, and ethics, we are thus caught in a situa-
tion wherein stories, and the thoughts they make possible, are all part
of choice-making, and yet their ‘‘cost-benefit’’ ratio is uncertain—how
many possibilities can or should we entertain, and how much otherness
can we invite in from what is not readily available to our imagination?
Speaking in ‘‘cold,’’ ‘‘rational’’ terms, how can we optimize our choices
by accommodating and processing information that we may have habit-
ually ignored or discounted without being placed in a situation wherein
we can never choose because there are too many equal, nondifferenti-
ated choices? Speaking in ‘‘humanistic’’ and ‘‘literary’’ ways, how much
‘‘otherness’’ is necessary to gain the benefits of being ‘‘exposed’’ to the
lives of others without creating too much distance and alienation from
our selves, fragmenting beyond recuperation our sense of reality, at-
tached as it is to reasonable choice, action, bridges between here and
there? Indeed, the issue of otherness is, according to one account, there
from the birth of realist literature.
Literary Realism among Others
Realism is a paradoxical moment in Western literature when representa-
tion can neither accommodate the Otherness of woman nor exist with-
out it.—naomi schor, Reading in Detail
Literary realism, in short, was a cultural brother of ideology, or more
accurately was itself an ideological ‘‘operator,’’ performing the primary
task of ideology, the function of naturalizing socially and historically
produced systems of meaning.—christopher prendergast,
‘‘Realism, ‘God’s Secret,’ and the Body’’
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On the one hand, one could say that from its inception ‘‘realism’’ had to
grapple with a greater diversity of newly recognized actors who tested
the cohesiveness of norms and institutions and at times forced their
modification. On the other hand, literary critics have asserted that real-
ism was enabled precisely by otherness; the new diversity of the world
called for another way of representing reality, hence, realism. In either
case, key questions were raised not only in terms of the constitution of
the ‘‘real,’’ but also regarding the way people were understood to behave,
to act in this new world. What did it mean for new, different sets of
subjects to interact? What results could be anticipated, good and bad?
George J. Becker attaches realism in literature with a new modern social
project: ‘‘In a general but very persuasive way the development of real-
ism in literature is associated with the effort of leaders of nineteenth-
century thought and institution building to update themselves, to cre-
ate for themselves a social and intellectual ambience in reasonable
harmony with the facts of human existence as they appeared then, in
short, to become ‘modern.’ ’’∞∏ He continues, ‘‘Broadly speaking, these
movements, and others like them, attempted to give nonpeople the
status of people, in varying degrees enlarging the spectrum of human
personality.’’∞π The ‘‘nonpeople’’ Becker is referring to here include those
newly viable populations produced after the Catholic emancipation in
England and Ireland, the abolition of serfdom in Russia, and the aboli-
tion of African slavery throughout the world, beginning with the closing
of the slave trade at the start of the nineteenth century and ending with
emancipation in Brazil, in 1888. He asserts that during this period ‘‘there
was a steadily broadening interest in human beings, a realization that a
potential originality—and a potential interest for literature—existed in
all strata of humanity.’’∞∫
Nevertheless, two passages from Benito Pérez Galdós, writing in the
last years of the nineteenth century, capture both the positive and the
negative effects of this new diversity. First, in the realm of literary com-
position, things become more ‘‘real,’’ and the ‘‘masks’’ of conventional
representations give way to diverse, and presumably more authentic,
finer-tuned modes of writing about the world and its varied peoples.
In the sphere of Art, generic types, which symbolized major groupings
of the human family, are disappearing and losing life and color. Even
human faces are not what they were, so it would seem ridiculous to say
so. . . . With the breakdown of categories masks fall at one blow and faces
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appear in their true purity. Types are lost, the man is better revealed to
us, and Art is directed solely to giving to imaginary beings a life that is
more human and social.∞Ω
In short, we find the emergence of the modern individual, in all its
particularity and detail, or so it is claimed.
But Galdós also points to the challenges such new constituencies
present to social structures and conventions, asserting that ‘‘the lack of
unity is such that even in political life, naturally organized and disci-
plined groups, there is clear evidence of the vast dissolution of these
large families formed by the enthusiasm of constituencies, by traditional
affinities, or by more or less clear-cut principles.’’≤≠ It is as if the standing
principles of presenting and judging action, choice, behavior cannot
operate in the same ways anymore, given these new sets of agents.
Radical otherness pushes the limits of any liberal accommodation of
‘‘diversity,’’ as Naomi Schor succinctly points out. How much otherness
is incorporable into this newly realized world, and in what manner?
How can literature serve as not only a ‘‘reflection’’ of the real, but also an
instrument whereby the real, or what passed for it, could be judged,
debated, reimagined? Amid multiplicity, was there any commonality?
How could ‘‘others’’ be ‘‘delivered’’ and managed across this vast uneven
terrain of the real?
Indeed, Erich Auerbach takes up precisely this problematic as it ex-
tends into twentieth-century modernist writing, which incorporates the
new multiplicity of subjectivities into its formal presentation of reality.
Auerbach’s well-known example is found in Virginia Woolf.
The essential characteristic of the technique represented by Virginia
Woolf is that we are given not merely one person whose consciousness
is rendered, but many persons, with frequent shifts from one to the
other—in our text, Mrs. Ramsey, ‘‘people,’’ Mr. Bankes, in brief inter-
ludes James, the Swiss maid in a flashback, and the nameless ones who
speculate over a tear. The multiplicity of persons suggests that we are
here after all confronted with an endeavor to investigate an objective
reality, that is, specifically, the ‘‘real’’ Mrs. Ramsey.≤∞
Crucially, Auerbach places his analysis within the broader sociohistori-
cal context that put new pressures on the capacity of realist literature.
It is easy to understand that such a technique [the reflection of multiple
consciousnesses] had to develop gradually and that it did so precisely
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during the decades of the First World War period and after. The widen-
ing of man’s horizon, and the increase of his experiences, knowledge,
ideas, and possible forms of existence, which began in the 16th century,
continued through the 19th at an ever faster tempo—with such a tre-
mendous acceleration since the beginning of the 20th that synthetic and
objective attempts at interpretation are produced and demolished every
instant. A tremendous tempo of the changes proved the more confusing
because they could not be surveyed as a whole. . . . Furthermore, the
changes did not produce the same effects in all places, so that the
differences of attainment between the various social strata of one and
the same people and between different peoples came to be—if not
greater—at least more noticeable. The spread of publicity in the crowd-
ing of mankind on a shrinking globe sharpened awareness of the differ-
ences and ways of life and attitudes, and mobilized the interests and
forms of existence which the new changes either furthered or threat-
ened. In all parts of the world crises adjustment arose; they increased in
number and coalesced.≤≤
Here we see slow but irreversible change spreading globally, albeit un-
evenly. This unevenness creates variegated peoples, each affected dif-
ferently by mass historical shifts, and, critically, these differences, this
new production of otherness, is disseminated by ‘‘publicity’’ in all man-
ner of print media that struggle to cognitively map this new world.
Most important for my study of the mapping of rationality, action,
and the representation of how different people might act the same way
(or not) is how Auerbach develops this line of inquiry. In a manner not
dissimilar to that of Galdós, who noted the dissolution of conventional
categories and the birth of more variegated, ‘‘precise’’ modes of repre-
senting reality, Auerbach notes that in modernist fiction, the essential
aim of realism abides, though now delivered via a new mode of writing
which could disclose the new surface variations of life. But Auerbach
adds a crucial dimension. He argues that beneath any surface, at any
time, one would discover a common human ‘‘reality.’’
Something new and elemental appeared: nothing less than the wealth of
reality and depth of life in every moment to which we surrender our-
selves without prejudice. . . . It is precisely the random moment which is
comparatively independent of the controversial and unstable orders
over which men fight and despair; it passes unaffected by them, as daily
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life. The more it is exploited, the more the elementary things which our lives
have in common come to light. The more numerous, varied, and simple
the people are who appear as subjects of such random moments, the
more effectively must what they have in common shine forth. In this
unprejudiced and exploratory type of representation we cannot but see
to what extent—below the surface conflicts—the differences between
men’s ways of life and forms of thought have already lessened.≤≥
Modern life has produced a dizzying and seemingly untotalizable pro-
liferation of new effects—technological, scientific, economic—that has
linked people together in new ways, even while impacting different
populations unevenly. Nonetheless, broad heterogeneity is paradoxi-
cally accompanied by profound homogeneity; the newly connected
modern world reveals a diversity of modernities that nonetheless har-
bor something essentially common. Modernist literature focused on a
seemingly contradictory project: to entertain, accommodate, even so-
licit a multiplicity of points of view and angles of vision, and at the same
time to attempt to ascertain, from all those randomly chosen perspec-
tives, what they held in common. Auerbach seems to be challenging the
world: set aside the large, obvious categories of belonging and identity
—ideology, religion, nation, language itself—that place people into dis-
crete groups all too easily. Instead, pick a moment, any moment, and
you will find, from that unprejudiced sampling, that the cards are all
the same.
So thoroughgoing is this commonality that Auerbach audaciously
asserts there are no longer any exotic peoples—not only are swarthy
‘‘Corsicans’’ and ‘‘Spaniards’’ now decidedly un-exotic, but even Chi-
nese seem equally part of the common human family.
The strata of societies and their different ways of life have become
inextricably mingled. There are no longer even exotic peoples. A cen-
tury ago (in Mérimée for example), Corsicans or Spaniards were still
exotic; today the term would be quite unsuitable for Pearl Buck’s Chi-
nese peasants. Beneath the conflicts, and also through them, an eco-
nomic and cultural leveling process is taking place. It is still a long way to
a common life of mankind on earth, but the goal begins to be visible.
And it is most clearly visible now in the unprejudiced, precise, interior
and exterior representation of the random moment in the lives of dif-
ferent people.≤∂
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More than a century before Thomas Friedman’s flat-earth theory, Erich
Auerbach seems to have recognized a harbinger. But we need to be more
precise about what he says, for Auerbach isn’t speaking of these people,
but rather about the representation of them, and by specific literary
figures, from Mérimée to Pearl Buck. The tension between hetero-
geneity and homogeneity is lessened, if not obviated, by the work of art,
which dialectically presents the surface variations of the underlying
reality of a common life. People may act differently on the surface,
unevenly impacted as they are by sweeping historical changes, but their
motivations and desires and the thinking that goes into different choices
are not so uncommon—discrete economic and cultural worlds no lon-
ger exist. Nevertheless, in Auerbach the presentation of reality is com-
plicated by both its anchoring in history, which of course is not static,
and in literature, whose forms and goals are precisely not simple or
uniform, and this dialectic is one of the basic insights of Mimesis.
Today the functionality of literary language, as it attempts to present
the reality of others, is made intensely problematic precisely because the
‘‘leveling’’ effect of globalization, the famous ‘‘flatness’’ trumpeted by
Friedman and others, is only perceptible from a certain angle of vision.
However, otherness of a certain degree, presented in literary texts, dis-
rupts that angle of vision. In short, the uneven impact of history that
Auerbach notes has not been dissipated and leveled out, and neither
have their forms of representation. This unevenness has of course deeply
affected how people have come to act according to different imaginings
of their situatedness in ‘‘globalization.’’ Their differing positions in turn
naturally alter the way they interact with others, the choices they make
based on sometimes radically different conceptions and performances
of ‘‘rationality.’’ Literary realism, seeking to make sense of choices, ac-
tions, behaviors of and toward others, is now involved with a new sort of
social contract. Brook Thomas, describing the sociocultural world of the
American realist novel, says, ‘‘Readers who enter such a world partici-
pate in a moral economy in which people potentially stand on an equal
foot with each other.’’≤∑ I want to underscore the word potentially and up
the ante in this ‘‘multicultural,’’ ‘‘global’’ world. I map this immanence on
to our temporary age of globalized delivery systems, to see their hege-
monic logic at work in ordering facts, choices, consequences, across the
board. The idea of American literary realism’s connection to the idea of a
‘‘contract,’’ which Thomas uses as a key word in his study, can, I think, be
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more broadly applied. Thomas connects the unfolding of syntagmatic
sequences along the horizontal plane, the chain of reason and action and
fulfillment—Coetzee’s ‘‘bridge-building,’’ in other words—to the draw-
ing up and execution of a contract. In the realist text, we have nothing
less than the building of epistemological relations to form a world:
‘‘Contract’s promise to generate an immanent, rather than transcenden-
tal, ordering of society suggests that how ‘facts’ are ordered is more
important than simple attention to them.’’≤∏
Indeed, most critics and theorists of realist narrative regard the syn-
tagmatic unfolding of literary narrative as its chief structural charac-
teristic. The movement from one moment to the next, from cause to
effect, has been seen to be particularly present in realist narratives; the
‘‘real’’ is manifested as a certain logic unfolds, as choices appear, as
actions are taken which lead to certain results, and as contracts are
fulfilled or breached. According to a common critique of ‘‘realism,’’ these
results also serve as judgments; there is a sort of ‘‘poetic justice’’ that is
repeatedly rehearsed, a certain ideology underscored and reaffirmed.
However, while I will certainly attend to the syntagmatic unfolding of
the narrative contract, I also attend to the vertical axis, and in particular
to which sorts of agents can occupy the linguistic slot of ‘‘subject’’ or
‘‘agent.’’ Updating the relation between actor and act in this new histor-
ical frame is essential.
According to liberal ideology, and Gary Becker’s ‘‘economic behav-
ior’’ model, it should not matter who stands in the role of ‘‘agent,’’ at
least not enough to disrupt the formula. I disagree. Different peoples
crowding into the position of ‘‘subject’’ affects not only the narrative
constitution of the literary world being narrated, but also the very mode
of presenting reality. Different models of reason and rationality are set
forth as different subjects occupy the same linguistic slot; but more
important than realizing the ‘‘rich variety’’ of other perspectives, these
literary narratives show the fragility of such norms when a radical de-
gree of otherness is perceived, if not entirely contained. Ultimately, this
should prompt us to read these texts in different ways—in fact, this is
required by these new kinds of narratives, which critique both the
claims of commonality that allow ‘‘others’’ to be delivered to us and how
those claims, founded on the ‘‘proper’’ or ‘‘acceptable’’ ratio of self to
other, are themselves predicated on certain assumptions about not only
what it means to be human, across the board, but also how human
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beings connect. Coetzee’s novel offers a complex critique of the ratio of
self to other, and the capacity and nature of interaction at a dizzying
degree of otherness, all captured in the novel’s emplotting of choice,
behavior, and judgment.
But before turning to Coetzee’s novel, I want briefly to evoke the
work of the linguist Roman Jakobson and the literary critics Lawrence
Scherer and Pamela Morris, to illustrate more concretely what I am
concerned with regard to the vertical axis. From their very different
angles, each considers the case of excessive otherness in terms of an
‘‘overload’’ within the paradigmatic axis. What happens when too many
subjects crowd into that space, too many possible agents exist? How
does the linguistic, and the literary narrative system, accommodate that
overflow? That is, as we follow Becker, Galdós, and Auerbach in linking
literary history to the proliferation of otherness and other perspectives,
what sort of adjustments are necessary, both systemically and in terms
of our understanding of the reality of human interaction?
To begin with, Jakobson importantly takes note of how language is
used according to common understandings and assumptions. Again, a
social contract is at work. Crucially, the fulfillment of the contract
participates in the construction of a world, built up from the combina-
tion of speech acts that cross-reference each other. There is no ‘‘free-
dom’’ to say just anything; rather, the conversation builds an under-
standing about reality based on a common stock of terms, locutions,
lexical items between mutually recognized speakers.
Speech implies a selection of certain linguistic entities and their com-
bination into linguistic units of a higher degree of complexity. At the
lexical level this is readily apparent: the speaker selects words and com-
bines them into sentences according to the syntactic system of the
language he is using; sentences in their turn are combined into utter-
ances. But the speaker is by no means a completely free agent in his
choice of words: selection (except for the rare case of actual neologism)
must be made from the lexical storehouse which he and his addressee
possess and comment.≤π
Again, ‘‘everyone, when speaking to another person, tries, deliberately
or involuntarily, to hit upon a common vocabulary: either to please or
simply be understood or, finally, to bring him out, he uses the terms of
his addressee. There is no such thing as private property in language:
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everything is socialized. Verbal exchange, like any form of intercourse,
requires at least two communicators, an idiolect proves to be a some-
what perverse fiction.’’≤∫ What happens when people are not able to
fulfill that contract, even if they wish to?
Jakobson’s study of aphasia is well known; in it he extrapolates from
case histories of what he calls ‘‘similarity’’ and ‘‘contiguity’’ disorders a
poetics of poetry and prose. Critics such as David Lodge have famously
evoked Jakobson’s analysis of ‘‘contiguity’’ to describe the basic struc-
ture of realist narrative.≤Ω Lodge and others interested in the description
and analysis of narrative look at how worlds unfold in the ‘‘projection of
similarity upon contiguity,’’ that is, the process of selection from a para-
digm of like items and the insertion of that selected term onto the
horizontal axis, to join its now contiguous neighbors in making a sen-
tence. But what happens when one cannot easily choose from that
menu of like items? What happens when too many things seem too
similar, or when what is ‘‘available to the imagination’’ is excessive,
rather than narrowed down, when there is no clear choice, no finally
convincing determining reason to choose one term rather than another,
when seemingly wildly different words can easily stand in the place of
each other? Again, while one can dwell in that dysfunctional world by
dubbing it ‘‘poetry’’ or ‘‘the poetic imagination,’’ in the linguistic con-
tract of realist literature, this has potentially devastating consequences.
Jakobson’s study focuses on what happens when a language user’s
capacity to make choices fails, that is, when he or she cannot decide
either which term to select from the vertical axis or how to put words
together on the horizontal plane. The inability to distinguish between
paradigmatic elements—for example, ‘‘Tom,’’ ‘‘man,’’ ‘‘real-estate agent’’
all appear to be equivalent, no one term seeming more appropriate than
the other—evinces ‘‘similarity disorder,’’ a malfunction of the process by
which one selects terms from a paradigm; the major deficiency ‘‘lies in
selection and substitution, with relative stability of combination and
contexture.’’ Conversely, a ‘‘contiguity disorder’’ describes the inability
to fit words together, wherein the deficiency lies in ‘‘combination and
contexture, with relative retention of normal selection and substitu-
tion.’’≥≠ Such disorders make the basic performance of language ex-
tremely difficult; language users suffering from such dysfunctionality
struggle to fulfill the basic ‘‘contract’’ between speakers. Their deficien-
cies on one axis force them to compensate by taking recourse to the one
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axis still available to them in an attempt to fulfill, to use Thomas’s term,
their linguistic contract.
The instability (or even impossibility) of being able to choose which
words to slot into the horizontal frame (Tom, businessman, male, wolf,
seducer, Boy Scout, balding, tall) places greater pressure on the con-
tiguous terms to shore up the sentence. That is, if one cannot see the
sense of this or that word in a particular slot, one leans on its neighbors
for direction, a hint at possible meanings to be made.
Aphasia with impaired substitution and impact and texture, operations
involving similarity, yield to those based on contiguity. . . . Goldstein’s
tests justify such an expectation: a female patient of this type, when
asked to list a few names of animals, disposed them in the same order in
which she had seen them in the zoo; similarly, despite instructions to
arrange certain objects according to color, size, shape, she classified
them on the basis of the spatial contiguity as home things, house mate-
rials, etc., and justifed this grouping by reference to a display window
where ‘‘it does not matter what the things are,’’ that is they do not have to
be similar.≥∞
What does this have to do with otherness? My adaptation of Jakobson
argues that when too many unlikely subjects ‘‘take place’’ in the vertical
paradigm, when, according to the genesis of literary realism laid out by
George Becker, an incrementally larger number of new and different
subjects can vie for position in the slot of ‘‘subject,’’ when new, different,
and incommensurate perspectives all can be seen to count as ‘‘a per-
spective,’’ this puts greater pressure on the sequence of choice-action,
cause-effect, and so on to help us make sense, and more reliance is put
on the fictional account of how the world is held together. The old
familiar ‘‘home things’’ are relied on in more necessary ways than before.
There is thus a testing out of the capacity of new subjects to fit into
conventional norms of behavior; radically ‘‘other’’ people need to be
understood in ‘‘normal’’ contexts. If they are scrambled together and
inaccessible in the subject position (the vertical paradigm), the words
that join them to form a predicate have to be anchored in normal
discourses syntactically. In the case of radical otherness, when any-
body or anything can seem to occupy the vertical paradigm, it is thus
all the more important that they appear ‘‘reasonable’’ as manifested in
the unfolding of the horizontal axis, that is, the logic of the predicate.
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Otherwise, the sentence will collapse under the weight of the person’s
difference—and it is exactly this that we find in Elizabeth Costello.
Interestingly, in addition to the greater reliance on the syntagmatic
axis, Jakobson describes a second key effect of similarity disorder as
involving the reduction of the multiplicity of terms that fill the paradig-
matic axis—there has to be more certainty, stability, absoluteness on
that axis. Put briefly, this results in monolingualism: ‘‘Loss of bilingual-
ism and confinement to a single dialectal variety of a single language is a
systematic manifestation of this disorder.’’≥≤ The connection I draw
here, perhaps too metaphorically, is that in this linguistic/poetic analy-
sis of ‘‘ordinary’’ language and its poetic dysfunction we can find as well
a commentary on two key themes of this chapter: the ‘‘contract’’ that
realist literature enacts and perhaps enforces between actors (charac-
ters, authors, readers) according to a commonly agreed on language
and its norms and protocols; and the manner in which that progressive
unfolding of ‘‘realism’’ may be troubled by too much otherness as more
and more visible subjects test out the norms of realist representations of
‘‘the world.’’
What happens when one cannot easily select or choose, because
too many formerly dissimilar subjects now vie for equal status, for, in
other words, similarity, commonality? In that stalled, confusing mo-
ment, when it is no longer as clear as it was before which terms are
viable or even preferable, not only is more and more reliance placed
on the neighboring words—that is, the verbs, predicates, propositions,
modifiers—to give a hint as to what, or who, can fit into that ‘‘subject’’
position, there also is a reduction of the static or dissonance occurring
along the vertical axis; multiple languages, each offering their own pos-
sibilities, are muted or excluded, and a single determinant language
remains. Turning now to literary history and criticism ‘‘proper,’’ we find
another, not dissimilar, way of describing the dissonance created by
excessive otherness, this time in terms of literary history and ideology.
Lawrence Schehr argues that realism is involved in a contradictory
project: even as it includes ‘‘the other’’ in its universe, it tries to maintain
the particularity of the other while making itself universal.≥≥ That is, to
fulfill its liberal ambitions, it invites ‘‘the other’’ in (for variety, diversity,
enrichment), while all the time holding itself above and beyond the
other as a perpetually dominant force. In the unfolding of its narrative
logic, realism normalizes textual relations that reflect this relationship.
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But, Schehr continues, the other can bring her own law, undercutting
the process of domination.≥∂ What we find, then, is the setting forth of a
contract (a convention for accommodating and situating the other) and
a reply (a contestation of that assignment).
In either case, to make this ‘‘real,’’ there has to be some common,
legible ground that includes both the dominant and the minor, and it is
history, uneven as it may be. Different people’s different behavior has to
be seen as occurring at the same time, under similar, if not identical,
constraints and possibilities. We find people understood via the histor-
ical praxes of the real that surround them. Schehr asserts, ‘‘In realist
narrative, being human means having a locus in which to speak, a
language to speak, and possibility of interacting with others.’’≥∑ Natu-
rally, for this to occur, the other has to be granted the rights of language:
‘‘The Other has to be posited first as having the possibility of language
and of being a subject.’’≥∏ But at this moment, membership into the club
means exclusion from otherness, and this has dire consequences: with
the loss of ‘‘the truly other’’ the very possibility of unrepresentability is
erased. Thus, the unfolding of realist narrative—its ‘‘epistemological
progress,’’ to use Pam Morris’s description—is stalled, at least tempo-
rarily, as it has to do the work of accounting for behavior that is sup-
posedly like, and unlike, our own.
The conventional account of what follows, in the transition from
nineteenth-century realist fiction to late-twentieth- and twenty-first-
century works, is that the postmodernist narratives of the latter evince
an intense skepticism toward the notion of realist ‘‘progress’’ and the
‘‘knowledge’’ that comes from it. I suggest that the proliferation of
points of view emanating from increasing numbers of ‘‘other’’ people
finally exerted so much pressure (and not only literary, of course) that
new modes of literary representation had to be found. ‘‘Master narra-
tives,’’ for all sorts of aesthetic and ideological reasons, were suspect and
frail. Nevertheless, besides the fact that I believe the reports of the death
of realism are (for better or worse) in many ways premature, my con-
cerns here are not to rehearse or reevaluate the move to postmodern-
ism.≥π Rather, I want to examine how the weakening of the realist claim
does not take place in isolation from the critique of the systems of
delivery that it draws on. That is to say, if in a literary text people no
longer act in common, according to one or another formula for human
behavior (rational choice theory, social choice theory, game theory,
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etc.), then how does that disclose the unevenness, the problematic
nature, of the very notion that commonality can be formulated? Fur-
thermore, and essentially, what consequences does this have for the
ways we might reassess the general notion that people can be ‘‘deliv-
ered’’ to us with our understandings of ‘‘us,’’ ‘‘them,’’ and the system
intact? How should we act differently, informed now with a different
understanding of how we have come to be together in the first place?
The fact of the matter is that we do act as if we share some common
properties, even knowing that that commonality is ‘‘constructed.’’ Don-
ald Davidson writes,
One might, in a metaphorical mood, describe my method for under-
standing someone else as putting him in my shoes; but this would
certainly be a misleading metaphor if taken seriously. While plenty of
imagination is called for in a good interpretation, I am not asking any-
one to imagine he is playing another’s part. I simply call attention to the
fact that the propositions I use to interpret the attitudes of another are
defined by the roles they play in my thoughts and feelings and behavior;
therefore in interpretation they must play appropriately similar roles. It
is a consequence of this fact the correct interpretation makes interpreter
and interpreted share many strategically important beliefs and values.
. . . [I]f it is true that the basis of interpersonal comparison already exists
when we attribute desires to others, then we can, after all, make a fairly
clear distinction between interpersonal comparisons and the normative
judgments based on them.≥∫
Pamela Morris glosses Davidson thus: ‘‘if experiences, beliefs of one
community are transferable into the language of another community,
then it cannot sensibly be claimed that the two communities constitute
wholly self-contained, incommunicable epistemological and linguistic
worlds. On the other hand, if they are wholly incommensurate, it would
not be possible even to make a claim for being incommensurate. If
another world were to be totally unknowable we would not logically be
able to know if it was different.’’≥Ω This seems clear. However, I want to
shift the focus slightly. Along with examining how claims to commonal-
ity are staked, and then tested in the literary narratives I look at in this
study, we need to think of what adjustments come into play as one
struggles to find, or maintain, common ground. What steps are taken to
establish, or prop up, the notion that people are the same, or at least on
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some basic level ‘‘commensurate,’’ in their humanity? This is the argu-
ment of Dudley Shapere, who writes,
If two scientific theories (or more general contexts of scientific thought,
such as ‘‘traditions’’ or ‘‘communities’’) differ in so many respects, as
they certainly seem to do, in virtue of what do we compare them?
Rather than deny that such comparisons can be made, what we need to
ask is how it is possible to do so, and what the implications of our way of
doing it as we do are: how we manage to compare and even evaluate
such scientific usages and the contexts in which they occur.∂≠
That is to say, the focus will shift from the possibility of making com-
parisons to the conditions of possibility.
Jürgen Habermas’s appreciation of Davidson is founded on his shift
from the ‘‘fixation on the fact mirroring function of language.’’∂∞ In terms
of the current study, we move from a concern with how realist texts
name real things to a more performance-based, possibility-making an-
gle, or what I am calling ‘‘delivery systems.’’ How is language used to test
out commonality, self-identity, otherness? And I am talking about not
only ‘‘ordinary’’ language, but also the language of two specific dis-
courses: that which is found in Becker’s ‘‘economic behavior’’ model
and embedded in rational choice theory, and that which is found in
literary realism. This all will hinge on how people act together. In spirit
then, I follow Habermas: ‘‘As soon as we conceive of knowledge as
communicatively mediated, rationality is assessed in terms of the capac-
ity of responsible participants to orient themselves in relation to validity
claims geared to enter subjective recognition,’’ with the important quali-
fier that ‘‘subjective recognition’’ is ‘‘delivered’’ in complex and some-
times contradictory ways that actually test even Habermas’s commu-
nicative action model.∂≤ This ‘‘orientation’’ follows the trajectory of
‘‘deliverance,’’ of media that rely on a set of common properties to assure
transposability, communication, contract, bridge-building.
And this brings us exactly to our discussion of Elizabeth Costello. As
indicated in the epigraph from the novel that begins this chapter, in the
course of the narrative Coetzee tracks the move from realism, the corre-
spondence of words and things and rational action predicated on a faith
in such correspondence, to a postrealist world in which language and
things no longer connect, when actions lead to unexpected results, and
in fact people become paralyzed. This all occurs not because of some
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weird delinkage in the universe, but because rational choices are made
impossible when placed in an intersubjective realm populated by too
much otherness. The world we find in Elizabeth Costello is thus the
mirror image of the world of common ground posited by Auerbach.
Ultimately, the very thing that binds humans together is shattered, as all
living beings, including nonhuman animals, now qualify for a position
in the same paradigm.
At the very beginning of the novel, we are presented with the passage I
used as an epigraph for this chapter. It is a statement on literary real-
ism that brings together the topics of narrative art, rationality, choice-
making, and otherness. Coetzee borrows precisely the discourse of
problem-solving and choice-making: ‘‘There is first of all the problem of
the opening, namely, how to get us from where we are, which is, as yet,
nowhere, to the far bank. It is a simple bridging problem, a problem of
knocking together a bridge. People solve such problems every day. They
solve them, and having solved them push on.’’∂≥ We find here two key
elements that tie together the issue of rationality and otherness. First of
course is the idea of choice—in the poetics of realism one identifies
one’s preferences, one’s utility, and then works out the ways to remove
obstacles and maximize efficiencies toward that end. But, second, the
poetics of realism is also a poet(h)ics, for that bridge is built not only
between discrete choices and actions but also between people and other
creatures of the earth. In fact, the latter connection is implicated in the
former. The connection between those two relies and puts tremendous
pressure on the imagination, so much so that it may strain against the
constraints of reason. It is no accident that Coetzee’s fictional protago-
nist, the speaker of these lines, presents him with this key problem of
otherness and imagination: how to bridge the distance between his
biological and biographical self and the sixty-six-year-old Australian
female author who is his chief character and organizing point of view.
How will he solve the engineering problem he sets forth for all realist
literature?∂∂
Costello confidently asserts that for realism the task is to ‘‘supply the
particulars [and] allow the significations to emerge of themselves’’ (4).
However, the problem set forth in the novel is a historical one: it relies
on a reader who is able to see the bridge and to connect the particulars
into a meaningful unit. Moreover, the novel will proceed to outline
a problematic in which it is precisely the difficulty of envisioning a
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broader, global set of readers, each bringing her or his set of interests
and values to the text, that makes signifying a fraught and unsure ven-
ture. Time and again in this text we find that the significations do not
easily or unambiguously ‘‘emerge of themselves.’’ Coetzee suggests that
the audience for realist literature may be deaf to those connections and
significations, and this is in no small way attached to a different and
problematic condition of understanding why and how different people
who now exist within our sphere of life (as opposed to existing as distant
and distinct) act.
From the very start, the novel sets up the conditions of its success and
failure. On the one hand, Costello opines, ‘‘Realism is driven to invent
situations . . . in which characters give voice to contending ideas and
thereby in a certain sense embody them. The notion of embodying turns
out to be pivotal. In such debates ideas do not and indeed cannot float
free: they are tied to the speakers by whom they are enounced, and
generated from the matrix of individual interests out of which their
speakers act in the world’’ (9). On the other hand, the characters so
invented by Coetzee embody chaotic and inconsistent ideas, and the
entire notion of an identifiable individual is shown to be questionable,
just as the line between Self and Other is seen to be radically blurred. As
such, characters are intensely problematic anchors for any realist posi-
tion, and as a consequence of this, the ‘‘matrix of interests’’ thus turns
out to be anything but coherent; rather, we are confronted by a matrix
composed of conflictual gestures and aspirations. It is critical here to
insist that the problematic of the novel itself is not (simply) an ar-
bitrarily invented series of paradoxes—the problematic is indeed pro-
duced by the twin failures of artistic realism and rationality.
Both the failure of ‘‘bridging’’ and the incoherence of interests stem
from the same source: the essential inability to imagine an other. This
ability has been a cornerstone in Western philosophical aesthetics since
Kant, and has an intimate connection with ethics. It shows up especially
in Kant’s notion of the sensus communis, a term which is difficult to
translate fully, but which might be called a common sense: ‘‘For the
principle [of sensus communis,] while it is only subjective, being yet
assumed as a subjective universal (a necessary idea for every one),
could, in what concerns the consensus of differing judging Subjects,
demand universal assent like an objective principle, provided we were
assured of our subsumption under it being correct. This indeterminate
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norm of a common sense is as a matter of fact, presupposed by us’’
(Kant, 85). As Antoon Van Den Braembussche argues,
Kant tries to construct sensus communis as an operation of reflection
which enables us to free ourselves from our own prejudices by compar-
ing ‘‘our own judgment with human reason in general.’’ . . . Here, Kant,
clearly, is making a stance for a kind of maieutics, a sort of thought
experiment, in which we compare our judgments not with the actual but
rather with the merely possible ones of others in order to put ourselves
in the position of someone else.∂∑
It is, in short, a particular form of empathy that tries to intuit the
universally shared affect of a work of art. One’s disinterested free play of
the imagination is thus an image of the morally good; the sensus com-
munis is connected to acting in such a way that one’s actions can be the
basis for a universal order. In short, the private is connected to the inter-
subjective and the public.∂∏ And within the first dozen pages of the novel
we find that the imagining of others is articulated precisely as a core
element of Costello’s dicta: ‘‘It is otherness that is the challenge. Mak-
ing up someone other than yourself. Making up a world for him to move
in’’ (12).
What becomes clear as the novel progresses is that the true difficulty
of this challenge is to create a plausible world for the fictional character,
a ‘‘realistic’’ one which, according to what we have learned thus far, must
be able to present a matrix of interests and behaviors associated with
that person as a unified subject that can speak to others. The reader’s
imaginative construction of that ‘‘bridge’’ between discrete acts and
events forms the crux of the realist project, but it must be supported at
base by a faith in the consistent behavior of an individual character.
However, Elizabeth Costello blurs the line between human beings not
only as greater numbers of ‘‘other’’ kinds of people invade the privileged
space of ‘‘the subject,’’ but also as the line between humans and animals
disintegrates. Costello ups the ante in her next articulation of realism,
presenting a lecture titled ‘‘What Is Realism?’’ and alluding to a parable
by Kafka in which an ape (or so it appears) stands before an audience
and delivers a speech. Costello uses this as a challenge to her own
audience: can they reside in that space in which the human and the ape
can cohabit a form of the imagination? What is our capacity to imagine
otherness in a transspecies fashion? What do our senses of the real and
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the rational rely on as foundational, and how does that foundation act as
a barrier to other modes of reasoning or imagining? Turning precisely to
the act of writing fiction, she questions the bounds of rhetoric, the
tropes and figures that stand outside its signifying protocols: ‘‘For all we
know, the speaker may not ‘really’ be an ape, may simply be a human
being like ourselves deluded into thinking himself an ape, or a human
being presenting himself, with heavy irony, for rhetorical purposes, as an
ape’’ (18).∂π
This is not a transhistorical question regarding the elasticity of the
imagination and poetic language. Coetzee locates the problem of po-
etics, realism, and imagination at a specific moment in time, when we
witness a particular strain placed on the logic and reason of realism, a
crisis predicated by the expanding field of otherness.
There used to be a time when we knew. We used to believe that when
the text said, ‘‘on the table stood a glass of water,’’ there was indeed a
table, and a glass of water on it, and we had only to look at the word-
mirror of the text to see them. But all that has ended. The word-mirror is
broken, irreparably, it seems. About what is really going on in the lecture
hall your guess is as good as mine: men and men, men and apes, apes
and men, apes and apes. . . . There used to be a time, we believe, when
we could say who we were. Now we are just performers speaking our
parts. The bottom has dropped out. (19)
There is no way to avoid the radical quality of the last statement espe-
cially, for if ‘‘we’’ as human subjects are simply performers playing parts
set forth by history, then with the blurring of boundaries, the evapora-
tion of the containers of the real, with the flooding-in of otherness,
comes too the dissolution of human subjectivity. And yet this dissolu-
tion is regarded in Elizabeth Costello as not necessarily a bad thing.
There is a wonderful and at the same time terrible price to pay for
meeting the challenge of inventing something truly other than oneself.
To fully embrace the potential of this terrible success of the ‘‘fusion’’ of
self and other, one must first abandon reason as absolute: ‘‘Both reason
and seven decades of life experience tell me that reason is neither the
being of the universe nor the being of God. On the contrary, reason
looks to me suspiciously like the being of human thought; worse than
that, like the being of one tendency in human thought. Reason is the
being of a certain spectrum of human thinking’’ (67). To maintain the
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belief that reason is universal rather than particular is to maintain the
boundaries of the imagination and the limits of the Self.
Might it not be that the phenomenon we are examining here is, rather
than the flowering of a faculty that allows access to the secrets of the
universe, the specialism of a rather narrow self-regenerating intellectual
tradition whose forte is reasoning, in the same way that the forte of
chess players is playing chess, which for its own motives it tries to in-
stall at the centre of the universe? Yet, although I see that the best
way to win acceptance from this learned gathering would be for me
to join myself, like a tributary stream running into a great river, to the
great Western discourse of man versus beast, of reason versus unreason,
something in me resists, foreseeing in that step the concession of the
entire battle. (69)
Costello resists this concession because it would not only acknowl-
edge the assumptions that undergird that dichotomy, but also because it
would also leave intact the illusion that the question of reason and its
separation from unreason is a neutral, unmotivated one. Instead, she
sees behind the very posing of such questions a continuing program of
subordination, of dominance that allows precisely for the maintenance
of the boundary between Self and Other in the entire animal realm. She
uses the psychologist Wolfgang Köhler’s treatise of 1917, ‘‘The Mentality
of Apes,’’ as a prime example. Köhler tries an experiment on an ape he
names Sultan, withholding food until the ape is forced to use his intel-
ligence in a way that confirms Köhler’s assumptions of what an animal
should think: ‘‘As long as Sultan continues to think the wrong thoughts,
he is starved. He is starved until the pangs of hunger are so intense, so
overriding, that he is forced to think the right thought, namely, how
to go about getting the bananas. . . . From the purity of speculation
(Why do men behave like this?) he is relentlessly propelled towards
lower, practical, instrumental reason (How does one use this to get
that?)’’ (73).
Thus, as Costello says, ‘‘A carefully plotted psychological regimen
conducts him away from ethics and metaphysics towards the humbler
reaches of practical reason’’ (74). Indeed, to put it more bluntly, as long
as the ape thinks in any other fashion than pragmatically, his behavior
confirms his status as animal (and not human), and the creature is
punished. This critique has, of course, a broader application: as long as
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any animal or sentient creature defies its placement in the schematiza-
tion of reason, it will be forcefully disciplined. What does this tell us
about our stance toward other human beings? Conversely, and this is
Costello’s next topic, much as we seek to maintain a careful watch over
the borders between human and animal life, policing the line with
reason as our yardstick, we can also relegate other human beings to the
other side when our motives require. This is only possible, Costello
claims, when we deny ourselves the faculty of sympathy. And this brings
her discussion fully back into the realm of her declared topic: realism
and literature. At this point in Costello’s disquisition the demand for
rationality placed on others is replaced by a demand placed on ourselves
to be able to feel sympathy.
We recall that the key challenge presented to the author is to create
fictional others and worlds in which they would act. And yet this chal-
lenge seems insurmountable precisely because it puts us face to face
with a number of imperatives: for example, how to displace (or at least
‘‘bracket’’) oneself enough to allow for the imagining of an other that
endows that other with her or his (or its) own sphere of action and
choice, without mandating that the other has to act as we do? And yet
how can we make a bridge between their discrete acts and our realm of
understanding reasonable, that is, ‘‘realistic,’’ if we do not retain (as if we
could truly give it up) our own particular sense of the real, the rational,
the reasonable? This line of questioning thus links the ethical aspect of
writing to that of being human in general. Costello is moved to make a
bold assertion: ‘‘If I can think my way into the existence of a being who
has never existed, then I can think my way into the existence of a bat or a
chimpanzee or an oyster, any being with whom I share the substrate of
life’’ (80). And yet we are forced to wonder if mere ‘‘sharing’’ is all we
(can) do in life, for both practical and moral reasons. The move into the
realm of the real and historical exerts tremendous critical pressure on
Costello’s idealism (though from what we have learned about her, that
word does not exactly fit), not to mention on her politics.
Using the Holocaust as her historical example, Costello argues, ‘‘The
question to ask should not be: Do we have something in common—
reason, self-consciousness, a soul—with other animals? . . . The horror is
that the killers refused to think themselves into the place of their vic-
tims, as did everyone else. . . . In other words, they closed their hearts.
The heart is the seat of a faculty, sympathy, that allows us to share at
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times the being of another’’ (79). Taken alone, this argument seems
noncontroversial. It is when Costello makes more explicit what she
means by ‘‘other animals’’ that her audience rises up in protest: how can
she compare the slaughter of humans with the ‘‘culling’’ of livestock? Is
she not desecrating the human in order to elevate the animal and to
create a world in which we ‘‘share’’ the planet? The issue thus recedes
from being a purely ethical one and emerges full force as a historical and
eminently political one. Along with this forced entry into the realm of
the political, we note, as well, a logical problem. An audience member
thus questions Costello: ‘‘The very fact that you can be arguing against
this reasoning, exposing its falsity, means that you put a certain faith in
the power of reason, of true reason as opposed to false reason’’ (100).
Behind every critique of reason is another sort of rationality that founds
that critique. It is at this point in the novel that, as if this line of reason-
ing were exhausted, the scene abruptly shifts to a new locale: Africa.
Costello there meets her sister Blanche, now Sister Bridget, and finds
herself defending precisely reason, beauty, and choice. We find that
Costello’s beliefs respond to this new environment and to her tenuous
relationship with her sister. Costello finds herself unwittingly recruited
to be the defender of not only humanism, but also the faculty of reason.
And reason is no better borne out than in choice. Emblematic in this
section is the episode of Joseph the woodcarver, a person revered by the
religious community for his absolute dedication to God, which he man-
ifests every minute by his laborious carving, over and over again, of
crucifixes. In response to her sister’s comment that Joseph can take
gratification in Jesus’ joy over this ‘‘choice,’’ Costello replies sardonically,
‘‘I would think Jesus would be gladder still . . . if he knew that Joseph had
some choice. That Joseph had not been dragooned into piety’’ (138). In
the same way that Sultan the ape is ‘‘dragooned’’ away from ethical
questions and into the sheer practicality of remaining alive, Costello
claims that Joseph has been lured away from choosing a broad range of
aesthetic life (which she relates to the ideal aesthetic of the ancient
Greeks) and into the mere repetition of a single figure, repeatedly de-
picted in exactly the same pose and posture. To her, this makes no sense.
Yet to Blanche it not only makes perfect sense to adhere to this con-
straint, which is a source of joy, not suffering, but is also senseless to
abandon it in order to gain something so pointless in her sister’s aes-
thetic: ‘‘I do not need to consult novels . . . to know what pettiness, what
56 Chapter One
baseness, what cruelty human beings are capable of ’’ (128). That is to
say, even in sheer economic terms, the cost is hardly worth it; in fact, it
is to trade down one life choice for another. Frustrated by the fail-
ure to win the argument with her sister, Costello undergoes another
transformation.
Performing first the role of aesthete against the hegemony of cold
reason, then the role of liberal secular humanist armed with reason
against the hegemony of cold, choiceless religious passion, Elizabeth
next takes on the role of a moralist who will constrain the very realm of
artistic choice that she has just championed against religious constraint.
She is invited to give a talk in Amsterdam on ‘‘Witness, Silence, Censor-
ship,’’ and during that period becomes deeply disturbed by Paul West’s
novel The Very Rich Hours of Count von Stauffenberg, in which the author
offers a horrifyingly graphic account of the final, tortured existence of
the conspirators against Hitler. If previously she championed literary art
for its aesthetic humanistic value, and for its ethically critical ability to
put us in touch with others of all species, now Costello draws back and
blocks off certain ‘‘realities’’ from our scope of empathy, for our own
sake: ‘‘She is no longer sure that people are always improved by what
they read. Furthermore, she is not sure that writers who venture into the
darker territories of the soul always return unscathed. She has begun to
wonder whether writing what one desires, any more than reading what
one desires, is in itself a good thing’’ (160). We have come some distance
then from the imperative to be able to choose one’s poetic investments,
as seen in the episode of the crucifix maker, to the delimiting of aesthetic
choice found in this passage. Indeed, choice is taken out of the realm of
aesthetics and placed squarely into the realm of ethics: ‘‘She no longer
believes that storytelling is good in itself. . . . If she . . . had to choose
between telling a story and doing good, she would rather, she thinks, do
good’’ (167). Nevertheless, this transition is not founded in anything
logical or rational. With neither aesthetic nor rational criteria to guide
her, Costello is cast into the realm of sheer faith, or belief. And this is
indeed the subject of the penultimate sequence of the novel.
Costello finds herself in a Kafkaesque situation, in a remote Italian
village, petitioning before an anonymous tribunal to cross over to ‘‘the
other side,’’ and we seem to have come full circle back to the novel’s
initial statement: ‘‘There is first of all the problem of the opening,
namely, how to get us from where we are, which is, as yet, nowhere, to
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the far bank.’’ We have come, in other words, to the final ‘‘bridge’’ to be
crossed, the final solution to be arrived at, and it is a problem precisely
of crossing over, between events, locales, and subjectivities, between
life and death. In this state of limbo, Coetzee plumbs the depths of
language and articulation, of intersubjectivity, of Costello’s adamant
individual will and the social nature of writing and of speaking to and
with an other.
The judges have one and only one question: what does Costello
believe in? The novel is about nothing if not the inventory of possible
modes of belief: in reason, in art, in religion, in other human beings,
in our capacity to imagine lives other than our own, and in the reason-
ableness of choices we ourselves would perhaps not have made (poetic
and otherwise). Here, near the very end of the novel, we find Costello
unable, or unwilling, to admit to believing in anything, even if it means
release—a highly irrational choice, if her intent is to reach the other
side. Naming her belief will mean release precisely because, according
to the belief of the tribunal, it will attest to nothing less than her hu-
manity: ‘‘Without beliefs we are not human’’ (200). But Costello rejects
this statement, interpreting it as requiring that beliefs be rational: ‘‘Be-
liefs are not the only ethical supports we have. We can rely on our hearts
as well. That is all. I have nothing more to say’’ (203). Yet, crucially,
the retreat is not from rationality to sentimentality, and the reliance on
‘‘our hearts’’ leads rather to an evacuation of self and a merging with the
other. Costello’s refusal to state her beliefs is paradoxically founded on a
belief in an indistinct and fluctuating self. She defiantly asks the tri-
bunal, ‘‘But who am I, who is this I, this you? We change from day to
day, and we also stay the same. No I, no you is more fundamental
that any other. You might as well ask which is the true Elizabeth Cos-
tello: the one who made the first statement or the one who made
the second. My answer is, both are true. Both. And neither. I am an
other’’ (221).
At this point in the novel the ‘‘bridge’’ to be made between individuals
and the significance of their choices and actions collapses, and this also
marks the implosion of the enclosure of the Self. However, this is a
riposte that has been with us since the beginning of Costello’s lecture on
realism. We can thus read Elizabeth Costello as following the vacillating,
inconsistent trajectory of reason, emotion, belief, art and religion, all
ultimately tied to the problematic of otherness: how do we ‘‘know’’ or
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understand other living beings? What constitutes our emotional re-
sponse to their lives? How can reason, art, religion form the foundations
on which we meet the other? And, crucially, are we capable of concep-
tualizing ourselves either as apart from, or as indistinct from, the other?
And what are the costs of both conceptualizations? While the novel
spends the bulk of its time challenging us to imagine otherwise, the end
of the novel presents the vertiginous descent into a maelstrom not only
of oneness, but also of paralysis.
This conclusion is dramatically articulated in the text that introduces
the postscript to the novel, Hugo von Hofmannstahl’s ‘‘Letter to Lord
Chandos from Lord Bacon’’: ‘‘It is as if everything, everything that
exists, everything I can recall, everything my confused thinking touches
on, means something’’ (226). This statement achieves its full signifi-
cance only in light of, again, Costello’s opening comments on realism:
for realism the task is to ‘‘supply the particulars, [then] allow the signifi-
cations to emerge of themselves’’ (4). The problem now before us is
precisely that there is an overabundance of particulars, so much so that
everything ‘‘means something,’’ and that the discriminations and hier-
archies secured by reason are under attack: with the proliferation of
diversity reason turns to con-fusion.
The coextensivity of language and being, of rational discrimination
and ontological indistinction, is paralleled in the companion piece to
Lord Chandos’s agony over the influx of irrationality. I am referring to
Lady Chandos’s agony over the influx of otherness, as found in the
‘‘Letter of Elizabeth, Lady Chandos, to Francis Bacon’’: ‘‘All is allegory,
says my Philip. Each creature is key to all other creatures. A dog sitting
in a patch of sun licking itself, says he, is at one moment a dog and at the
next a vessel of revelation. But I ask you can I live with rats and dogs
and beetles crawling through me day and night, drowning and gasp-
ing, scratching me, tugging me, urging me deeper and deeper into
revelation—how? We are not made for revelation’’ (229). This seems to
be a final rebuttal of Costello’s project of writing, a rebuttal of the
challenge of projecting oneself outside oneself and of ‘‘sharing’’ the
planet with all other life forms. Whether through art or religion, this
project or challenge and the attendant revelation are to be rejected, for
they will ultimately strip one of reason and selfhood at once. And yet
even as language itself is dragged along unremittingly by a flood of
otherness, as each creature allegorizes another, and each word then
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bleeds into another (‘‘It is like a contagion, saying one thing always for
another’’), the final appeal is made precisely through language, and
more precisely through writing, to a man who is known to the writer of
the letter as one who ‘‘selects’’ his words and ‘‘sets them in place’’ and
‘‘builds his judgments’’ with discretion and discernment. And here, in
this linguistic freefall, we can see the trace of Emmanuel Levinas’s call to
radically reconceive our ontological presumptions and see the emer-
gence of self as always preceded by an irreducible other. Levinas himself
uses language as a key corollary for this: ‘‘Everything depends on the
possibility of vibrating with a meaning that is not synchronized with the
speech that captures it and cannot be fitted into its order; everything
depends on the possibility of a signification that would signify in an ir-
reducible disturbance.’’∂∫ In this passage from Elizabeth Costello, I would
assert, we find such a disturbance perpetrated by the constant slippage
of signifiers, unmoored from ‘‘order’’ and madly referencing themselves
and not things (anymore).
And thus we note that the structure being built at the end of this novel
is not the realist bridge between particulars (‘‘It is a simple bridging
problem, a problem of knocking together a bridge’’), but rather a wall:
‘‘Yet he writes to you, as I write to you, who are known above all men to
select your words and set them in place and build your judgments as a
mason builds a wall with bricks. Drowning, we write out of our separate
fates. Save us. Your obedient servant, Elizabeth C. this 11 September
1603’’ (229). This wall is the barrier between radical irrationality, as
found in the vertiginous semantic slippage into and among otherness
(‘‘But I ask you can I live with rats and dogs and beetles crawling
through me day and night, drowning and gasping, scratching me, tug-
ging me, urging me deeper and deeper into revelation—how?’’), and a
specific kind of realism signaled by linguistic stability (‘‘You select your
words and set them in place and build your judgments as a mason builds
a wall with bricks’’).
Coetzee’s text rearticulates the ardent hope that literature can deliver
others to us, and us to others, in an unreasonable, irrational, and emi-
nently total manner, and yet it shows behind the dissolution of distance
and of singular being, behind a successful poet(h)ics, a maddening slide
beyond the ken of the mind, a journey across a bridge that leads into a
horrible mystery that can only be intimated with trepidation. Dissatis-
fied with the rational because of its hegemonic dominance of mental
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activity, its monopoly on the definition of what it is that separates
humans from humans and humans from animals, and the cruelty that
follows in the wake of such a separation, Elizabeth Costello nonetheless
draws no conclusion, ultimately, only a wall, and in so doing forces on
us, the readers, a choice of rationality enabled by linguistic fixity and
‘‘realism,’’ or madness brought about by too much otherness.
Or perhaps this is a matter of too much ethics. For Coetzee is pressing
us to rethink in radical terms the notion of rationality as it is used to
segregate us from nonhuman animals. If Costello has punctured the
illusion of the rational as somehow transcendent and pure, then she has
also laid bare the logical and ethical consequences of embracing other-
ness absolutely. For Coetzee, the appearance of this issue comes about
at the appearance of a particular ‘‘slot’’ of possibilities opened up in our
recent avatar of globalization: ‘‘Whatever is wrong (in the relations
between human beings and other animals) has become wrong on a
huge scale in the last 100 or 150 years, as traditional animal husbandry
has been turned into an industry using industrial methods of produc-
tion.’’∂Ω The perpetuation of inhuman acts on those who are only avail-
able to us as objectified others on a mass scale because they have been
denied the attribute of a problematic and nonnatural rationality is what
draws Coetzee’s attention, as it exposes our mass complicity.
The vast majority [are those people] who in one way or another sup-
port the industrial use of animals by making use of the products of that
industry but are nevertheless a little sickened, a little queasy, when they
think of what happens on factory farms and abattoirs and therefore
arrange their lives in such a way that they need to be reminded of farms
and abattoirs as little as possible, and do their best to ensure that their
children are kept in the dark too, because as we all know children have
tender hearts and are easily moved.∑≠
How does this particular choice of action—not just to kill, but to
breed to kill—rely on a slot of technical possibilities (industrial tech-
nologies) coupled with a particular ‘‘delivery system’’ that diverges from
and contorts our relations to nonhuman animals? How are affect and
sympathy, those hallmarks of eighteenth-century literature which we
contemporaries still feel are part of what literature ‘‘delivers’’ to us via
otherness, blocked in this particular case? The crisis in literary form
coincides with the crisis in ethics and animal rights. Everything depends
on how we secure our position as writing subjects, as human beings,
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on the notion of possessing something the nonhuman animals lack:
rationality. The overflow of otherness is therefore attributable to the
breakdown of this barrier, as reason is dethroned. The debunking of
reason as the absolute determinant of exceptional human being and also
of human rights forces us to address the issue of the ‘‘sameness’’ of
nonhuman animals at this point in history when technology has allowed
for mass extermination of both the human and nonhuman animal. How
are we to act ethically in this new world?
Elizabeth Costello’s cynicism can be traced, ultimately, to an observa-
tion she makes early on, one that we now need to revisit.
There used to be a time when we knew. We used to believe that when
the text said, ‘‘on the table stood a glass of water,’’ there was indeed a
table, and a glass of water on it, and we had only to look at the word-
mirror of the text to see them. But all that has ended. The word-mirror is
broken, irreparably, it seems. About what is really going on in the lecture
hall your guess is as good as mine: men and men, men and apes, apes
and men, apes and apes. . . . There used to be a time, we believe, when
we could say who we were. Now we are just performers speaking our
parts. The bottom has dropped out. (19)
This remarkable passage contains, indeed, nearly the entire trajectory of
the novel, moving from an age when knowledge was sure, when ra-
tionality did its work, and, coextensively, when literary language did its
work as well: when the text said something, it conjured up that thing in
our minds and in our system of belief. Words mirrored things, and
projected them into our consciousness as well. In short, literature could
do its work because the reader was able to make the connections be-
tween words and images, particular events and actions and some in-
tended significance. One could, in short, have a particularly realistic set
of beliefs and assumptions underwrite one’s choice-making.∑∞ But the
breaking of the word-mirror has to be seen not only in the context of a
rupturing of literary functionality, but also in the context of a spill-over
effect from the text to the world in general, and it is a world which itself
contains too much alterity, a world in which the global intrudes and
insists on being fully recognized as other. This is where the ethical
comes into play. And it does so through an ontological crisis concerning
not just the social, but also the species. In this crisis, realism itself seems
to fall victim to unbridled otherness. Who are ‘‘we’’ (to go back to the
testimony delivered to the tribunal)?
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It is this aspect of the novel, beyond the simultaneous dissolution of
both rationality and art, that is most troubling. For Coetzee seems to be
saying that the dissolution of the rational and the aesthetic occurs
within a systemic meltdown that takes along with it the ethical and
political. And all this is attributable in no small degree to the invasion of
otherness and the failure of the liberal imagination to make good on its
aspiration to accommodate it. For as much as romantic liberal human-
ists welcome the opportunity to share the planet, the novel suggests that
without a foundation of reasonable belief to secure the project, we are at
a loss to survive the tidal wave of difference, because it will have taken
effective political action with it. The ‘‘globe’’ will outdo us, not because
of its mass or multiplicity, but because we have no workable political
instrument with which to mediate and negotiate a settlement. That
underpinning is taken away precisely by the exhaustion of realism and
the dethroning of rationality in the face of the nonhuman animal. If ra-
tionality no longer absolutely skewers our difference from them, every-
thing has to be renegotiated. And that is precisely the work Coetzee sets
out for us.
Let me urge us to read this problematic in a different, though I think
related, history, which is exactly what Coetzee does in his most cele-
brated novel, Disgrace (1999), which locates itself very specifically in the
transitional era in South African history when blacks begin to take on
more and more rights. It is only by reading Elizabeth Costello in concert
with Disgrace that I believe the full weight of either can be felt. The
abstractions of one illuminate the political and historical precision of
the other, and vice versa; the dilemma of ‘‘animal’’ otherness is linked
surely to the issue of racial otherness. The plot of Disgrace is well-
enough known. David Lurie, a professor forced to resign his teach-
ing post in Cape Town for sexually harassing a young undergraduate
woman, takes up residence at his daughter’s smallholding in the coun-
try. Lucy maintains a sustenance-style farmhouse and dog kennel; she is
the last of a group of young people trying to make a go of living off the
land. David is brutally beaten and Lucy violently raped by a group of
young black men. During the rape, she is impregnated. In the course of
the novel, the identity of at least one of the perpetrators becomes
known. However, although David urges her time and again to lodge a
formal complaint against the boy, Lucy refuses. Just as Elizabeth Cos-
tello attempts to finesse the rationality of the tribunal, whom she stands
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before on the passage from life to death, so, too, do both David and
Lucy, in separate instances, refuse to give testimony before two different
tribunals. Lurie refuses to mouth the confession and apology tacitly set
up as requisites for him to be able to retain his teaching position; Lucy
refuses to press charges. Why is that? Why make that choice to relin-
quish rights and justice? Although I am not prepared to argue that the
ethics or logic of father’s and daughter’s refusal to speak are the same, I
do believe they share an appreciation of the fact that they are caught out
of step with their historical moment. For Lurie, the age of romanticism,
of literature, of aesthetics, is gone, as are the days when rape could pass
easily for seduction. For Lucy, to keep to her original bargain to live off
the land requires that she compromise and become not a landowner,
but a tenant, effectively switching places with the black African Petrus,
who will take over her property, as she, traumatized by her victimage
and by the new laws, must acquiesce to the fact that ‘‘her’’ land is
inevitably, one day or another, going to revert to the ownership of black
Africans.
Like her father, who leaves Cape Town and withdraws into a seem-
ingly endless and futile attempt to finish a libretto, Lucy performs her
own retreat from the protocols of filing a charge of rape with the author-
ities. For her, the rape becomes purely a ‘‘private matter’’ precisely
because the historical moment has changed—what would have been a
reasonable, rational course of action now has to be reassessed, given
history and, in particular, her new relation to the other. This in turn
transforms her sense of herself and her role as an actor in the world. She
tells her father,
This has nothing to do with you, David. You want to know why I have
not laid a particular charge with the police. I will tell you, as long as you
agree not to raise the subject again. The reason is that, as far as I’m
concerned, what happened to me is a purely private matter. In another
time, in another place, it might be held to be a public matter. But in this
place, at this time, it is not. It is my business, mine alone.∑≤
Conversely, her father relentlessly pursues the cause and culpability of
the act, interrogating Lucy’s tenant, Petrus, suspecting that Petrus’s
involvement could have ranged from simply turning a blind eye to the
invasion, to actually planning the crime as a way to drive Lucy off the
land and acquire it himself. Was it simply a random act of racism against
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whites or a carefully planned and executed act of violent dispossession?
‘‘Do you know, Petrus,’’ he says, ‘‘I find it hard to believe the men who
came here were strangers. I find it hard to believe they arrived out of
nowhere, and did what they did, and disappeared afterwards like ghosts.
And I find it hard to believe that the reason they picked on us was simply
that we were the first white folk they met that day. What do you think?
Am I wrong?’’ (118). For both David and Lucy, there is a gradual yet final
realization that history has brought a profound and irreversible change
to South Africa, and no ‘‘normal’’ remedy or action is possible, given the
radical change in the delivery system. While Lucy declares, ‘‘As for
Petrus, he is not some hired laborer whom I can sack because in my
opinion he is mixed up with the wrong people. That’s all gone, gone
with the wind’’ (133), David asserts that his daughter’s dream of staying
on and farming the land alone is doomed to fail: ‘‘Yet [Lucy] too will
have to leave, in the long run. As a woman alone on a farm she has no
future, that is clear. Even the days of Ettinger, with his guns and barbed
wire and alarm systems, are numbered’’ (134).
David presents this ‘‘rational choice’’: ‘‘Lucy, it is really time for you to
face up your choices. Either you stay on in a house full of ugly memories
and go on brooding on what has happened to you, or you put the whole
episode behind you and start a new chapter elsewhere. Those, as I see it,
are the alternatives. I know you would like to stay, but shouldn’t you at
least consider the other route? Can’t the two of us talk about it ra-
tionally?’’ (155). The problem, of course, is that they cannot talk about it
rationally, for each sees the future of South Africa from a radically
different angle—if only for the fact that David cannot not act as a father,
a role he has heretofore only performed occasionally and without full
consciousness of who his daughter is. For him, this situation calls not
only for him to protect his daughter and gain justice for her, but also for
him to negate the horrible truth that his grandchild will be the bastard
child of a black rapist. If David’s promiscuous reenactments of ‘‘ro-
mance’’ in a cynical age yield only barren and alienated pleasure, Lucy’s
motherhood will be a wretched symbol of the new position of whites in
South Africa.
The outcome of David’s presenting the rational choice to Lucy actu-
ally predicts the resolution to the tale: Lucy cannot stay on ‘‘alone,’’ and
the solution to that is for her to marry the black African Petrus and have
him claim the child she is to bear as his. If this is the new realism in
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South Africa, the new way actions will unfold with this radical revision
of the subject paradigm, it is a heavy irony that Lucy asks her father to
present her contract to Petrus—as if echoing Coetzee’s own assumption
of the voice of Elizabeth Costello, David ventriloquizes Lucy. She gives
him the script for the presentation of, as Brook Thomas puts it, the new
contractual agreement of a post-apartheid South Africa, one where the
other is allowed to determine the narrative.
Go back to Petrus. Propose the following. Say I accept his protection.
Say he can put out whatever story he likes about our relationship and I
won’t contradict him. If he wants me to be known as his third wife, so be
it. As his concubine, ditto. But then the child becomes his too. The child
becomes part of his family. As for the land, say I will sign the land over to
him as long as the house remains mine. I will become attendant on his
land. (204)
It is crucial to note that with this new power to tell ‘‘whatever story he
likes,’’ Petrus is not totally unencumbered, for with that power comes
the obligation for him to acknowledge as well his responsibility—this
‘‘fiction’’ will now contain a symbolic real, and he must accept the child
of the rape as his product. In Lucy’s case, it is clear that ‘‘otherness,’’ in
this case blackness, has merged into the paradigm of privilege and
ownership heretofore denied it. Within the specific ‘‘delivery system’’
that now incorporates blacks and whites, what used to be an area of
exclusion and separateness has become, at least in potential, common
ground.
A tectonic shift in rights, ownership, results in a different kind of
voicedness.∑≥ Crucially, what we are presented with is not the age of
apartheid or of some revolutionary post-apartheid world, but, as Nadine
Gordimer says, life ‘‘in the interregnum.’’ If in Elizabeth Costello the
outcome of too much otherness flooding the paradigm of ‘‘human’’ is a
general paralysis of that category, in Disgrace the result is an overwhelm-
ing sense of resignation to history as well. The great accomplishment of
that novel lies in the characters’ attempts to salvage from it all some
moment of grace, in terms of both racial and animal being. The line
between resignation and grace, however, is very thin.
Disgrace ends with the most radical vision of commonality, the same
found at the end of Elizabeth Costello: human and nonhuman animal
have merged. Here is the final exchange between David and Lucy.
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‘‘Yes, I agree, it is humiliating. But perhaps that is a good point to start
from again. Perhaps that is what I must learn to accept. To start at
ground level. With nothing. Not with nothing but. With nothing. No
cards, no weapons, no property, no rights, no dignity.’’
‘‘Like a dog.’’
‘‘Yes, like a dog.’’ (205)
However, we should note a key difference between this notion of a
human and nonhuman fusion and the one found in Elizabeth Costello.
Unlike Elizabeth Costello’s absolute, transcendent merging of human
and animal, in Disgrace the relationship between humans and animals is
historically precise—it is not all humans who are now like dogs, but spe-
cifically the older white male intellectual in post-apartheid South Africa.
I now turn to another South African novelist’s treatment of the same
era, Nadine Gordimer’s My Son’s Story (1990). In it, we find another
meditation on the role and nature of narrative at a time of radically
increased contact with the other. Here, however, ‘‘the political’’ is placed
in the foreground, and its possibilities read specifically as involved in an
interracial problematic. Crucially, Gordimer powerfully installs gender
as a key element that allows a different kind of political action to take
place. Its altogether startling conclusion suggests a feminization of poli-
tics and a complex, ambivalent stance toward literary art. In short, we
find a compelling and qualitatively different address to these twin ‘‘de-
livery systems.’’
≤
Whose Story Is It?
At a key moment in her novel My Son’s Story (1990), Nadine Gordimer
describes a particular convergence of whites and blacks at a politi-
cal rally.
An avenue of black faces looked into the windows, pressing close, so that
the combis had to slow to these people’s walking pace in order not to
crush them under the wheels. No picnic party; the whites found them-
selves at once surrounded by, gazed at, gazing into the faces of these
blacks who had stoned white drivers on the main road, who had taken
control of this place out of the hands of white authority, who refused to
pay for the right to exist in the decaying ruins of the war of attrition
against their presence too close across the veld; these people who killed
police collaborators, in their impotence to stop the police killing their
children. One thing to read about them in the papers, to empathize with
them, across the veld; Hannah felt the fear in her companions like a rise
in temperature inside the vehicle. She slid open the window beside her.
Instead of stones, black hands reached in, met and touched first hers and
then those of all inside who reached out to them. The windows were
opened. Passengers jostled one another for the blessing of the hands,
the healing touch. Some never saw the faces of those whose fingers they
held for a moment before the combi’s progress broke the grasp. In the
crush outside faces gleaming in welcome bobbed up.∞
The passage lends itself to be read allegorically. As the whites attempt to
express their solidarity with blacks, their gesture is stalled for a moment:
blacks themselves block that expression and draw attention to them-
selves not simply as abstract political objects of identification, but as
real, embodied, human beings. That interruption, that stalling, carves
out a time and a place for mutual observation: each group gazes into the
68 Chapter Two
other’s faces, not past them. At the same time that blacks are recognized
as agents of both violence and resistance, whites are identified as exist-
ing within a specific relationship to that violence and resistance. That is
how the two groups ‘‘know’’ each other. Critically, this encounter is
emphatically historicized—the ‘‘war of attrition’’ marks a key element in
Gordimer’s later novels. Gordimer describes herself at a certain mo-
ment as, borrowing from Gramsci, living ‘‘in the interregnum,’’ that is, in
the slow transitional period into a post-apartheid age.
This new contact zone differs as the political relation shifts, from that
of damage done by rocks hurled from a distance, to the laying on of
hands through the windows of the combis, and finally to physical to-
getherness and political solidarity. The new proximity requires a new
way of sensing human social space, from one in which certain humans
are brought together exclusively under a specific logic of political econ-
omy, to another, which produces and contains a different community.
The blacks were accustomed to closeness. In queues for transport, for
work permits, for housing allocation, for all the stamped paper that
authorized their lives; loaded into over-crowded trains and buses to take
them back and forth across the veld, fitting a family into one room, they
cannot keep the outline of space another, invisible skin-whites project
around themselves, distanced from each other in everything but sexual
and parental intimacy. But now in the graveyard the people from the
combis were dispersed from one another and the spatial aura they
instinctively kept, and pressed into a single, vast, stirring being with the
people of the township. The nun was close against the breast of a man. A
black child with his little naked penis waggling under a shirt clung to the
leg of a professor. A woman’s French perfume and the sweat of a drunk
merged as if one breath came from them. And yet it was not alarming for
the whites; in fact, an old fear of closeness, of the odours and heat of
other flesh, was gone. One ultimate body of bodies was inhaling and
exhaling in the single diastole and systole, and above was the freedom of
the great open afternoon sky. (110)
This emphatically is a moral and political moment, eminently collec-
tive, as individual faces are blurred and indistinct, almost irrelevant,
signaling a broad historical sweep. But alongside this image of solidarity,
of fusion, there is nonetheless a residual difference. The whites have
been blessed by the laying on of black hands, in a moment of redemp-
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tion and reconciliation, and hence are granted absolution from the ‘‘old
fear of closeness.’’ Yet even in the construction of this celebratory and
indeed utopian ‘‘body of bodies,’’ the same is not said of blacks. Indeed,
‘‘freedom’’ as it exists resides above, not among them. It is as if the image
leading up to this ‘‘body of bodies’’ has not faded into the historical past;
it is an image of language that is not quite yet able to be shared as easily
as it is pronounced. And the reason for this is that its historical function
is still too deeply rooted in one linguistic, social, and racial community
whose segregation from the rest has been too deeply rooted and per-
sistently enforced to be forgotten. This stubborn historical fact forces a
rereading of ‘‘unity’’ and a reinterpretation of political language, spoken
and gestural.
There were the cries, Amandla! Viva! and joy when these were taken
up by the whites, and there were the deep dreamy intonations of the
old-time greetings, ‘‘nkos’’ from people too ancient to grasp that this,
granted to whites, now represents shameful servility. In the smiling haze
of weekend-drunks the procession of white people was part of the illu-
sions that softened the realities of the week’s labour, and made the
improbable appear possible. The crowd began to sing, of course, and
toyi-toyi, the half-dance, half-procession alongside the convoy bringing,
among the raised fists of most in the combis, a kind of embarrassed
papal or royal weighing-of-air-in-the-hand as a gracious response from
others. (109)
In this novel are two images that refuse to resolve into one: the image in
which otherness is dissolved, subordinated by a larger inclusivity in
which differences are at least conditionally erased; and another in which
history refuses to be so easily swept into the past and replaced by a
new order. The question then becomes whether the literary imagina-
tion, and literary art, can envision a set of new historical conditions
under which that emergence of solidarity between self and other might
take place. Can it work against the grain of a history of segregation
and separateness, of a material history that is not ready yet to accom-
modate such a vision? Can it provide a picture of anything else but the
silence found at the end of both of Coetzee’s novels, at the same his-
torical moment?
My Son’s Story announces its attention to these themes in its very nar-
rative conceit: Gordimer places the narration (largely) in the hands of
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a young adolescent black man, named ‘‘Will’’ by his father in homage to
Shakespeare. The boundaries of gender and age are thus imaginatively
crossed as Gordimer takes on the voice of the other, inventing it not out
of the ether, but from a literary imagination informed by historical
memory and present-day contact. As in Elizabeth Costello, in My Son’s
Story the protagonist happens to be a writer of fiction, but this bond
between the actual author and the protagonist-as-author is not the only
link that appears to reach across their differences in gender and age: it is
also critical to note that there is the essential link of national identity. It
is precisely in playing out its negotiations of otherness within this emi-
nently national framework that the story is grounded; its characters and
their relations are situated in a highly particularized time, place, and set
of interests. The questions that form the core of this book’s discussion
of writing, imagination, and the ways people are brought together—
which include their historical relation as well as their imagined relation
to the world, what Althusser famously calls ‘‘ideology’’—demand to be
understood within this frame, even as they point outward to larger,
universal thematics.
My Son’s Story provides a comprehensive portrayal of all these issues,
addressing the transgression of sexual, racial, moral, political, national,
and gender boundaries that keep different peoples separated out into
various groups of ‘‘others.’’ At base, the novel’s problematic seems to ar-
gue a zero-sum game: as boundaries are destabilized, as players change
position, new points of balance and equilibrium are established. It is as
if the world cannot tolerate too much change, of any sort, and that shifts
in the political, sexual, racial landscape end up settling into other, but
similar, patterns of empowerment and disempowerment. Before mov-
ing into my reading of My Son’s Story along these lines of inquiry, it
would be good to first listen to what Gordimer has to say about writing,
otherness, and South African history.
Writing, Identification and Disidentification, Otherness
Let’s begin with a very basic question: how does Gordimer ‘‘identify’’
with her topic and the people, real and fictional, that go into the making
of her novel? If literature is to bring us into contact with distant others
across geographic, cultural, class, gender, racial differences, how does
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the writer begin to form some idea of what that other might be, and
what constraints—aesthestic, intellectual, ethical—might pertain? In
the introduction to a 1976 collection of her short stories, Gordimer
describes the genesis of her writing process: ‘‘I have written from the
starting point of other people’s ‘real’ lives; what I have written represents
alternatives to the development of a life as it was formed before I
encountered it and as it will continue, out of my sight. . . . Fiction is a
way of exploring possibilities present but undreamt of in the living of a
single life.’’≤
Gordimer then focuses on the intimate connection between writing
and ethics.
Powers of observation heightened beyond the normal imply extraordi-
nary disinvolvement; or rather the double process. Excessive preoccupa-
tion and identification with the lives of others, and at the same time a
monstrous detachment. For identification brings the superficial loy-
alties (that is, to the self ) of concealment and privacy, while detachment
brings the harsher fidelities (to the truth about the self ) of revealment
and exposure. The tension between standing apart and being fully in-
volved; that is what makes a writer. There is where we begin. The
validity of this dialectic is the synthesis of revelation; our achievement
of, or even attempt at this is the moral, the human justification of what
we do.≥
This resembles nothing as much as Adam Smith’s detached observer.
But Gordimer develops this ethical notion further, in relation to the act
of writing fiction.
According to Gordimer, writing’s ‘‘double process’’ involves not only a
fascination with the lives of others, but also both identification and its
opposite. And yet, she continues, the focus becomes not the other, but
the self. Identification, it seems, has become complete—the other has
become identical, however contingently and momentarily, to the self,
which now itself requires the loyalty and discretion owed to the other.
At the same time, to even be able to write demands forgoing that right
to privacy and the ‘‘exposure’’ of the secret understanding forged be-
tween other and self. This is what writers do, ultimately: they not only
invent but also expose the imagined union between the other and the
self. And yet it cannot be lost to readers that the ‘‘other’’ in this formula-
tion has a rather ephemeral existence. Almost instantaneously, it disap-
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pears and the ‘‘tension’’ of disclosure exists purely within the right to
hide the self and the impulse to disclose it. The issue could be one of
simple, unreflective egotism, but I think that is too easy an interpreta-
tion. It might be more useful to consider seriously what allows that
precipitous, seemingly unconscious slip. It would be better to delve
more deeply into the act of writing. On the one hand, this act seems
simply to involve dipping into the ‘‘real’’ life of others in order to grasp a
small moment of it, then setting it back on its way into the flow of ‘‘real’’
history, having mined it for a particle of life to be recast in the forge of
the literary imagination. On the other hand, writing seems to be caught
between the desire to discreetly protect from view this newly minted
imaginary construction of a new self and the compulsion to ‘‘expose’’
and in fact share that figment with the world. This latter option is a
politically motivated one.
In Gordimer, the compulsion to express the internalized encounter
with the other—that is, this newly arrived at imaginative world—is
highly specific to the political situation in which she finds herself and
the other.
A writer is a being in whose sensibility is fused what Lukacs calls
‘‘the duality of inwardness and outside world,’’ and he must never be
asked to sunder this union. The coexistence of these absolutes often
seems irreconcilable within one life, for me. In another country, another
time, they would present no conflict because they would operate in
unrelated parts of existence; in South Africa now they have to be co-
ordinates for which the coupling must be found. The morality of life and
the morality of art have broken out of their categories in social flux. If
you cannot reconcile them, they cannot be kept from one another’s
throats, within you.∂
In this quotation, Gordimer connects the act of writing fiction to the
specific challenge of South Africa. More particularly, she brings forward
a term missing from the previous passages we have considered; the issue
is now more than simply ‘‘art’’ and ‘‘life,’’ the inward and the outward,
concealment and disclosure. Along with the insistence that these dy-
namics be located in time and space is the assertion that morality colors
all, and that morality is tied to social phenomena. We now are asked to
consider the ethicopolitical demands that intrude on what might other-
wise be regarded as only a debate within oneself as to whether to express
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or repress the contents of one’s imagined encounter with another, one’s
projection of that image into the world.
The imagination is now to be seen as irrevocably linked to a consider-
ation of time and place and a larger social context. This context is not
fixed, but in motion and variable, creating a shifting terrain across which
to read the lives of others and one’s relation to them.
Part of these stories’ ‘‘truth’’ does depend upon faithfulness to another
series of lost events—the shifts in social attitudes as evidenced in the
characters and situations. . . . The change in social attitudes uncon-
sciously reflected in the stories represents both that of the people in my
society—that is to say, history—and my apprehension of it; in the writ-
ing, I am acting upon my society, and in the manner of my apprehen-
sion, all the time history is acting upon me.∑
In any imagining of the lives of others, and in any attempt to imag-
inatively forge from that a trajectory of life, a writer thus reads as
well the traces of the past and the present—history weighs in on one’s
understanding of one’s material, and constrains and colors one’s work-
ing with it. We therefore see, from the minimal outline of self and other,
an expansion of the act of writing into a wider consideration of his-
torical, political, ethical, and social (rather than simply intersubjec-
tive) life.
With that widening sphere, with such considerations now also ex-
tending outward to encompass a larger sphere of responsibility and
accountability, in Gordimer’s South African case is the inevitable ques-
tion of race and material history. In a speech delivered in 1979, ‘‘Rele-
vance and Commitment,’’ Gordimer draws all these elements together
in a forceful and precise account of the arts in South Africa, insisting
that ‘‘it is at the widest level of the formation of our society itself, and
not at any specific professional level, that the external power of society
enters the breast and brain of the artist and determines the nature and
state of art.’’∏ This is probably her single most comprehensive and in-
deed passionate statement on writing, race, and South Africa, and thus
bears substantial citation and discussion. First, there is her declaration
that any consideration of ‘‘culture’’ in South Africa cannot be discussed
seriously or comprehensively without attending to race relations, and
those relations in turn are irrevocably linked to material history and
economics.
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There is a question that bursts with the tendency of a mole from below
the surface of our assumptions at this conference: Do men and can men
make a common culture if their material interests conflict?
. . . The nature of art in South Africa today is primarily determined by
the conflict of material interests in South African society. We gather, rent
by that conflict, in this auditorium. On the very ground of one of South
Africa’s institutions, this 150-year-old university, we gather within a phi-
losophy of spiritual liberation that requires, among other fundamentals,
a frank appraisal of the institutions and policies of the white commu-
nities that affect the arts in South Africa.
. . . For I take it we acknowledge that as racial problems, both material
and spiritual, can hope to be solved only in circumstances of economic
equality, so the creative potential of our country cannot be discussed
without realisation and full acceptance that fulfillment of that potential
can be aimed for only on the premise of the same circumstances.
Equal economic opportunity, along with civil and parliamentary
rights for all 26 million South Africans, is rightly and inevitably the basis
for any consideration of the future of the arts.π
This is a straightforward weaving together of much of what my book is
about: the intimate connection between culture and material history,
the profound effects of the latter on the former, and the critical role that
institutions play in the ‘‘deliverance’’ of others across those terrains—
how it is that people are drawn together and kept apart at the same time
by the uneven applications of laws, economic practices, political power,
and disenfranchisement. In another essay, ‘‘Living in the Interregnum,’’
Gordimer writes, ‘‘It is not a matter of blacks taking over white institu-
tions, it is one of conceiving of institutions—from nursery schools to
government departments—that reflect a societal structure vastly dif-
ferent from that built to the specifications of white power and privi-
lege.’’∫ Importantly, she reflects on how the shifting national landscape
of race relations affects the ways one envisions one’s art as it regards
the other and one’s relation to that other. Indeed, it is exactly the lib-
eral vision of art as reconciling the discordance between the real and
the ideal that has to bear the particular contradictions of national racial
politics.
For a long time—a generation at least—the white artist has not seen
his referent as confined within white values. For a long time he as-
sumed the objective reality by which his relevance was to be mea-
Whose Story Is It? 75
sured was somewhere out there between and encompassing black and
white. Now he finds that no such relevance exists; the black has with-
drawn from a position where art, as he saw it, assumed the liberal role
Nosipho Majeke defined as that of the ‘‘conciliator between oppressor
and oppressed.’’Ω
Under such conditions, when asked the question ‘‘Where do whites fit in
in the New Africa?,’’ Gordimer is forced to reply, ‘‘Nowhere, I’m inclined
to say.’’∞≠
Nonetheless, later in the same essay Gordimer cannot refuse a conjec-
ture on the preconditions that might allow some ‘‘place’’ for whites in
the new Africa. And these preconditions involve exactly that whites take
on the imagined existence of an other. She does not venture as far as
to say that whites must imagine themselves as subjugated, colonized
people—that would be inappropriate on a number of levels, certainly.
Rather, she assigns another imagined identity for them to occupy: ‘‘The
white man who wants to fit in in the new Africa must learn a number of
hard things. He’d do well to regard himself as an immigrant to a new
country; somewhere he has never lived before, but to whose life he has
committed himself. He’ll have to forget the old impulses to leadership,
and the temptation to give advice backed by the experience and culture
of Western civilization.’’∞∞ In this situation of reidentification, whites
must disabuse themselves of both their sense of ownership and control,
but also of the cultural capital that they have heretofore been reliant on
and confident in deploying. What Gordimer has done, in inventing the
necessary reimaging of the self and its relation to the other, has de-
manded that whites identify themselves within another imaginative
narrative. Critically, their entrance into Africa is not that of colonizers
but of subaltern immigrants. Only by reidentifying themselves in an
other’s narrative can they achieve the mental and political humility now
required for them to exist in South Africa.
In the subsequent decades Gordimer shifts ground and argues that
despite the clear differences in economic and political life that separate
her experience of South Africa from that of blacks, they have both a
shared national history and a shared experience of political, if not mate-
rial life. This has given her the privilege to write about blacks. After all,
she says, echoing the problematic found in the scene of the mixed
crowd, ‘‘we have been not merely rubbing shoulders but truly in contact
with one another; there is a whole area of life where we know each other,
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despite the laws, despite everything that has kept us apart. . . . I have
gone through the bit of falling over backwards and apologizing because
I am white. . . . If I write about blacks I feel I have the right to do so.
I know enough to do so. I accept the limitations of what I know.’’∞≤ This
switch in position might be attributed to several things, not the least of
which are the changing political climate in South Africa and the inven-
tion of different tactics and strategies of resistance. Change is upon
South Africa, but it is a slow and uneven change, which, as it tears at the
roots of apartheid, pulls up other things as well. The national landscape
is marred with suspicion and hope at the same time; we see both the
intimations of a new South Africa and the stubborn residual effects of
the old.
Ultimately, a quote from Gramsci that Gordimer uses as the epigraph
for her novel July’s People defines the imaginative project—it is one of
diagnosis: ‘‘The old is dying, and the new cannot be born; in this
interregnum there arises a great diversity of morbid symptoms.’’∞≥ This
diagnosis presses into precisely the literary imagination, and the imag-
ining of a multiplicity of relations between the self and other. Perhaps
this investment in symptomology drives Gordimer to at the very least
bracket the notion of an unbreachable wall between self and other and
to put in its place a hollowed out space for the literary imagination.
Crucially, this is not simply a blank check to write at will; it is ‘‘paid for,’’
if you will, by the writer’s ability to sense deeply and live within exactly
that space and time outlined at the start of this chapter, wherein a fusion
of black and white might be at least contingently produced. But the
writer’s role there is not simply one of inhabitant, but also one of
diagnostician, critic, and reimaginer. The synaesthetic image found in
the following passage is heady and vertiginous, exhilarating and liberat-
ing, and at the same time the novelistic structure that embeds it con-
tains as well its negation. The flow and flux of self and other is channeled
and compelled in critical ways by the human and the historical. And it is
the fictional text that captures all of this, for an instant: ‘‘A woman’s
French perfume and the sweat of a drunk merged as if one breath came
from them. And yet it was not alarming for the whites; in fact, an old fear
of closeness, of the odours and heat of other flesh, was gone. One
ultimate body of bodies was inhaling and exhaling in the single diastole
and systole, and above was the freedom of the great open afternoon sky.’’
The central question for Gordimer would take on not just the nature of
such a seemingly transcendent moment, but also its roots, its uneven
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effects, and its longevity, and all this springs forth from a specific na-
tional historical moment.
My Son’s Story (?)
In My Son’s Story Gordimer examines this collective coming together
microcosmically, her sociological sampling being the family unit. It is in
the interface between the members of this family, and between the
family and the outside world, that she tests out the viability of political
struggle in South Africa. It is important to note how the connection
between private and public space is so well developed in the novel,
serving as an index of the shifting social relations, freedoms, and un-
freedoms that are manifested in the daily lives of South Africans. The
key question is how these various social, political, communal forms are
to be occupied, invested with new and different possibilities for living
together. For living together compromises the clear demarcations be-
tween private and public, social and political, history and the imagina-
tion, the self and the other. Indeed, at a key moment of the novel it
becomes clear that not only are the walls of the family house porous, but
porous, too, are psychic, ontological, and epistemological categories. In
response to an interviewer’s question regarding her novel None to Ac-
company Me, Gordimer remarks on the relationship she constructs be-
tween a white woman and a black man; this relationship bears a strong
resemblance to one found in My Son’s Story.
There’s something special about their relationship; it’s really not pos-
sible to define it. I think the whole thing is, she doesn’t try to define it;
she accepts it: it is there. It’s an irrational thing, because—if you look at
his background and the way that they met—here is a man coming out of
the squatter camp. But, of course, if you’re looking at it in a political way,
it’s connected with what is quoted on the jacket of the book: that with
the passing of an old regime, perhaps there is a possibility of living a new
way, of discovering a new self. So that is the connection with the fact
that he is a prominent black man. He’s living in a way quite different
from the way anybody in his world has lived before—as a businessman,
an entrepreneur. And yet he comes from the heart of the struggle, living
there in the squatter camp. So he is becoming someone who can answer
what he sees as the demands of his time. Some people can never change.
78 Chapter Two
They may be wonderful in a certain situation and totally impotent in
another. It is always difficult to analyze your own books, but if I try to
analyze it, what Vera and Zeph have in common is that they are both
moving into a different life and perhaps, with it, there can be a different
kind of relationship.∞∂
Let’s begin by looking at My Son’s Story in a ‘‘political way.’’ After all, we
can gather from its author’s remarks that the political texturing of ordi-
nary existence is unavoidable, if not overdetermining. At this precise
moment in history, along the calibrations of the ‘‘interregnum,’’ the new
‘‘self ’’ is not only made possible, but certain old selves are also rendered
untenable, or only tenable in new ways. The relationship between Vera
and Zeph is one between two individuals whose lives are caught in this
new historical configuration, a still-in-between state. The old Africa has
shaped them, and they are carrying that identity into a new territory,
one that will encase and redefine their relationship. The question will
become whether the loss of old demarcations of self and other, brought
about in the name of solidarity, has truly been liberating. Is it possible to
break out of old categories in ways that control against the too-great
influx of people and new forms of political and social behavior?
The first scene of My Son’s Story brings all these issues together within
what appears to be a rather mundane scene. Gordimer draws us into an
understanding of apartheid, its shifting historical permutations, its ef-
fects on the everyday, and the way the everyday taps into the deep racial
divides and psychic effects of apartheid. The novel opens onto a scene
outside a movie theater. The narrator, Will, a young black African, is
playing hooky from his exam preparation, enjoying a brief respite of
freedom at a theater that has recently opened its doors to blacks. Gor-
dimer is keenly attuned to the ways in which everyday ‘‘institutions’’
manifest the imagined relation (hence ideological relation) between
blacks and whites. Indeed, in one essay she uses precisely the cinema as
an example of the interlacing of institutions, laws, and perceptions of
everyday life for blacks and whites.
A more equitable distribution of wealth may be enforced by laws. The
hierarchy of perception that white institutions and living habits implant
throughout daily experience in every white, from childhood, can be
changed only by whites themselves, from within. The weird ordering of
the collective life, in South Africa, has slipped its special contact lens
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into the eyes of whites; we actually see blacks differently, which includes
not seeing, not noticing their unnatural absence, since there are so many
perfectly ordinary venues of daily life—the cinema, for instance—where
blacks have never been allowed in, and so one has forgotten that they
could be, might be, encountered there.∞∑
At this precise moment, on leaving the movie theater, Will runs into
his father, Sonny, who is with a white woman. Will’s first reaction is that
he has ‘‘discovered’’ his father. This discovery is not simply about his
father’s assumed infidelity with regard to Will’s mother and family; it
is a discovery which Will imagines and narrates via a conventional
and racist narrative, that of a black man lusting after a younger white
woman, foregrounding the racial nature of that lust and the power
politics that would drive his father to break his marriage vows for the
sake of making love to a woman Will describes in these terms.
Pinkish and white-downy-blurred; her pink, unpainted lips, the embroi-
dered blouse over some sort of shapeless soft cushion (it dented when
she moved) that must be her breasts, the long denim skirt with its
guerrilla military pockets—couldn’t she make up her mind whether she
wanted to look as if she’d just come from a garden party or a Freedom
Fighters’ hide in the bush? Everything undefined; except the eyes. Blue,
of course. Not very large and like the dabs filled in with brilliant colour
on an otherwise unfinished sketch. (15)
In fact, Will freely admits his reliance on racial and sexual stereotypes:
‘‘And even if I hadn’t known her, I could have put her together like those
composite drawings of wanted criminals you see in the papers, an iden-
tikit. The schoolboy’s wet dream. My father’s woman’’ (15).
It is as if the floodgates were opened suddenly, with the liberalization
of the laws that prohibited blacks from entering the cinema. Now that
they can, the ‘‘rubbing of elbows’’ can lead to anything. If they can now
be drawn into a common cultural experience—watching the ‘‘foreign’’
film—what else might happen? What has already happened? If the loos-
ening of barriers can be read positively, then Gordimer also asks us to
read the negative potential as well. Take for instance, the basic notion of
ethics and personal deportment. How are people to act among them-
selves? What is the nature of the new social contract in South Africa? At
the start of the novel, after this opening scene announcing the change in
the rights of blacks to attend this theater, we return to an account of
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what preceded that change, of what life was like before, and how that
shaped one’s sense of community and interpersonal relations.
Speaking of Will’s family in the early days, Gordimer writes, ‘‘They
found that for them both the meaning of life seemed to be contained, if
mysteriously, in living useful lives. They knew what that was not: not
living only for oneself, or one’s children, or the clan of relatives. They
were not sure what it was; not yet. Only that it had to do with respon-
sibility to a community’’ (9). The passage begins as a laudable but
conventional statement regarding practical useful lives, and that useful-
ness was to be targeted to a ‘‘community.’’ But the sentence continues in
an extraordinary manner, transforming the platitudinous tone into a
sinister one: ‘‘And that could only mean the community to which they
were confined, to which they belonged because the law told them so, in
the first place, and that to which the attachments and dependencies of
daily life and the shared concerns that came from living within it, made
them belong, of themselves’’ (9). Community is therefore not freely
chosen, it is mandated—where one lives is determined by where one
cannot live. Confinement is a soft term for imprisonment, after all.
The traffic between discrete and segregated spaces is thus carefully
controlled and contained, and within the individual consciousness is
interpolated a psychic barricade.
During the week, the throng vanished, obediently pushed back to the
areas set aside for them outside the town. The workers were in the fac-
tories, the schoolteacher went to his designated school; men, women,
children—everyone kept to the daily pathways worn within that circum-
scribed area. . . . [I]t was as if the municipality left some warning odour,
scent of immutable authority, where the Saturday people were not to
transgress. And they read the scent; they recognized it always, it had
always been there. There was no need for notices spelling it out. (11–12)
And yet the fact that this community is a coerced one does not impede
the growth of real human attachments; ‘‘shared concerns’’ are thus the
instigators of a sense of sameness and indeed belonging, albeit a belong-
ing confined to that space and that lived experience. The real task is to
determine the prioritization of shared concerns within the community,
as well as the proper relation to the ‘‘outside.’’ For most, behavior is
largely geared toward survival and maintaining the status quo.
But because of the universality of liberal sentiment and institutions,
of course the blacks need schools—there must be inculcated in them a
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sense of (and even obligation for) improvement. Where that improved
self will go and what it will do is, under apartheid, a cruel circle—back to
the segregated community or out into the broader world to take up a
subaltern position. In the face of such expectations, Will’s father, Sonny,
attempts to debunk the notion, held by the parents in the community,
that their children’s education is indeed impractical, a ‘‘luxury,’’ a dalli-
ance for a short period in the lives of whites, which will be rechanneled
back into the black community to little effect. On the contrary, Sonny
wishes to connect the state apparatus back to the community it serves,
however partially and ineffectively: ‘‘Sonny felt his way was obviously
through a special responsibility to the children in the school: it opened
out from conscientiousness in teaching his own classes to an account-
ability for the welfare of all the children at the school. He saw the need
to bring together the school and the community in which it performed
an isolated function—education as a luxury, a privilege apart from the
survival preoccupations of the parents’’ (9). It is no understatement to
say that this is the foundation of Sonny’s politicization. The community
that is his by law nonetheless produces moral and ethical responsibili-
ties that ironically demand that blacks turn against the state sponsors
and, armed with the knowledge conveyed within those very structures,
militate to change structural injustices.
Like the cinema, schools are spaces in which culture is disseminated
and in which, just as important, people mix to receive and produce cul-
ture, with different goals and effects. Sonny teaches the children Shake-
speare, an author he has always loved, as a literary artist he admired
enough to name his only son after him, but also as a token of the cultural
capital he assumed would facilitate his upward mobility. But at a critical
moment in the text he also teaches them how to design and paint
protest signs. Swept up in the anti-apartheid movement, the children
have begun following another tutor—the movement. They start becom-
ing (re)producers of another language, and marching on another path.
education apartheid slavvery police get out our
schools. They were copying the real blacks, the headmaster told his
staff meeting, and he would have none of it. They would not grow up
to carry passes, their schools were better than the blacks, they were
advantaged—no, he did not say it: they were lighter than the blacks. But
the hardest-working, best member of his staff was thinking how children
learn from modeling themselves on others, mimicking at first the forms
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of maturity they see in their parents and then coming to perform them
cognitively as their capacities grow; why should they not be learning
something about themselves, for themselves, by mimicking the responsi-
bilities recognized precociously by certain other children—their sib-
lings. To recognize the real blacks as siblings: that was already something
no irritated, angry head-master could explain away as a schoolyard craze,
wearing bottle-top jewellery, passing a zoll round in the lavatories. (26)
In this transformative historical moment, the relation between student
and teacher is inverted, and they are ‘‘delivered’’ to each other in a
radically different way across the same channel. Soon a synthesis is
achieved, as their personal and political wills are inculcated in Sonny
and he bends his training to their purpose.
The schoolteacher walked back to his empty classroom; stood there at
his table alone; then picked up a red marker with a broad tip and went
out among his boys and girls. They stirred with bravado and fear; they
had had many calls for silence from teachers who came to harangue
them with orders and even to plead reason to them. But he went from
cardboard to cardboard correcting spelling and adding prepositions left
out. Giggles and laughter moved the children now, like one of the gusts
that kicked dust spiralling away in the trampled yard.—Let’s take your
placards into class and rewrite them. When you want to tell people
something you have to know how to express it properly. So that they will
take you seriously.—And they followed him. (26)
Sonny thus embarks on a different kind of education for himself, and this
produces a greater and a different kind of contact not only with blacks,
but with whites as well. Compare these parallel reports on his activities.
He was approached to form a local committee, he was elected to a
regional executive, he studied government white papers in the tin-trunk
archives of township proclamations, and title deeds old people had kept;
he stood on the creaking boards of a church hall and made his first
speech. (32)
He bought books that kept him from Shakespeare. He read them over
and over in order to grasp and adapt the theory that recognized social
education of the community, the parents and relatives and neighbours
of the pupils, as part of a school’s function. He started a parent-teacher
association and an advisory service for parents, collected money for
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special equipment for handicapped children, took groups of senior boys
and girls to do repairs in the yard rooms of pensioners. What else might
he do? For the uplift of the community he enterprisingly approached
the Rotary Club and Lions’ Club in the white town with respectful
requests that they might graciously send their doctors, lawyers, and
members of amateur theatre and music groups to lecture or perform in
the school hall. (9)
It is crucial to note that as Sonny is transformed from teacher to politi-
cal activist, his remaking takes place by putting him into contact with
whites in different manners, via specific institutional connections, with
a set of motivations that in turn prompt him to act and speak differently
in order to enter the political discourse of power. Indeed, it is words and
language, now embodied differently, that lead to this graphic change
in identity: ‘‘Unexpectedly, he proved to be one of the best speak-
ers in the movement and at weekends was needed to address gather-
ings around the province. His name appeared on posters in dorms
where they were scrawled over obscenely or torn down by local whites.
‘Sonny,’ in quotes, was printed between his first and surnames, in the
lists of speakers, the childish appellation became a natural political
advantage, stressing approachability and closeness to the people he
would address’’ (32).
In this study, of course, the ‘‘deliverance of others’’ is being examined
for its ‘‘delivery system.’’ This means not only how others are repre-
sented in fiction, but how the very designation of other (and same) is
produced via specific instruments and discourses—schools, laws, politi-
cal struggle, and, yes, sex—that shape how identities and human con-
nections are formed and reformed. In this interaction, in Gordimer
there is a mixed sense of purpose and coincidence, fatality and historic-
ity. Why did Will and Sonny happen to be at the same theater, at that
moment? How did the liberalization of the laws allow this tiny window
to open? Recall how Gordimer describes the protagonist of None to
Accompany Me: ‘‘He’s living in a way quite different from the way any-
body in his world has lived before—as a businessman, an entrepreneur.
And yet he comes from the heart of the struggle, living there in the
squatter camp. So he is becoming someone who can answer what he
sees as the demands of his time. Some people can never change. They
may be wonderful in a certain situation and totally impotent in an-
other.’’∞∏ This unsteady ebb and flow of historical change and effect
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demands a political strategy built to accommodate it. Sonny remarks,
‘‘ ‘Taking into account changing circumstances’ is a tenet like that of a
farmer taking into account the weather’’ (138). The confines of commu-
nity are slowly set aside, as he declares to his family, ‘‘We’re going to
move among whites. It’s a tactic decided upon, and I’m the one who’s
volunteered. . . . Working-class Afrikaners want to move up in the world
and they’ll sell for a high price’’ (41). ‘‘Circumstances’’ thus dictate the
family’s decisions; moving house becomes a ‘‘tactic.’’ The penetration of
the public into the private, social, and personal history seems complete,
and the flow of otherness is channeled precisely along these new path-
ways, these new ‘‘slots of possibility.’’
Let us gather up some of these threads—as before, the very composi-
tion of ‘‘community’’ is determined not by any organic growth, but by
the changing demands of institutions of power and resistance. Here, the
‘‘shared concerns’’ that influence who lives where include the aspirations
of poor whites to move up (measured against the resulting need to ‘‘sell
high,’’ the cost-benefit analysis of race and class identifications). The
historical opportunity thus is shared, if inexactly, across racial lines. For
as poor whites move out, driven by class considerations, blacks move in
for both class and racial considerations. Sonny ‘‘volunteers’’ to move his
family into this precarious and still untransformed territory, this liminal
zone, for the sake of the movement. And as he does so he establishes a
contact zone not only with the remaining poor whites and newly admit-
ted blacks, but also on the political front, a zone of engagement with
sympathetic whites. This is precisely how he will encounter the white
woman who will become both his political ally and his lover.
As Sonny becomes more and more involved in the public life of
politics, his involvement with the private space of family life shrinks, as
if in some zero-sum game. Indeed, despite the fact that at first the
entrance of the political into Sonny’s house seems a straightforward
matter, a noble confluence of interests, in Will’s eyes it seems more like
an invasion. In Will’s story, this is the moment when his father is lost to
the cause; it is the beginning of the end of the family. Indeed, the
appearance of Sonny’s soon-to-be-lover, Hannah, is linked to Sonny’s
disappearance.
Of course ‘‘we know each other.’’ She entered our house when he was in
detention. I let her in. I opened the door to her myself; I always went to
the door, then, the schoolboy was the man of the house for my mother
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and sister, now that he was not there. Each time, I prepared my expres-
sion, the way I would stand to confront the police come to search the
house once again. But it was a blonde woman with the naked face and
apologetic, presumptuous familiarity, in her smile, of people who come
to help. It was her job; she was the representative of an international
human rights organization sent to monitor political detentions and
trials, and to assist people like my father and their families. We didn’t
need groceries, my school fees were paid; my mother and Baby (after
school) were both working and there was no rent owed because when
we moved to the city my father had bought that house in what later was
called a ‘‘grey area’’ where people of our kind defied the law and settled
in among whites.
So we didn’t need her. She sat on the edge of our sofa and drank tea
and offered what is known as moral support. (14)
The simple social nicety of his opening the door for Hannah becomes in
Will’s eyes an act retroactively regarded as the betrayal of the family.
The simple ‘‘visit’’ from Hannah is likewise connected to a whole set of
actions proper to her relation to the family. She is there to ‘‘assist’’
according to a carefully scripted and rationalized set of expectations of
how whites of a certain political persuasion and profession behave to-
ward blacks of the same. The interlinkage between the personal and
political is concisely summed up in the last phrase—‘‘She sat on the
edge of our sofa and drank tea and offered what is known as moral
support’’—and yet Will has already determined the superfluous nature
of that support, based on his assessment of black-white relations and the
cost and benefits of accepting support.
One thing has been apparent since the very beginning of the narra-
tive: perhaps more than any other commodity, except bodies them-
selves, the thing most valued, and at the same time most misappre-
hended, is knowledge. In the course of the narrative, the domestic
sphere, supposedly the sanctuary of the private and shared intimacies of
families, is shattered by the intrusion of the public world of politics.
Knowledge of Sonny’s infidelity, knowledge of his wife Aila’s knowledge
(or lack of it) of the affair, knowledge to be passed down to the children
at the school or up to Sonny from those same children, knowledge of the
political and legal systems can become cross-referenced when the pri-
vate and public commingle. Hannah is critical to the family (as much as
her affair with Sonny proves fatal to it in a profoundly unexpected
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manner) because she has ‘‘inside knowledge’’ that Will says ‘‘she must
have gathered from interviews with the lawyers and furtive exchanges in
court with the accused in trials she had already attended, exchanges
made across the barrier between the public gallery and the dock during
the judge’s tea recess’’ (15). The silent, secretive, hidden knowledge
passed between the accused and their supporters sitting behind the
barriers in the public section of the courtroom is something Hannah in
turn absorbs as knowledge. This is a private, but seemingly routine use
of a language invented to deal with that specific ‘‘circumstance,’’ to use
Sonny’s word. It is a language that not only connects the accused with a
select public, but also connects Hannah to that relation, and one which
she and Sonny will deploy at his trial, as they take on those positions
and that relationship. It will also bind Aila to her family across exactly
that same space.
However, as insistent as Gordimer is that we understand the connec-
tions that the political and the legal set up between blacks and whites, in
the case of Sonny and Hannah, the sexual and racial are imbricated
through and through, and this presents another compelling site for the
interpenetration of self and other across formerly sacrosanct racial bar-
riers. Gordimer has Will repeat the phrase ‘‘of course,’’ this time as he
describes Hannah as a racialized, sexual object, understood through
long-standing conventions and stereotypes of race and gender. Why
repeat that phrase, that assessment? Because it signals a natural or
habitual way of perceiving and representing others via a stereotype. But
in a literary text it also calls attention to itself as precisely as a stereotype,
and demands to be questioned. What does this tell us about Will, and
about the ways race and sex are insinuated together in his apprehension
of his father’s adultery? The repetition of ‘‘of course’’ signals both ironic
distance and a habit of seeing that Will cannot completely distance by
this ironic tone:
Of course she is blonde. The wet dreams I have, a schoolboy who’s never
slept with a woman, are blonde. It’s an infection brought to us by the laws
that have decided what we are, and what they are, the blonde ones. It
turns out that all of us are carriers, as people may have in their blood-
streams a disease that may or may not manifest itself in them but will be
passed on; it has come to him in spite of all he has emancipated himself
from so admirably—oh yes, I did, I do admire my father. People talk of
someone ‘‘coming down’’ with a fever; he’s come down this; to this. (14)
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Why and how is Sonny’s sexual relationship with a white woman inevi-
table? How is desire produced not simply between blacks and whites,
but between blacks and whites constructed as such by ‘‘the laws’’ which
are here anthropomorphized, given a will and intention of their own?
These laws have decided not only identities, but also behaviors that
both constitute and manifest ‘‘who’’ other people ‘‘are.’’ And Will’s di-
agnosis of Sonny is precisely of a spirit with the diagnosis of ‘‘mor-
bid symptoms’’ of which Gordimer speaks in her essay ‘‘Living in the
Interregnum.’’
Counterposed to Will’s diagnosis of the affair as both externally
driven and narcissistic, we have Sonny’s version, which comes off as self-
ennobling. Instead of being mediated and indeed determined by ‘‘the
laws’’ which have produced internalized laws of attraction (‘‘of course’’),
Sonny’s version insists on the political and ethical motivations that he
and Hannah share. He sees their relationship as mediated and deter-
mined by both their political will and the institutional apparatuses that
frame that will. Any emotional content is sublimated into a higher
purpose. He regards himself and Hannah as operating in parallel fash-
ion: as his new relation to his new community is one of political activ-
ism and self-sacrifice, her relation to his family is also put in terms of
sacrifice for the greater good of an expanding community.
As the picture of the first time he saw her—the young woman monitor-
ing the trial—was reconstructed only later, so the meaning of the mo-
ment when she came to comfort his daughter was interpreted by him
only later, growing in its power over him, a sign. It was then that it
began, that it was inescapable. Needing Hannah. He could not think of
what had happened to him as ‘‘love,’’ ‘‘falling in love’’ any more than,
except as lip-service convenience, political jargon expressed for him
his decision to sacrifice schoolmastering, self-improvement, and go to
prison for his kind. A spontaneous gesture quite in the line of her
professional concern for prisoners and their families: she walked across
the gallery of Court A into a need that clanged closed, about the two of
them. It was the creation myth of their beginning. That it was not
recognized as such at once, by them, added to its beauty. (53–54)
This jibes with Hannah’s own representation of the affair to herself. In
the following passage she meditates on how her moral and ethical be-
liefs, coupled with her profession, put her into specific kinds of contact
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with blacks, and consequently with Sonny. And as with his recitation,
Hannah’s describes their love as indistinguishable from their shared
political desires.
The hands of the accused across the barrier while they joke about their
jailers; visiting the wives, husbands, parents, children, the partners in
many kinds of alliances broken by imprisonment—all this extended
Hannah’s feelings in a way she would not have known possible for
anyone. In love. She was in love. . . . In love, a temperature and at-
mospheric pressure of shared tension, response, the glancing contact of
trust in place of caresses, and the important, proud responsibility of
doing anything asked, even the humblest tasks, in place of passionate
private avowals. A loving state of being. (90)
Most concisely, ‘‘In her . . . sexual happiness and political commitment
were one’’ (125). As the affair takes hold, Sonny’s transformation is made
complete. Will notes the end of whatever happiness the family might
have enjoyed, as the zero-sum game between private and public, family
and national politics, is played out: ‘‘When he had to stop being a
teacher and his profession and his community work were no longer each
an extension of the other, something that made him whole. Our family,
whole. . . . He no longer had a profession; his profession had become the
meetings, the speeches, the campaigns, the delegations to authorities’’
(35–36). What allows Hannah and Sonny to legitimize their affair is
their belief that it is necessary to the political struggle. Indeed, their
coupling seems to symbolize for them the overcoming of racial barriers
and thus serves as an allegory as well of the triumph of anti-apartheid
struggles: ‘‘Hannah was, after all, a comrade. Always had been, from the
first; and as well. The cause was the lover, the lover the cause’’ (223).
Yet when Hannah, in political solidarity, lets a compatriot stay in the
cottage that is both her home and their trysting place, Sonny feels
betrayed, not only by the intrusion of a third party, but the fact that
Hannah has disclosed their secret password to another:
—He slept here. I used to come in and see him snoring there on your
bed. . . . [W]hy did you give him that password, Hannah? Why couldn’t
you have thought of something else?
—What else could I have sent that would make you absolutely sure?
What else is there that belongs only to us?
—Well now there’s a third person. (173)
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The ‘‘intrusion’’ of the third person puts the lie to Sonny’s depiction of
his love affair with Hannah as synonymous with their political struggle.
The love nest he has constructed and now privatized shows the hypoc-
risy of his narrative. We see that the connections, real and imagined,
between the characters are in fact different ways of knowing, and acting,
with regard to their imagined relationships with the other. These cir-
cuits of knowledge and action rely not only on desire, politics, family
alliances, and loyalties—but also the connections and overlaps between
each of these.
But now the ‘‘private’’ relationship between Sonny and Hannah is
breached by someone else besides the anonymous young man who is
the initial ‘‘third person.’’ Since Sonny and Hannah’s relationship is,
according to their construction of it, intimately connected to, and even
synonymous with, political struggle, then there is no keeping out other
participants in that struggle. Besides the young man, this will include
Will himself, designated by Sonny as their messenger, and later the
secret police. The political allies, too, have earned the right to enter into
the relationship with Sonny and Hannah—how could they not? The
boundary between the love affair and the political intrigue is porous, if
not impossible to maintain. If what links Sonny and Hannah is a com-
mon political cause—if that is their mode of deliverance to each other
across the borders of race and gender difference—then anyone of the
same political sympathy and purpose should be able to join that rela-
tionship. And that is exactly how Aila comes to figure into it. Crucially,
and poetically, she enters the struggle to protect the daughter she and
Sonny conceive together—‘‘Baby.’’ Poetic, because their first child, the
first moment in which they become a nuclear family, grows up to be the
instrument and agent of political struggle that links the personal to the
political once again. And, to achieve an even higher degree of irony,
Gordimer sets down a narrative thread suggesting that Baby joins the
struggle because she has discovered her father’s affair.
Once Aila joins the cause, she becomes privy to and conversant in
exactly the strategic and tactical language of the courtroom. Her com-
ing to acquire this skill, which parallels her political action, takes place as
a zero-sum game: the more expertise and power she acquires, the less
power Sonny retains.
She had been briefed on how to deal with interrogators. My father
clasped fist in hand as if stunning himself, his knees spread and his head
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sunk over his sagging body. The lawyer was embarrassed and alarmed.
He tamely filled a glass of water; could not offer it to a man who had
been through detention and imprisonment himself, a veteran of chal-
lenge to jailers of all kinds. My father looked up all round, wanting to
know from somewhere, from me, because I was there, I was always there
at home, her boy, mother’s boy, how it happened? When? Where did my
mother learn these things? How, without his having noticed it, had she
come to kinds of knowledge that were not for her? And what was it she
knew? Whom did she know whose names she couldn’t reveal? What was
Aila doing, all those months, without him? (222)
Aila’s independence is thus directly linked to the keyword knowledge,
and the zero-sum game is patently clear: Aila knows, and Sonny has no
clue as to how she has come to know ‘‘these things.’’
But it is not just Aila who ascends to knowledge. At the same mo-
ment, Hannah’s knowledge is coupled to Aila’s. In a stunning move-
ment, the power of women is consolidated in Hannah, Baby, Aila, as the
men (Sonny, Will, even the astounded lawyer) stand apart and ignorant.
Indeed, the communication between Sonny and Aila is made possible
only by Hannah. However, unlike the first instance, wherein Hannah
was helping Aila to communicate with the imprisoned Sonny, here the
positions are reversed: Aila is the accused.
It was Hannah who found out where Aila was being held. Hannah’s
connections. It was Hannah who got a note from Aila’s husband smug-
gled to her. Hannah had helped this family in trouble before. Many
families. She had visited the father and husband in prison. The note was
a minute tightly-rolled piece of paper—Sonny knew how such things
had to be slipped in stuck to the bottom of a tin plate at meal time or
under the inner sole of a shoe. Hannah did not read the note before she
passed it on for delivery. A note came back in Aila’s hand-writing. The
scrap of paper was the label soaked off an aspirin bottle. There were four
words. Don’t contact Baby. Wait. (223)
But more than this functional, professional relationship between the
two women, which has now displaced and superseded Hannah’s rela-
tion to Sonny (precisely because of a change in ‘‘circumstances’’), there
develops out of this mode of ‘‘delivery’’ or connection an affective,
emotional one, qualitatively different from the sexually grounded rela-
tionship that had sprung up between Hannah and Sonny. And Sonny,
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rather than being pleased by this new relationship between Hannah and
Aila, is both astounded by its unlikeliness and jealous: ‘‘Hannah’s con-
cern about Aila was a comfort; and could not be. It seemed to him she
lay beside him now as if in her professional capacity, as she had come to
see him when he was in detention, one among others her persistence in
devotion to the cause enabled her to get to visit, and to whom, as to him,
she wrote morale-building letters’’ (223). The unique relation between
Hannah and Sonny now seems to be set within a general category of
those aided and abetted by Hannah. The very notion that Sonny uses to
assuage his guilt and rationalize his infidelity comes back to haunt
him—Hannah has (and should have) many ‘‘comrades.’’ Again: ‘‘Sonny
was amazed, intruded upon. Hannah wept. The tears moved slowly
down her broad cheeks and she did not turn from him or cover her face
in decency with her hands. She had no right to weep for Aila!’’ (235).
Sonny’s jealousy extends not only to the relation between Hannah
and Aila, but to that between Aila and the public at large—Aila’s fame
has trumped his: ‘‘Aila! In that role . . . to imagine the freedom songs and
salutes for poor Aila!’’ (226). This is an exact reversal of Will’s early
assessment of how Sonny arrives at his priorities: ‘‘My mother’s not in
the struggle so my mother has no priority’’ (136). Now, however, she is,
and now Sonny’s hypocrisy and great egotism become obvious and
undeniable. This leads to a general categorical breakdown for Sonny.
If he had been the one with the right to judge her. As her husband? As
a comrade? The construction he had skilfully made of his life was un-
inhabitable, his categories were useless, nothing fitted his need. Needing
Hannah. His attraction to Hannah belonged to the distorted place and
time in which they—all of them—he, Aila, Hannah, lived. With Hannah
there was the sexuality of commitment; for commitment implies dan-
ger, and the blind primal instinct is to ensure the species survives in
circumstances of danger, even when the individual animal dies or the
plant has had its season. In this freak displacement, the biological drive
of his life, which belonged with his wife and the children he’d begotten,
was diverted to his lover. He and Hannah begot no child; the revolution-
ary movement was to be their survivor. The excitement of their mating
was for that. But Aila was the revolutionary, now. (241–42)
With that displacement of the familial by the political, the very displace-
ment initially wrought by Sonny, we find the erosion of the ‘‘center of
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life,’’ and in his greatest act of selfishness and egotism, and moral eva-
sion, Sonny blames his lover for the loss of his wife: ‘‘The centre of life
wasn’t there, with her, the centre of life was where the banalities are
enacted—the fuss over births, marriages, family affairs with their sur-
vival rituals of food and clothing, that were with Aila. Because of Han-
nah, Aila was gone. Finished off, that self that was Aila’’ (243).
And it is not just the ‘‘center of life’’ that has been evacuated by this
gendered reversal—it is also Sonny’s political and sexual power: ‘‘Since
when did Aila decide what was politically expedient? Since when did
she think she understood such things?’’ (169). With Aila’s new under-
standing and decision-making power comes the collapse of Sonny’s
sexual power. On the same page, Gordimer writes, ‘‘His bundle of sex
hung there like something disowned by his body’’ (169), and this loss
extends from the physical to the emotional. Sonny rethinks his relation
to Hannah: ‘‘What was he going to get her to say: I love you Sonny, I
love you so much—but she’s like Aila, now, she can’t say it’’ (211).
Conclusion: Whose Story?
The ability to say, or not, to write, or not, to resurrect or keep alive
certain modes of knowing others and oneself—all these questions, and
others, have been raised in the novel. It is thus no accident that Gor-
dimer ends where she began—with Will, whose name not only refer-
ences, as his father intended, William Shakespeare, but also, I would
argue, the will to write. As such, Will’s meditation at the end of the
novel, a reflection on writing, continues the logic and thematic of the
novel, and in it we can imagine literature as a delivery system that
is inexact, open, and excessive in generating meaning, as it uncovers
and helps articulate the changing nature of the relationships between
self and other. This problematic is deeply embedded in the social and
historical networks that connect people variously, and often at cross-
purposes. Here we find individual will, individual imaginings of these
connections, placed into flux, as ‘‘circumstance’’ changes, sometimes,
but not always, due to the actions of the characters. In this regard, we
can recall the issue of ‘‘situation.’’ How is it that we can imagine (or not)
ourselves in the situations in which others find themselves? How is
it that Aila ‘‘becomes’’ Sonny, Sonny Aila, Hannah Aila, Will Baby, et
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cetera? Critically, how do people feel they ‘‘know’’ the world of others
through these identifications and disidentifications, which may or may
not be anchored in anything like reality? And, to link up emphatically to
the issue of ethics that is at the heart of this study, what kind of respon-
sibility comes with this so-called knowledge? Will asks, ‘‘Why should I
be the one who had to know. Is it supposed to be some kind of priv-
ilege?’’ (44). Further on in the narrative, he finds this ‘‘privilege’’ too
much to bear: ‘‘I wish I didn’t have so much imagination, I wish other
people’s lives were closed to me’’ (79).
Now what, exactly, has his imagination presented to him, and what
status does the imagining of others’ lives have to knowledge of others’
lives?
I’ve imagined, out of their deception, the frustration of my absence, the
pain of knowing them too well, what others would be doing, saying and
feeling in the gaps between my witness. All the details about Sonny and
his women?—oh, those I’ve taken from the women I’ve known. ‘‘Sonny
is not the man he was’’; someone has said that to me: his comrades think
it’s because Aila’s gone. But I’m young and it’s my time that’s come, with
women. My time that’s coming with politics. I was excluded from that, it
didn’t suit them for me to have any function within it, but I’m going to
be the one to record, someday, what he and my mother/Aila and Baby
and the others did, what it really was like to live a life determined by the
struggle to be free, as desert dwellers’ days are determined by the strug-
gle against thirst and those of dwellers amid snow and ice by the strug-
gle against the numbing of cold. That’s what struggle really is, not a
platform slogan repeated like a tv jingle. (276)
Here Will clearly declares what has been evident all along—his outsider
status with regard to the struggle. Is it by default or destiny that he is
thus the one whose story it is? But lest we get too taken with the notion
of individual destiny, Gordimer reminds us that there is another ‘‘wit-
ness’’ to the action, one embodied not by an individual but by a state
agency: ‘‘There was someone who always knew where Sonny was, the
Security Police. He knew that, Hannah knew that. . . . The third pres-
ence in the lovers’ privacy is the Security Police; anonymous, unseen: a
condition of the intimacy of political activists’’ (81–82). Gordimer later
makes clear the connection between the state and artistic imagination:
‘‘There was Will. What would he have done if there hadn’t been Will.
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Only to Will could he find some way of indicating where he could be
found if something happened. Like the Security Police, Will would be in
on it’’ (84). If Sonny has designated Will the messenger for the family—
‘‘You’re the family Mercury now’’ (85)—he has also at once made him
the Hermes, thus linked to hermeneutics. As he conveys, he interprets,
imagines, resignifies, creates their lives as well as reports them. Gor-
dimer thus doubles up and condenses the lives of the family—as a social
unit, and as a political one, open to the eyes of family members (albeit
those eyes might well be selectively blind), and to the state.
Gordimer’s epigraph for the novel comes from Shakespeare’s thir-
teenth sonnet, and by the end of the novel we understand her logic.
O, that you were yourself ! but, love, you are
No longer yours than you yourself here live:
Against this coming end you should prepare,
And your sweet semblance to some other give.
So should that beauty which you hold in lease
Find no determination: then you were
Yourself again after yourself ’s decease,
When your sweet issue your sweet form should bear.
Who lets so fair a house fall to decay,
Which husbandry in honour might uphold
Against the stormy gusts of winter’s day
And barren rage of death’s eternal cold?
O, none but unthrifts! Dear my love, you know
You had a father: let your son say so.
It is the last line that Gordimer uses for her epigraph, but the sonnet as a
whole gives a fuller and more urgent context. The legacy of the father,
his entire lineage before him, is at stake, and we can read into that
equation a sense of ‘‘house’’ that extends beyond the family, to the
community and to the nation. The discontinuity that would befall all
this would be brought about precisely by the son not fulfilling his duty—
to pronounce an identity on his father as a son. Language must pass
through the other here—one’s identity is determined by the figure of a
future generation. But in the unfolding of the narrative that commences
after the epigraph we are not given a great deal of confidence in Will’s
ability, or inclination, to bestow this identity on his father and to con-
tinue his name and his line, at least not directly and not singularly.
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To understand why this is so, we have to consider two things. First,
the last words Will addresses to his father take place in a poem which
speaks of nothing as much as betrayal. Adapting what we can take to be
Sonny’s voice, Will writes,
Come, lover, comrade, friend, child, bird
Come
I entice you with my crumbs, see—
Dove
Sprig of olive in its beak
Dashes in swift through the bars, breaks its neck
Against stone walls. (277)
Sonny’s disloyalty to his family, and his comrades, certainly would not
merit reward; in fact, Will’s poem seems a pointed response to the
epigraph’s benediction and charge to him. It is as if Sonny has indeed
allowed his house to fall into disrepair, and the rupture of his name and
his line is the consequence. Along with this is the fact that Will is now a
writer, but a writer with a particular blend of purposes. He admits that
he may not know certain details of the lives of others, but he has no
problem with ‘‘filling in the gaps between my witness.’’ As a ‘‘family
Mercury,’’ he does as Gordimer says she does—takes the lives of others
as a starting point. To what? To, Will says, come into a life of politics. He
will report ‘‘what it really was like to live a life determined by the
struggle to be free, as desert dwellers’ days are determined by the strug-
gle against thirst and those of dwellers amid snow and ice by the strug-
gle against the numbing of cold. That’s what struggle really is, not a
platform slogan repeated like a tv jingle.’’ Thus, while Will might well
include Sonny in his report, it will not be Sonny’s story exclusively, but
Sonny’s story as imbricated with those of many others in the struggle.
But we should put some pressure on the notion that he will simply be
a reporter, and this is again noted in his imaginative construction of how
things happened, things that were part of the experience of others. In
this sense, Gordimer blends art and politics in a way that indeed builds a
bridge between self and other, or, more precisely, discloses the delivery
systems that situate both, in sameness and difference. This relation is
thoroughly historicized, as will also be the case in the texts we examine
in the following chapter, this time centering on art, but with an eye
toward the moment when bodies can be shared.
≥
Art: A Foreign Exchange
[The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development]
aim[s] to ‘‘construct scenarios ‘to image’ the bioeconomy in the future
landscape’’ in order to draft a policy agenda for governments in respect
to this sector. They define ‘‘the bioeconomy’’ as that part of economic
activities ‘‘which captures the latent value in biological processes and
renewable bioresources to produce improved health and sustainable
growth and development.’’—organization for economic
co-operation and development, ‘‘Proposal for a Major
Project on the Bioeconomy in 2030’’
The bioeconomy is doing very well, thank you. In 2003, the U.S. biotech
sector was a $33.6 billion industry. In that subfield of the bioeconomy
that has to do with organ transplants, the body itself has become like
Mother Earth, as the Doors put it—raped and pillaged, or as Dorothy
Nelkin has it, ‘‘Body parts are extracted like a mineral, harvested like a
crop, or mined like a resource.’’∞ More than reason, more than emotion,
bodies are taken as the most concrete and irrefutable common human
coin, relatively constant across its multiple iterations. We all have bod-
ies, of sorts. We may not agree that a thought is a thought, or a feeling a
feeling, as vaguely defined as those things are. Their powers to affiliate
radically disparate others are hampered by language, by representation.
On the other hand, bodies simply exist in time and space, the here and
now. We can argue that those that stand before us don’t think like
humans should, or react emotionally as humans normally would, but
there are reasonable ways to push back against each of these arguments
and adjust the ratio of ‘‘sameness’’ and ‘‘otherness.’’ People are bound
together across institutional media and discourses (political struggle,
economic rationality, literary realism, advertising, and visual media)
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which count on persuading minds and hearts of a common human
‘‘nature,’’ over and against the particular interests that abide. To best
allow that human nature to flourish (whether it be to act rationally, to
acquire the greatest quantity of its preferences, to seek freedom and
happiness, to ‘‘feel’’ bonded to the human world, etc.), we have had to
see our individual manifestations of humanness as somehow in conver-
sation with those of others, alive or dead.
And yet this dynamic of negotiation employs otherness to both
strengthen claims to legitimacy and to sometimes destroy it. At some
point in literary history we were instructed to read the lives of those
different from us in order to obtain a broader, richer, and more real and
indeed more global sense of life, and to increase our human capacities.
Yet that has been coupled with a political and ethical question: how
much otherness is required for this lesson to be learned, for value to be
added, and how much ‘‘excessive’’ otherness has to be jettisoned? Bodies
would seem to present a different case. And in this chapter my address
to ‘‘bodies’’ is solely in the most intense form of body-sharing: organ
transplants. This issue disrupts and troubles two key works of philoso-
phy and literature. In organ transplantation we are faced with the most
unflinching instance of the delivery of a part of another’s body into our
own, within a bioeconomic field that has at its core an engine of aliena-
tion and dispropriation that ultimately forces a question as to the na-
ture of life, living, self, and otherness: ‘‘Vitality has been decomposed
into a series of distinct and discrete objects, that can be stabilized, fro-
zen, banked, stored, accumulated, exchanged, traded across time, across
space, across organs and species, across diverse contexts and enter-
prises, in the service of bioeconomics. Inevitably, it raises questions
about the borders of life, and those troubling entities—notably em-
bryos and stem cells—whose position on the binaries of life/nonlife
and human/nonhuman is subject to dispute.’’≤
So as to be perfectly clear from the very start—I am no purist. If I were
Jean-Luc Nancy, or just my plain self, I would leap at the chance to
extend my life by accepting the organ of another human being. I am not
against this type of medical procedure in general. However, my inten-
tion is not to make an ethical pronouncement on the industry, but
rather to see how this phenomenon has provided two major writers of
the twenty-first century, Jean-Luc Nancy and Kazuo Ishiguro, the vehi-
cle through which to explore radical otherness, the binary of self-other.
98 Chapter Three
Their efforts bear not unproblematic fruit, and I will demonstrate how a
similar contradiction abides in both, one that involves precisely ideol-
ogy and history.
Both of the texts I have chosen for examination here seem to be
doubly split. Nancy’s work L’intrus (The Intruder) builds on his long-
standing meditation on being alone with others. What does it mean to
be ‘‘singular’’ when, according to Nancy, this singularity always already
appears as plural, conjoined, and indistinct? For Nancy, death is the one
common point of recuperating that vision of being together; each per-
son’s death is a death of others as well, and all the efforts of human be-
ings to defer or avoid death bespeak to Nancy an effort to postpone that
grand recuperation. I couple this idea of singularity/plurality with his
aversion to notions of ‘‘operative’’ communities, those that are geared
toward making manifest some always different and better thing at the
expense of reflecting on what already exists in common but is glossed
over in the name of fulfilling some greater purpose. Yet Nancy’s own
heart transplant is predicated on exactly those two activities—that of
‘‘operatizing’’ a biotechnical apparatus or community for the purpose
of forestalling Nancy’s own demise. Therefore, we are left to make a
choice, or at least pragmatically to bracket one in favor of the other:
we can wax philosophical, critiquing the operative, death-postponing
‘‘community’’ of technicians and surgeons; or we can enjoy the time
granted us by those less-than-optimal activities.
This issue can be rephrased thus: we can detemporalize (universalize,
generalize) the problem, or see it as an eminently historical problem of
the constitution of communities, in particular communities that ‘‘de-
liver’’ otherness to the self in the form of migrated organs. Can philoso-
phy, in other words, provide us with a ‘‘big picture’’ that renders the
specifics of ‘‘deliverance’’ irrelevant and in so doing disarm the contra-
diction between the ideal vision Nancy offers of ‘‘inoperative commu-
nities’’ and the operative community that allows his life to continue?
Similarly, Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel Never Let Me Go is split between a deep
and indeed even insurmountable commitment to art as providing an
at least temporary escape from the shadow of mortality, an interlude
of transcendence, so to speak, and an equally profound sense of bad
timing—here history matters, a lot. On the one hand, Ishiguro directs
our eyes to an entirely abstract ‘‘lesson in growing up’’ (as he calls it); on
the other hand, that lesson is predicated on erasing two key distinctions,
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that between the human and nonhuman, and that of the precise relation
of exchange between those two groups. Only if we perform this act of
double erasure can we luxuriate in the wisdom Ishiguro proffers. In both
these cases, the relation between self and other, and the media that
connect the two, cannot remain unaffected by this inner split. We con-
stantly see, on both these authors’ parts, an attempt to adjust that
relation. This adjustment, rather than being critiqued for its adequacy
or not, is better seen as an index to the abiding contradictions that make
philosophy and literary art so very frustrating and rich.
The history of tissue and organ transplants in Western medicine has
always been involved with questions of singularity, otherness, sharing,
and politics. As early as the sixteenth century, Gaspari Tagliocozzi, a
surgeon who was also a professor of anatomy and of medicine at the
University of Bologna, wrote of grafting skin to form a nose on those
who were noseless (in those days nasal amputation was a common form
of punishment—we are speaking thus of the reconstitution of a citizen,
of reconstruction as a political and ethical act). While proud of his
accomplishment in fabricating a nose from an individual’s own tissue,
Tagliocozzi warns against grafting noses from one body to another. His
warning is based precisely on the idea of individuality: ‘‘The singular
character of the individual entirely dissuades us from attempting this
work on another person. For such is the force and power of individu-
ality, that if anyone should believe that he could accelerate and increase
the beauty of the union, nay more, achieve even the least part of the
operation, we consider him plainly superstitious and badly grounded in
the physical sciences.’’≥ Inherent in the sense of individual bodies is the
notion that there are specific individual properties that cannot be trans-
posed. Indeed, as Sherwin Nuland notes, the story of transplantation
became ‘‘the story of our evolving comprehension that the cells of each
of us harbored within them something that is theirs alone.’’ The ques-
tion then becomes, ‘‘How can a potential recipient be made less xeno-
phobic, less destructive of protoplasm from a donor? In other words,
how can one person be made more tolerant of the transplanted tissues
of another?’’∂
It is precisely with the discovery of cyclosporin that an entirely new
horizon opens up; cyclosporin becomes the chemical of tolerance, one
which enables doctors to manage the immune system and selectively
accommodate the foreign, or quell ‘‘xenophobia.’’ Thus, in 1986, William
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Winslade and Judith Wison Ross re-pose the question of individuality,
but this time with a radical alternative in mind.
Are we spirits who happen to possess bodies and in fact need those bod-
ies in order to manifest ourselves in this particular material world? If so,
then it is not much concern whether we are inhabiting a pure or mixed-
parts body. Are we, instead, minds-and-bodies, a kind of computer-like
system in which the bodies are our hardware and the minds our soft-
ware, our operating systems, as it were? If so, then the software, like
any software, can run on any compatible body, although often not as
well on the body-hardware for which the mind-software was originally
intended. . . . [I]ndividual integrity lies presumably in the brain or in the
more complex parts of the nervous system culminating in the brain
(although even here a serious problem lurks as researchers investigate
the transportability of brain tissue). The rest, outside and inside, is
mere packaging of operating parts, to be used, and, when exhausted, to
be replaced.∑
Thanks to modern technologies of medicine, we have come the distance
from unimpeachable individual specificity to wide-open interchange-
ability. And it should be clear by now that throughout these meditations
on the distinct, unique, and nontransferable properties of individual
bodies is a corollary ontological value pertaining to the notion of indi-
vidual identity as something inherent, unchanging, and nontransferable.
The historical possibilities of entertaining such a profound re-
evaluation of individuals and their bodies creates complex questions of
technology and ethics, ontology and otherness. It is in this context of
opportunity and crisis that we can read Jean-Luc Nancy’s L’intrus, which
precisely situates itself historically.
Less than twenty years ago, one didn’t graft, especially not with the use
of cyclosporin, which protects against the rejection of the graft. Twenty
years from now, it will certainly be a matter of another sort of graft, with
other methods. A personal contingency thus crosses a contingency in
the history of techniques. In an earlier age, ‘‘I’’ would be dead; in the
future, I would be a survivor by some other means. But always, ‘‘I’’ finds
itself tightly packed into a narrow slot of technical possibilities.∏
The notion of historical contingency, this ‘‘slot of possibilities,’’ deeply
informs not only L’intrus and Never Let Me Go, but also the entire
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project of the study of the deliverance of others: the self and the other
are seen here as brought together under very specific, historical delivery
systems.
Central to the philosophical writings of Jean-Luc Nancy is the precise
nature of human being and the ontological status of material subjects.
Nancy has focused on the manners in which being has been framed in
two different but not mutually exclusive ways, each of which has nega-
tive consequences for thinking through the issue of being. First is the
dominant tendency to read human being as immanent—some individ-
ual essence is always at the verge of appearing. The manifestation of
essence (whenever and however it appears) is assumed to then be able
to ratify an entire philosophical program of reading the human as such.
Until then, we must be satisfied with evaluating human history and
contemporaneity as indexed by that immanence. Second, and most
germane to the topic of this chapter, is the will to operationalize human
being—human being and its various actions in the world are meant to
accomplish something, to bring something into existence, to change the
world and human being in it. There is the sense that such operational-
ization will, directly or indirectly, be related to the immanent unfolding
of human being: we are human in the way that we act in the world,
transform the world to our purposes, make it be ‘‘us,’’ and the manifesta-
tion of such actions takes place through institutions and discourses that
codify and rationalize these transformations and their intentionality.
The nature of human organization in communities is intimately re-
lated to both these frames. Ideal communities are traditionally thought
to manifest the perfect negotiation and reconciliation of individual
and collective identities, of self and other. This is their immanence—
supposed convergences and consolidations are operationalized, their
collective ‘‘being’’ quickly used either to reflect back on their perfect
enactments or made to be a sign of something else to come. In contra-
distinction to this kind of purposeful framing and tracking of human
being (philosophically and pragmatically so), Nancy proposes that we
look at human being in the present as simultaneously singular and
plural. The key issue is neither the emergence of being as ‘‘individual,’’
nor the emergence of ‘‘community’’ as the harmonizing of individual
beings, but rather the notion that all being is best described as a co-
extensive and contemporary ‘‘being with,’’ the focus being at once the
singular entities and their common properties of being with each other.
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Certainly, one can regard Nancy’s meditation on his heart transplant
as the near-perfect occasion in which to dramatize this philosophical
premise.
In my treatment of Nancy’s text, I argue that advances in medi-
cal technology have created another kind of human community, one
framed precisely by operationalization. Its operationalization is keyed
into the project of making possible the immanent realization of immor-
tality. This operationalized community of biotechnical workers has dev-
astating consequences for Nancy’s ontology, even as it extends his life.
(In a similar vein, in Ishiguro’s novel, the invention of life to sustain life
raises huge ethical issues when those invented lives have feelings and
emotions and bodies just like ours. It is the institutional genesis and
logic that gives them birth that creates precisely a deadly schism be-
tween donor and receiver, benefactor and beneficiary. Thus, the very
possibility of delivering otherness delivers to the donor a death sen-
tence, and to the receiver a morally contaminated, albeit extended, exis-
tence.) From this, I believe, we can derive a lesson about human ‘‘con-
nectedness’’ via the logic and economics of exchange and otherness.
Being cannot be anything but being-with-one-another, circulating in
the with and as the with of this singularity plural existence.
—jean-luc nancy, Being Singular Plural
Throughout his writings, Nancy insists that any attempt to define singu-
lar being as ontologically isolatable from others is bound to fail. Being is
always ‘‘being-with-one-another.’’ This ‘‘co-appearance’’ is the ‘‘funda-
mental ontological structure’’ (Being Singular Plural, 61).π The closest
Nancy will come to naming Being as distinct is to place it in coextensive
relation to his concepts of the ‘‘singular’’ and the ‘‘plural.’’
Being singular plural: these three apposite words, which do not have any
determined syntax . . . mark an absolute equivalence, both in an indis-
tinct and distinct way . . . Being singular plural means the essence of
Being is only as co-essence. . . . Because none of these three terms
precedes or grounds the other, each designates the coessence of the
others. This coessence puts essence itself in the hyphenation—‘‘being’’
‘‘singular-plural’’—which is a mark of union and also a mark of division,
a mark of sharing that effaces itself, leaving each term to its isolation and
its being-with-the-others. (Being Singular Plural, 28, 30, 37)
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Just as he is loathe to isolate Being as separable from (and valorized
over) being-with-others, Nancy is set against aggrandizing ‘‘otherness’’:
‘‘All forms of the capitalized ‘Other’ represent precisely the exalted and
overexalted mode of propriety of what is proper, which persists and
consists in the ‘somewhere’ of a ‘nowhere’ and in the ‘sometime’ of a ‘no
time,’ that is, in the punctum aeternum outside the world’’ (Being Singu-
lar Plural, 13). We end up with a schematization of Being as no less and
no more than the Other; both are in turn removed from any singular
‘‘exalted status.’’∫
Crucially, Nancy’s proposal is different from the Hegelian dialectic in
which there is a mutual dependency of being and other, ultimately to be
resolved in the florescence of the subject of absolute Being. Instead,
Nancy argues for a shared ontology that refuses both an origin in sin-
gularity and an immanent resolution into singular Being: ‘‘A like-being
resembles me in that I myself ‘resemble’ him: we ‘resemble’ together, if
you will. That is to say, there is no original or origin of identity. What
holds the place of an ‘origin’ is the sharing of singularities. This means
that this ‘origin’—the origin of community or the originary community
—is nothing other than the limit: the origin is the tracing of the borders
upon which or along which singular beings are exposed’’ (The Inopera-
tive Community, 33).
Nancy extends this notion far beyond the ‘‘human’’ to delineate a
global notion of the shared property of a nondialectical being-with-
otherness.
Both the theory and the praxis of critique demonstrate that, from now
on, critique absolutely needs to rest on some principle other than that of
the ontology of the Other and the Same: it needs an ontology of being-
with-one-another, and this ontology must support both the sphere of
‘‘nature’’ and sphere of ‘‘history,’’ as well as both the ‘‘human’’ and the
‘‘non-human’’; it must be an ontology for the world, for everyone—and
if I can be so bold, it has to be an ontology for each and every one and
for the world ‘‘as a totality,’’ and nothing short of the whole world, since
this is all there is (but, in this way, there is all). (Being Singular Plural,
53–54)
In particular, and with specific import for my discussion of L’intrus,
Nancy insists on maintaining our focus on the interstitial spaces of
shared ‘‘being with’’: ‘‘There is no Other. ‘Creation’ signifies precisely
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that there is no Other and that ‘there is’ is not an Other. Being is not the
Other, but the origin is the punctual and discrete spacing between us, as
between us and the rest of the world, as between all beings’’ (Being Singular
Plural, 19).Ω I will return to this notion of the spacing of the in-between,
and the possible infringement thereof created by the heart transplant,
but first it is necessary to consider what this notion has to do with the
idea of community, and, by extension, ethics and politics.
In Nancy, the notion of being-with is intimately occasioned in a spa-
tial and temporal metaphor, which, once again, ‘‘scales back’’ both the
isolatability of ‘‘individual being’’ and the telos of immanence: ‘‘ ‘With’ is
the sharing of time-space; it is the at-the-same-time-in-the-same-place
as itself, it itself, shattered. It is the instant scaling-back of the principle
of identity: Being is at the same time in the same place only on the
condition of the spacing of an indefinite plurality of singularities. . . . We
are each time an other, each time with others’’ (Being Singular Plural,
35). Given both this simultaneity and this coappearance, the idea of a
slowly evolving social subject with an attendant, developing social com-
munity is erased, as are traditional notions of community as the collec-
tion of preexisting individuals. Stated flatly, ‘‘Community means that
there is no singular being without another singular being’’ (The Inopera-
tive Community, 28). The point of ontological articulation is thus ‘‘coap-
pearance’’ as it occurs in the in-between, shared spaces of being-with.∞≠
And it is precisely the dis-position of this shared space that characterizes
the political and ontological activity of community. This connection is
encapsulated in this sentence: ‘‘Being is put into play among us; it does
not have any other meaning except the dis-position of this ‘between’ ’’
(Being Singular Plural, 27). And it is made universal here: ‘‘Being is not
the Other, but the origin is the punctual and discrete spacing between us,
as between us and the rest of the world, as between all things’’ (Being
Singular Plural, 19).∞∞
Consistent with his insistence that Being not be reduced to the mere
immanence of something other to come is Nancy’s argument that ‘‘com-
munity’’ be freed from immanence. Such thinking leads one always to
think of community as less-than itself. Importantly, one effect of this
devaluing of being-together is the operationalizing of community. Un-
der the imperative to become something better, to reach some other,
more satisfying state, communities are asked to manifest progress to-
ward those goals, to be effective instances of human social development.
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The political, if this word may serve to designate not the organization
of society but the disposition of community as such, the destination of
its sharing, must not be the assumption or the work of love or of death.
It need neither find, nor regain, nor effect a communion taken to be lost
or still to come. If the political is not dissolved in the sociotechnical
element of forces and needs (in which, in effect, it seems to be dissolving
under our eyes), it must inscribe the sharing of community. . . . ‘‘Po-
litical’’ would mean a community ordering itself to the unworking of
its communication, or destined to this unworking: a community con-
sciously undergoing the experience of its sharing. (The Inoperative Com-
munity, 40)
Community, in Nancy’s sense of the word, is thus tied absolutely to the
idea of inoperation, a refusal to be drawn into a ‘‘higher’’ purpose (of
love, of death, or finding, or regaining, or efficacy). It is only then that
we can apprehend its location and experience it in this dis-positional
space, a lateral and coextensive motion that refers to nothing. Crucially,
in Nancy’s work we also find a very similar discourse on the body, and
this forms a crucial perspective on what will occur in L’intrus.
Just as he rejects the operationalizing of community, its being pressed
into service always to symbolize (and act toward) something other and
beyond, so too does Nancy critique the constant, seemingly inevitable
symbolization of the body. Against this current in Western philosophi-
cal thought, he asks instead for ‘‘a corpus, a catalog, the recitation of an
empirical logos that, without transcendental reason, would be a gleaned
list, random in order or in its degree of completion, a corpus of the
body’s entries: dictionary entries, entries into language, body registers,
registers of bodies. . . . All this would be possible only if we had access to
bodies, only if they were not impenetrable, as physics defines them.
Bodies impenetrable to language’’ (The Birth to Presence, 189). Just as he
wishes us to regard community as simply and always a distinct dis-
position of space in-between, and Being as the coappearance (always)
of the singular and the plural in and as this space, so too does he seek to
prevent the body from constantly being drawn into speaking of some-
thing else, or signifying beyond itself. Instead he would place it into a
simple catalog, an inventorying of itself and its others, such that it is
given over to writing itself. Then what we will find are ‘‘no longer bodies
that make sense, but sense that engenders and shares bodies. No longer
the semiological, symptomatological, mythological, or phenomenologi-
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cal pillage of bodies, but thought and writing given, given over to bod-
ies. The writing of a corpus as a separation and sharing of bodies, shar-
ing their being-body, shaped out by it, and thus divided from itself and
from its sense, exscribed all along its own inscription’’ (The Birth to
Presence, 197).
Nevertheless, and crucially for my reading of L’intrus, both Nancy’s
desire for us to see community as ‘‘inoperative’’ and his hope that we can
regard the body as something other than a symbolic space are jeopar-
dized precisely by the historical occasion of the transplant. For, in this
instance, Nancy is confronted by, and his body drawn within for its very
survival, a technological community with a precise intent—the deferral
of death. And in this community, immanence reappears as immortality.
If the negative image of the body for Nancy may be seen in this fragment
wherein ‘‘the body remains the organon, the instrument or the incarna-
tion, the mechanism or the work of a sense that never stops rushing into
it, presenting itself to itself, making itself known as such and wanting to
tell itself there’’ (The Birth to Presence, 192), then in the medical scientific
and technological community in which he finds himself inscribed we
find the invasion of a specific sense, a saturation of particular meaning,
operationalized and put into service to make the body survive. But sur-
vival is possible only within its unique regimes, values, and assumptions.
In the instance of the heart transplant, we find that the ‘‘rushing in’’ is
not just that of the other’s organ, which is substituted for one’s own, but
the entire sense-making operation of which this substitution is the end
and the beginning. This instance may be read as diametrically opposed
to Nancy’s description of the shared space between singularities, a shar-
ing that constitutes precisely the singular as singular/plural. Nancy
argues that this ‘‘between’’ ‘‘does not lead from one to another; it con-
stitutes no connective tissue, no cement, no bridge. . . . [I]t is that which
is at the heart of a connection, the interlacing of strands whose ex-
tremities remain separate even at the very center of the knot’’ (Being
Singular Plural, 5). Instead, in L’intrus we find the intense and inescap-
able pressure to discern whether this particular interlacing, interpene-
tration, does not fuse Nancy into the other, and vice versa. Does this
instance of fusion not provide a counterexample to that of sexual inter-
course, which Nancy often cites as the positive example of such unfused
interlacing?
Frustratingly and provocatively, one could indeed argue in either
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direction. On the one hand, one could say that the instance of the
transplant negates the positive assertions we find throughout Nancy’s
writing on being and otherness, that it points us to a new historical
moment wherein bodies are inscribed and fused (for the sake of their
very survival) within a community of science, technology, and the par-
ticular values that operationalize the heart in their service. On the other
hand, it is possible to argue that this opening up to receive the other,
and the subsequent re-relation of singularities, the radical upsetting of
a sense of separateness, exemplify instead the perfect realization of
Nancy’s ontology, that the technologically affected ‘‘fusion’’ actually
only reverses the self-other relation and accentuates their mutual iden-
tity within the interstitial space of indeterminate ownership of the heart.
Herein, the stranger and Nancy share a liminal space or dis-position of
organs and identity.
This microcommunity is well described in Rabinow’s notion of ‘‘bio-
sociality.’’ Nikolas Rose explains.
Paul Rabinow was the first to recognize this phenomenon—he coined
the term ‘‘biosociality’’ to characterize the new forms of collective iden-
tification that are taking shape in the age of genomics. His research had
led him to identify new types of group and individual identities and
practices arising out of the new techniques of genetic diagnosis and
monitoring of risks and susceptibilities. Such groups meet to share their
experiences, lobby for funding research into ‘‘their’’ disease, and change
their relations to their children, their environment, and their forms of
life in the plight of genetic knowledge. He also foresaw the ways in
which they would develop novel kinds of relations with medical special-
ists, clinics, laboratories, and with medical knowledge, surrounded by ‘‘a
heavy panoply of pastoral keepers to help them experience, share, inter-
vene, and ‘understand’ their fate.’’∞≤
Nancy Scheper-Hughes’s articulation of the concept nicely taps into the
long-distant, non-face-to-face nature of the liaison between self and
unseen other: ‘‘New forms of social kinship (and a promise of bio-
sociality) must be invented to link strangers, even at times political
‘enemies,’ from distant locations who are described by the operating
surgeons as ‘a perfect match—like brothers,’ while they are prevented
from seeing, let alone speaking to, each other.’’∞≥ This, then, is the par-
ticularly operationalized community into which Nancy enters as the
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heart of the other ‘‘intrudes’’ into the cavity in his chest. In this instance,
of course, no conversation between the two people is possible, as the
very condition on which the donor ‘‘gave’’ his heart was the condition of
his death.
Not only is Nancy’s survival ‘‘inscribed in a complex process woven
together with strangers and strangeness,’’ but this strangeness is of a
particular, instrumental nature (L’intrus, 21). Nancy describes the inti-
mate and concrete practices which invade his body, ‘‘the intrusion . . . of
this space: tubes, pliers, sutures, and catheters’’ (L’intrus, 26).
There is an opening there through which passes an incessant flux
of strangeness; immune depressant drugs, other drugs charged with
combatting certain so-called secondary effects, effects which they do
not know how to fight (such as the degradation of the kidneys), re-
peated check-ups, all of existence set in a new register, swept completely
through. It is life scanned and reported in multiple registers, each one of
which inscribes other possibilities of death. . . . It is thus I myself who
becomes my intruder, in all of these accumulated and opposing ways. I
feel it well: it is far stronger than a sensation. The strangeness of my
own identity, which was always so much alive and vivid, never before
touched me so acutely. ‘‘I’’ has clearly become the formal index of an
unverifiable and impalpable chain. (L’intrus, 35–36)
All this bespeaks the fact that the ‘‘strangeness’’ here consists not only of
the other’s heart, but of the entire apparatus that makes the operation
possible, that is, in the final analysis, the intrusion itself.
If one recalls Nancy’s critique of Western philosophy’s constant trans-
formation of the body into a sign of something else, we cannot but be
shocked at the present transformation of Nancy’s body into this ‘‘new
register.’’ In the regime of the transplant, the body has become both the
object of a thoroughgoing redefinition and, in that process, is per-
sistently and necessarily read as a symbol of the efficacy of those opera-
tions and its legitimizing token. The analytical struggle in L’intrus is
to tease out the properly philosophical, ontological dimension from
the pragmatic, technical, and medical scientific dimension—where
does one stop, and the other begin? Again, does this operation enable
Nancy’s ontological claims to be manifested, or does it negate them?
The weight of the pragmatic is indisputable; Nancy unrelentingly
notes the pervasive presence and profound reach of the discursive com-
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munity which mandates and governs the practices which keep him alive,
which enable and facilitate these processes for Nancy’s ‘‘own’’ sake.
To taking drugs more than once a day and going back to the hospital for
check-ups there added the dental consequences of radiotherapy, the
loss of saliva, the food restrictions, the restrictions on contact for fear of
contagion, the weakening of muscles and kidneys, the reduction of
memory and of the strength to work, the reading of analyses, the insid-
ious recurrence of mucositis, candida, polyneuritis and this general
feeling of no longer being dissociable from a network of measures, of ob-
servations, of chemical, institutional and symbolic connections which
never allow themselves to be ignored like the connections intertwined
in ordinary life are. On the contrary, these connections expressly hold
life unremittingly aware of their presence and supervision. (L’intrus, 40)
Such awareness extends to incorporating Nancy himself, transforming
him into the very material intrusions that now are necessary elements of
his body: ‘‘The intruder exposes me excessively. It extrudes me, exports
me, expropriates me. I am the malady and the medicine; I am the
cancerous cell and the transplanted organ; I am the immune depressant
agents and their palliatives’’ (L’intrus, 42).
In such dramatic and graphic passages, we find a dramatic and intense
instance where one has operationalized the heart, the body, and thereby
rendered them outside themselves altogether. Is it not the case that
‘‘when one puts the body on the program, on whatever program, one
has already set it aside’’ (The Birth to Presence, 190)? Again, the critical
question is whether or not this pragmatic program is consistent with
Nancy’s ontological program, or quite different from it. Do science and
technology radically alter (or even pervert) the ontological situation, or
dramatically enhance it?
Nancy addresses the relation of technology to being: ‘‘We regard
[‘technological’ nature] as an autonomous instrument. We do so with-
out ever asking ourselves if it might not be ‘our’ comprehension of ‘our-
selves’ that comes up with these techniques and invents itself in them,
and without wondering if technology is in fact essentially in complete
agreement with the ‘with’ ’’ (Being Singular Plural, 70). He continues the
idea that techné is consistent with ontology: ‘‘Even ‘in nature’ species
proliferate and live alongside one another. Techné would always have to
do with what neither proceeds from nor to itself, with disparity, con-
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tinguity, and, thus, with an unachieved and unachievable essence of the
‘with’ ’’ (Being Singular Plural, 202n.61). But is this not an altogether
different version of technology than the one we find in L’intrus? While
the positive version of techné finds it, along with everything else, along-
side everybody and everything else, in L’intrus is not techné intrusive
and violent, transformative? Doesn’t Nancy’s heart transplant present a
radically different, historically specific, instance? The specific, historical
case of technology is one which he mentions emphatically in The In-
operative Community:
But for us, by now beyond even the ‘‘totalitarianism’’ that was to be the
monstrous realization of this promise, there remains only the play of
imperialisms against the background of still another empire, another
techno-economical imperative, and the social forms that such an imper-
ative creates. It is no longer even a question of community. But this is
also because the techno-economical organization or ‘‘making opera-
tional’’ of our world has taken over, even inherited, the plans for a
communitarian organization. It is still essentially a matter of work, of
operation, of operativity. (23)∞∂
The question we have been asking all along—is this operation a drama-
tization of Nancy’s ontology or its worst nightmare—can be situated
and read across multiple sites. Each, however, touches on the question
of whether the operation allows us to see, graphically and profoundly,
Nancy’s ontology, or whether its very conditions of possibility do not
irredeemably place it in the circuits of a technological operationaliza-
tion that hijack the human body into a project of immanence. And this
immanence would be nothing else than the immanence of immortality.
It is now that we must finally turn to the role of death: ‘‘Thus, the
multiple stranger who intrudes on my life . . . is nothing other than
death, or rather life/death: a suspension of the continuum of being, a
scansion where there is not a lot for ‘me’ to do’’ (L’intrus, 25). Nancy
names the intruder, completely and absolutely, its multiplicity now
gathered under a single signifier. Crucially, this naming gives a new
name as well to the paradoxical question that we have laid out in this
chapter: is this operation to be seen as a positive or negative event? If we
see it as the latter, it is solely because of the operationalizing of the heart,
which comes on its insertion into a technoscientific (not to say eco-
nomic) community of immanence. Parallel to this network is a network
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where ‘‘life/death is shared, where life connects with death, where the
incommunicable communicates’’ (L’intrus, 30). Yet in the course of his
essay (and drawing on other of his writings on death), Nancy gives us
more grounds on which to answer for the positive, that is, to construe
this instance as providing the most intense experiencing of being. His
use of language makes this perfectly clear: ‘‘To isolate death from life—
to not let the one entwine itself intimately with the other, each one
intruding into the heart of the other—that is what one must never do’’
(L’intrus, 23).
We can thus look afresh at passages such as those from Being Singular
Plural, and see in L’intrus a particular concretization of Nancy’s notion
of death and others. The sharing of the heart, the creation of a particular
instance of being-singular-plural, is intimately acted out on the commu-
nal topos of death and life.
Community is revealed in the death of others; hence it is always re-
vealed to others. Community is what takes place always through others
and for others. It is not the space of the egos—subjects and substances
that are at bottom immortal—but of the I’s, that are not egos. It is not a
communion that fuses the egos into an Ego of a higher We. It is the
community of others. . . . A community is the presentation to its mem-
bers of their mortal truth (which amounts to saying that there is no
community of immortal beings: one can imagine either a society or a
communion of immortal beings, but not a community). (The Inopera-
tive Community, 15)
The death of others is always a death revealed to others; death ‘‘hap-
pens’’ to one, and at once constitutes yet another sign of the shared
space of being.
The language of this passage from The Inoperative Community graphi-
cally names the process of laceration and singular being and death.
What tears apart is the presentation of finitude in and by community—
the presentation of the triple mourning I must go through: that of the
death of the other, that of my birth, and that of my death. Community is
the carrying out of this triple mourning. . . . What is lacerated in this way
is not the singular being: on the contrary, this is where the singular being
coappears. Rather, it is the communal fabric, it is immanence that is
lacerated. And yet this laceration does not happen to anything, for this
fabric does not exist. There is no tissue, no flesh, no subject or substance
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of common being, and consequently there is no laceration of this being.
But there is sharing out. Properly speaking, there is no laceration of the
singular being: there is no open cut in which the inside would get lost in
the outside. . . . ‘‘Laceration’’ consists only in exposure: the entire ‘‘in-
side’’ of the singular being is exposed to the ‘‘outside.’’ (30)
Seen in these terms, the transplant operation changes exactly noth-
ing (and this is a good thing). The immanence of some marvelous
communion is taken away from the scene—there is no triumph, or,
indeed, defeat (since this laceration happens to nothing, either in the
present or in the future). Voided of substance as we are used to regard it,
the singular being simply stands exposed to and with the other. The
positions of self and other are interchangable, any ‘‘essence’’ (whose
heart is whose?) becomes replaced by a global notion of common-
placedness.
And yet this reading is to take only one dimension as the totality of
L’intrus. The simple fact is that sharing in this instance is enabled and
mediated by a structured community intent on immanence, the imma-
nence of its own perfection, the immanence of death-lessness (or at
least, the ability to create the possibility for the deferral of death). Read
in this regard, this operationalization of bodies (on all sides, from all
directions) reinstantiates immanence and recodes bodies in its own
logic. In this sense, the historical question which has been with us all
along emerges with a vengeance: are we now living at a time when the
one thing that brings about recognition of community—death—is fore-
stalled in the name of a specialized community operating under the
basis of the eternal imperative to find immortality? And is this immor-
tality to be found only by perverting the ontological precepts Nancy
sets forth, that is, ironically, by making possible this laceration that is
not a laceration? And, most sharply, is this ‘‘operation’’ not the sole
privilege of a select few who can afford to engage in this system, and
what of those who are unable to, and those whose organs are donated, in
other words, of those who underwrite the system? As Scheper-Hughes
notes,
The entry of free markets (black and grey) and market incentives into
organs procurement has thrown into question the transplant rhetoric
of ‘‘organs scarcity.’’ There is obviously no shortage of desperate indi-
viduals willing to sell a kidney, a portion of their liver, a lung, an eye,
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or even a testicle for a pittance. But while erasing one vexing scarcity,
the organs traffic has produced a new one—a scarcity of transplant
patients of sufficient means and independence and who are willing to
break, bend, or bypass laws and longstanding codes of medical ethical
conduct.∞∑
A powerful and early admonition is offered by Richard Titmuss.
The commercialism of blood and donor relationships represses the
expression of altruism, erodes the sense of community, lowers scientific
standards, limits both personal and professional freedoms, sanctions the
making of profits in hospitals and clinical laboratories, legalizes hostility
between doctor and patient, subjects critical areas of medicine to the
laws of the marketplace, places immense social costs on those least able
to bear them—the poor, the sick, and the inept—increases the danger of
unethical behavior in various sectors of medical science and practice,
and results in situations in which proportionately more and more blood
is supplied by the poor, the unskilled and the unemployed, Blacks and
other low income groups.∞∏
In my discussion of L’intrus, I have tried to maintain a focus on the
‘‘narrow slot of technical possibilities,’’ as it draws together self and
other, that is historically arrived at and institutionally delivered. This
historic occasion brings about the tension within Nancy’s writings that I
have outlined between a transcendent philosophical statement and a
historical materialist reading of life. The Intruder, in other words, in-
trudes into and disrupts the continuity of Nancy’s writings and forces a
reevaluation. In Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel, we find another tension and
contradiction, also situated between an abstract paean to art and the
question of why and how otherness is delivered to us. The tension of
Never Let Me Go is located at the nexus of an ideology that portrays art
as offering a ‘‘bubble’’ in which to live in productive blindness to death,
and a notion that the highest human tragedy is to live in the wrong
historical moment, when the ethics that guide the proper relations
between self and other are hopelessly inoperative. Ishiguro’s case, like
Nancy’s, forces a rethinking of otherness and one’s relation to others.
We have, in other words, an inescapable ethical question that accom-
panies any life-extending operation that involves not only the ‘‘intru-
sion’’ of the other but also, in this case, the sacrifice of his or her life as
mandated by this particular delivery system.
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Never Let Me Go
The basic plot of this novel is simply enough told. A young woman
reminisces about her childhood at boarding school and her days beyond
it. After not too long a time we realize that this is a rather special
institution. The children are actually clones, bred to grow to a certain
age and then to start donating their organs to actual human beings,
again and again, until they, in the language of the institution, ‘‘com-
plete.’’∞π In this discussion, I will use two ‘‘takes’’ on Ishiguro’s fiction,
from the author himself, to outline the basic contradiction in the novel.
First, Ishiguro has repeatedly insisted that this is a sad, but ultimately
affirmative novel. In one interview he provides the response he wishes
to hear: ‘‘ ‘This is a very sad novel. But there was something also quite
affirming in it, because the characters are so decent. But, it’s terribly sad.’
That response is probably closest to what I was trying to get at. You
know, the fact is, yes, we will all fade away and die, but people can find
the energy to create little pockets of happiness and decency while we’re
here.’’∞∫ In this perspective, with the evocation of ‘‘while we’re here,’’ this
is simply a novel about growing up: ‘‘It was a way of exploring certain
aspects—psychologically for instance—of what happens when you leave
childhood, face up to adulthood, and then face up to your own mor-
tality.’’∞Ω So far, so good: we are all mortal, after all, and under the gun of
the same death sentence. Why not delve into the way the novel offers
some solace for that universal condition, specifically as that solace takes
the form of education and art? This is just what a liberal sentimentalist,
such as myself, would want to hear.
But then things get both more interesting, and more dicey: ‘‘I thought
I could discuss certain aspects of facing death. I didn’t want them to
worry about how to escape. I wanted their concerns to be more or less
the same ones that all people had. What are the things important to us
while we are here? How do we fit things like love, work, friendship into
what is surprisingly a short period of time?’’≤≠ It is precisely here that we
have the first glimmer of recognition that there is a problem with imag-
ining that these characters are ‘‘just like us.’’ These ‘‘beings,’’ who are so
like us, are not really exactly so. From the sentence, ‘‘I thought I could
discuss certain aspects of facing death,’’ to the next one, ‘‘I didn’t want
them to worry about how to escape,’’ we have the insertion of ‘‘them,’’
not ‘‘us,’’ and the differential just becomes more entrenched after that
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point, if vacillating. This opens up a question: how are they like and
unlike us? Yes, they are alive, and they die, just like us. But are we all told
that our death is predicated on giving our life-sustaining organs to other
people? This seems a hard fact to ignore so easily. What lessons, then,
can be shared across that divide?
In this scenario, art education and practice (and education in gen-
eral) forms a useful illusion; it perpetuates the ‘‘bubble’’ of protection
we need to enjoy life before we inevitably die. Referring to death, Ishi-
guro asks, ‘‘What really matters if you know that this is going to happen
to you? What are the things you hold on to, what are the things you want
to set right before you go? What do you regret? What are the consola-
tions? What are the things you feel you have to do before you go? And
also the question is, what is all the education and culture for if you are
going to check out?’’≤∞ He asks the question more pointedly: ‘‘If they
had known they would die in the way they do, would they have em-
braced this arts education? They might say, ‘What’s the point? Why are
we making all this effort?’ I don’t mean just in arts, but in their relation-
ships. Would we make any effort to be decent human beings?’’≤≤ In sum,
the prescription is veiled ignorance, inculcation of aesthetic and ethi-
cal sensibilities, and then knowledge of impending doom, softened by
those acquired sensibilities. In other words, it’s ‘‘life and life only.’’ The
notion that this is just about growing up is expressed in its most banal
and intimate manner as Ishiguro speaks of this as not only something
one’s parents do for one, but also as a collective human act, performed
almost instinctively: ‘‘It struck me how quickly even total strangers
would enter into this conspiracy with myself and my wife to keep her
[their daughter] in this bubble. Everybody wanted to censor out the
sadness of the world. They desperately wanted this little child to be
deceived about how nice a place the world was.’’≤≥
But there is a difference that goes to the core of this book: the actual
‘‘otherness’’ of the clone children and the delivery system that links
them to ‘‘real’’ humans in a deadly unfair ratio of charity and purpose.
Ishiguro knows this difference intimately, yet he continuously seeks to
elide it. How can he actually imagine such an elastic metaphor as this?
‘‘The overall story is of the clones and the fact that they give up their
organs, one by one, and they die. They think about why they’ve been
educated and what’s important in their lives. That’s all a metaphor for
what we all do in the real world. Indeed, the same fate awaits us.’’≤∂ Yes,
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and no. We all die, but we do not all die at an early age because our
bodies have been slowly depleted of their vital organs for somebody
else’s sake. Or, more graphically: ‘‘There is a countdown. By creating a
situation where to us—the reader and me the writer—their lives seem
cruelly truncated, inside their world, that’s what’s normal. I thought by
creating that kind of situation for them, we could get a perspective on
our own situation, where we hope to live to eighty if something doesn’t
strike us down. These people operate the same way. They’ve been given
this fate and they accept it. There is a cruelty about it, but they don’t see
it to the same extent.’’≤∑
After seeing the number of times Ishiguro mentions this equivalence,
which acts as a kind of alibi, it becomes clear why he is so attached to
side-stepping the central conceit of the novel, the exchange system. He
does so to deliver its central ideology: that if the clones don’t know they
are going to die, not in that way at least, there is no real cruelty, or when
that recognition comes, it will be softened by art and education. At that
point, ‘‘they try to do the best to make it good. They don’t really try to
get outside of that. They say with varying degrees, ‘This is my life. I’m
going to do the best with what I’ve been given. I will try to gain dignity
and worth, to try and conduct my relationships with the people who are
important to me in the right way.’ ’’≤∏ Again, I am not trying to deprive
the novel of this intended reading; what I am trying to do is show how
radically partial it is, if we recognize the counterdiscourse of material
history and the actual exchange system that is, in effect, inoperative.
The clone children were spawned at this point, in this, to use Nancy’s
words, ‘‘narrow slot of technical possibilities’’ and sociohistorical needs
and desires, to deliver themselves up to gradual, ritualized, and ra-
tionalized slaughter. That this could take place requires that ‘‘good
people’’ think they are doing good things. And this goodness (this
‘‘decency’’) is in fact what is to be bestowed on the children as an act of
grace before their organs are ripped out (all the extractions are scrupu-
lously performed off-screen). This involves us in a deliberation of ques-
tions such as ‘‘Good in what sense? To whom? For whom?’’ To answer
these and other questions requires us to go into that territory of history,
and specifically material history, that Ishiguro wishes to bracket off.
Initially, Ishiguro’s novel was titled ‘‘The Student’s Novel’’ and had
nothing to do with clones. And then the world discovered actual (not
imagined) cloning: ‘‘It was the final dimension that helped the story to
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come alive. Around that time, in 2001, there was a lot of stuff about
cloning, about stem-cell research, about Dolly, the sheep. It was very
much in the air. . . . I was looking for a situation to talk about the whole
aging process, but in such an odd way that we’d have to look at it all in a
new way.’’≤π The ‘‘odd way’’ is thus an invented metaphor. The problem
is, it is not just a metaphor. With this very real possibility, people’s lives
were ineluctably altered, as was human history. The discovery of clon-
ing allowed Ishiguro to transfigure the already well-established practice
of organ transplants. Now we could imagine nonhuman ‘‘others’’ cre-
ated for the purpose of giving up their vital organs. The gap between
clones and human donors thus allows, indeed it forces a discussion of
otherness precisely within the boundaries of a radically operative com-
munity that is at once ‘‘nonhuman’’ and more pernicious—it creates life
to destroy life, and the sole compensation for sacrifice is ‘‘decency.’’ The
point of this discussion again is not to deny the metaphor; if anything, it
is to extend its reach and significance, but in the opposite direction. I
would like to use this opening to reflect back, not only on our mortal
status (we are all the same in death and in life, and art helps us all get
along ethically and spiritually), but also on how this narrative cannot so
easily slough off the issue of difference and history.
I am drawn to periods in history where more values in society have
undergone a sudden change because a lot of the things I am interested
in tend to find a cutting edge in those situations. I am interested in how
people who tried to do something good and useful in their lives sud-
denly find that they had misplaced their efforts. Not only have they
perhaps wasted their talent and their energies, but perhaps they have
contributed unknowingly to something that was evil all the time, think-
ing they were doing something good.≤∫
More than the specific remarks Ishiguro makes about Never Let Me Go,
the sentiment found above forms a litany that runs throughout even his
earliest interviews. In this view, people are inherently good and decent,
but as often as not their sense of right and wrong behavior is out of sync
with their historical moment, their ‘‘slot of possibilities.’’ In my discus-
sion of this topic, I focus on how biotechnology creates a historical
demand for an ethics that always lags behind. Ishiguro instead substi-
tutes an anachronistic liberal sentimentality. The problem is, of course,
that to do this he has to erase history, and the difference history makes,
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in contradiction to his avowed sensitivity to the way it can skew ethical
behavior.
This problematic is found forcefully in the final confrontation be-
tween the characters Kathy and Tommy and the directress of their
boarding school, and the terms in play are art, and life, and their narrow
slot of possibility. In Hailsham boarding school, art is a sign of creativity
and compliance at once; students are instructed to operationalize their
creative talents. Those who do not are considered both untalented and
uncooperative—rebellious in fact. But as the children grow, and grow
closer to the time when they will ‘‘graduate’’ to start their donations, and
hence start to die, a rumor circulates that the artwork appropriated by
the directress, Madame, for her ‘‘gallery’’ serves as an index to the
children’s proximity to the human. If their art reveals a capacity for love,
so the legend goes, they may be granted a ‘‘deferral,’’ an extension in life.
The mystery of the purpose behind art seems to become less opaque
now. Kathy and her lover Tommy thus make a journey to ask for just
such a deferral from Madame. She in turn asks,
‘‘Now why, young man, explain it to me. Why would my gallery help in
telling which of you were really in love?’’
‘‘Because it would help show you what we were like,’’ Tommy said.
‘‘Because. . . .’’
‘‘Because of course,’’ Madame cut in suddenly, ‘‘your art will reveal
your inner selves! That’s it, isn’t it? Because your art will display your
souls!’’≤Ω
The brutal truth is that there are no deferrals, for any reason: ‘‘Poor
creatures. What did we do to you? With all our schemes and plans?’’
(254). This is where the novel draws together art, humanism, and in-
stitutional ideology. These ‘‘creatures’’ will always be so and nothing
more, despite all the schemes and plans of the school which, it turns
out, have given the children not only false hope, but useless capacity
as well.
Confronted with this negation, Kathy asks the obvious questions,
which echo precisely the questions Ishiguro poses above: ‘‘Why did we
do all of that work in the first place? Why train us, encourage us, make us
produce all of that? If we’re just going to give donations anyway, then
die, why all those lessons? Why all those books and discussions?’’ (254).
The answer Ishiguro gives in the interview is that education and art
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soften the blow of mortality, and this answer is voiced by a teacher in the
school as well. But before that happens, another, equally revealing an-
swer is given. As it turns out, the careful cultivation of humanity in the
children was done, if not to save their lives, then to ‘‘improve’’ them. It is
here that the discourse of liberal sentimentality is laid bare, and it is
done so against precisely the ‘‘narrow slot of technical possibilities’’ of
which Nancy writes, one irrevocably tied to history. In a passage that
raises many issues, Madame declares,
You must try and see it historically. After the war, in the early fifties,
when the great breakthroughs in science followed one after the other so
rapidly, there wasn’t time to take stock, to ask the sensible questions.
Suddenly there were all these new possibilities laid before us, all these
ways to cure so many previously incurable conditions. This was what
the world noticed the most, wanted the most. And for a long time,
people preferred to believe these organs appeared from nowhere, or at
most that they grew in a kind of vacuum. Yes, there were arguments. But
by the time people became concerned about . . . about . . . students, by
the time they came to consider just how you were reared, whether you
should have been brought into existence at all, well by then it was too
late. There was no way to reverse the process. How can you ask a world
that has come to regard cancer as curable, how can you ask a world to
put away that cure, to go back to the dark days? There was no going
back. However uncomfortable people were about your existence, their
overwhelming concern was that their own children, their spouses, their
parents, their friends, did not die from cancer, motor neuron disease,
heart disease. So for a long time you were kept in the shadows, and
people did their best not to think about you. And if they did, they tried
to convince themselves you weren’t really like us. That you were less
than human, so it didn’t matter. And that was how things stood until our
little movement came along. But do you see what we were up against?
We were virtually attempting to square the circle. Here was the world,
requiring students to donate. While that remained the case, there would
always be a barrier against seeing you as properly human. Well, we
fought that battle for many years, and what we won for you, at least,
were many improvements, though of course, you were only a select few.
But then came the Morningdale scandal, then other things, and before
we knew it, the climate had quite changed. No one wanted to be seen
supporting us anymore. (263, emphases added)
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There are thus two historical moments. In the postwar period, that of
the ‘‘baby boom,’’ new scientific discoveries complement the burgeon-
ing of new life with technologies to enhance life and cure disease via
another mode of life production—cloning. Like the people on the dock
Marlow addresses in The Heart of Darkness, the citizens of the civilized
world prefer not to know the origins of their sustenance and order. The
threshold they in all cases do not want to cross is that which would
argue the equivalence of the clones to human beings. As long as the
clones can be regarded as subhuman, their otherness is indelible and
fatal. Hailsham’s effort, its decency, is to try to square the system by
cultivating the students (as the clones are known, and as consistent with
the original title of the novel) in another way—through education and
the arts. The point is that by that time an overwhelming need, and the
means to satisfy that need, was already instantiated, there was no go-
ing back. The Morningdale scandal just tipped the balance absolutely
against the students.
Morningdale is a geneticist who wants to breed humans that are
superior to normal human beings; this elicits unexpected scrutiny of the
entire cloning enterprise, and especially Hailsham’s efforts to produce
evidence of the children’s humanity. As long as the clones are regarded
as subhuman, the status quo is fine, or if they are slightly improved,
that does not seem to matter to the citizens at large, but ‘‘a generation
of created children who’d take their place in society? Children demon-
strably superior to the rest of us? Oh no. That frightened people. They
recoiled from that’’ (264). Hence, the Hailsham project is caught pre-
cisely at the wrong moment. We should thus see it as performing an
indecent act, as Ishiguro argues may be the case with an ethics out of
sync with history. This notion that the clones could be equal to or better
than humans is obviated by the fact that, according to the clones, their
models, or what they call ‘‘possibles’’ (humans whom they are modeled
after), likely come from the dregs of society: ‘‘We’re modeled from trash.
Junkies, prostitutes, winos, tramps. Convicts, maybe, just so long as they
aren’t psychos. That’s what we come from’’ (166).
This does not differ in the least from the sites in which Scheper-
Hughes did her fieldwork on transplants: ‘‘We have gone to many of the
places where the economically and politically dispossessed—including
refugees, the homeless, street children, undocumented workers, prison-
ers, awol soldiers, aging prostitutes, cigarette smugglers, petty thieves,
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and other marginalized people—are lured into selling their organs.’’≥≠
Nevertheless, it is precisely because of the abject status of the donors
(‘‘trash’’) that we have a paradox, it seems. To accept the organ from
these ‘‘people,’’ one must go to the bottom of society—either to those so
desperate for funds that they will literally sell their lives, or, in Ishiguro’s
fictional construct, to artificial life. In both cases, radical otherness is
required to make the deal (a) possible because of the financial differen-
tial and (b) possible because, absent financial compensation to square
the ethics of the act, the donors are not even human anyway, so no
obligation of compensation really applies. On the other hand, these
abjected objects from abjected souls are purified as they are torn out of
the host body and transplanted to the receiving body—their otherness
is somehow leeched out. If not, we cannot help but think that some of
that abject state must be absorbed into the host body.
It is here that we find the toggle point of liberal sentiment and eco-
nomic neoliberalism: ‘‘Indeed, commercialized transplant exemplifies
better than any other biomedical technology the reach of economic
liberalism. Transplant technology trades comfortably in the domain
of postmodern bioethics, with its values of disposability and free and
transparent circulation. The uninhibited circulation of bought and sold
kidneys exemplifies a neoliberal political discourse based on juridical
concepts of the autonomous individual subject, equality (at least, equal-
ity of opportunity), radical freedom, accumulation, and universalism,
expressed in the expansion of medical rights and medical citizenship.’’≥∞
In order for this to work, some adequate model of recompense and
exclusion from that obligation must exist. Either we compensate along
the axis of sameness (we can transfer benefits and cash to those who
give their organs), or we don’t have to provide compensation because
the donors are beneath our obligation (for instance, the clones, but this
scenario should not be read only in the realm of fiction; those who look
and act sufficiently different from us, those mute or deaf or living in
other hemispheres are just as likely to be invisible members of the
‘‘biosociety’’).
Rose points to exactly this kind of problematic—classical ethics are
no longer adequate.
What is clear, however, is that the classical distinction made in moral
philosophy between that which is not human—ownable, tradeable,
commodifiable—and that which is human—not legitimate material for
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such commodification—can no longer do the work that is required to
resolve this issue: that distinction is itself what is at stake in the politics
of the contemporary bioeconomy. The tensions between the intensify-
ing somatic ethics in the West, with the centrality it accords to the man-
agement of one’s own health and body to contemporary self-fashioning,
and the inequities and injustices of the local and global economic,
technological, and biomedical infrastructure required to support such a
somatic ethic, seems to me to be a constitutive feature of contemporary
biopolitics.≥≤
This is a key element in Ishiguro’s text—history, and the ethical gaps
that open up when things change in certain ways, leaving individuals
clueless at best, catastrophically wrong at others. Responding to the
children’s incredulity at the randomness of their existence, their teacher
again reiterates the ‘‘narrow slot’’ of time that has determined their
particular degree of humanity: human enough to feel the absurdity and
horror of their existence, but not human enough to be allowed to live.
‘‘I can see,’’ Miss Emily said, ‘‘that it might look as though you were
simply pawns in a game. It can certainly be looked at like that. But think
of it. You were lucky pawns. There was a certain climate and now it’s
gone. You have to accept that sometimes that’s how things happen in
this world. People’s opinions, their feelings, they go one way, then the
other. It just so happens you grew up at a certain point in this process.’’
‘‘It might be just some trend that came and went,’’ I said. ‘‘But for us,
it’s our life.’’ (266)
It is here that the notions of historical possibility, conflicting institu-
tional operativeness (the imperatives of technoscience and liberalism)
come into play, and these considerations link up with Ishiguro’s concern
about good people thinking they are doing good things that turn out to
be wrong. At a precise moment in time, Hailsham is a noble experiment
in granting humanness, that is, sameness, to the clone children. That
is what their artistic production is supposed to attest to. What are
(any) beings to do? ‘‘Our’’ lives, each, are caught, it seems, in the jaws
of history and contingency, and this drives our sense of how to act
toward others. The overwhelming imperative is to live (as we saw in
L’intrus), to stave off that great equalizer, death. Everything can be
geared to this goal, including making art, and that has been its constant
myth—immortality through art. But here, Ishiguro brings us into the
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not-so-brave world of operative art, that which is deployed not for the
children’s immortality, or even mortality, or even, as they imagine, to
postpone their death sentences for three years. It is to instantiate some
small degree of recognition, that they are not to be abjected and greeted
with horror. The irony of course is that even the perpetrators of the sys-
tem cannot squelch their aversion to the children. They may not have
brought them into this world, but their acts of kindness toward them are
blindered and self-centered. The institution is driven by a sentimen-
tality, not an ethics.
In this case, art and those who would endow the children with artistic
sensibilities stand on a par with the entire notion of being a ‘‘carer’’—
which is to be no more than a handmaiden to death. But again, this
perception is exactly the opposite of that of the ministers of Hailsham,
and of Ishiguro himself, who also expresses the idea that ‘‘bubbles,’’
protections against the truth of death—art, in other words—help. We
can almost hear Ishiguro’s voice as well as one teacher declares, ‘‘I’m so
proud to see you both. You built your lives on what we gave you. You
wouldn’t be who you are today if we’d not protected you. You wouldn’t
have become absorbed in your lessons, you wouldn’t have lost your-
selves in your art and your writing. Why should you have done, knowing
what lay in store for each of you? You would have told us it was all
pointless, and how could we have argued with you?’ ’’ (268). In the end,
liberal sentimentalism meets economic neoliberalism. Yet moments af-
ter Scheper-Hughes offers that stinging indictment, she adds, ‘‘To give
them their due, however, these new transplant transactions are a blend
of altruism and commerce; consent and coercion; gifts and theft; sci-
ence and sorcery; care and human sacrifice.’’≥≥ This just serves to con-
firm the doubleness, the ambivalence that I find in Ishiguro’s text, de-
spite his attempt to gloss over the ‘‘sadness’’ of the story. If we are to in
any way recover Ishiguro’s project, to take it from the jaws of contradic-
tion (artistic transcendence and liberal sentimentalism versus historical
contingency and ethical ambiguity), we need to invent another optics.
Inexact Exchange
To start to answer the question of whether or not ‘‘it’’ was all worth it, we
need to return to the second part of the contradiction I have outlined.
The first part is, again, the notion that art offers solace, that its ‘‘bubble’’
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is benign, that the children of Hailsham are like us and need that protec-
tion. The second part is that they are emphatically not like ‘‘us,’’ and that
their difference abides not only in the manner in which they are born
and die, but also in the system that mediates their lives and deaths with
those of the human beings in the novel. Born into the bioeconomic
system, the clones exist precisely in that liminal zone Scheper-Hughes
describes as concomitant with the invention of transplants: ‘‘Transplan-
tation demanded a radical redefinition of death, to allow the immediate
harvesting of organs from bodies neither completely dead nor yet still
living.’’≥∂ As such, there is not only a demand to redefine death, but with
it comes an uncertainty as to the clones’ actual ‘‘biovalue’’ until such
issues can be resolved. This is a term Catherine Waldby initially pro-
posed to ‘‘characterize the ways that bodies and tissues derived from the
dead are redeployed for the preservation and enhancement of the health
and vitality of the living.’’≥∑ This opacity, this liminal zone that the
children occupy, of uncertain value and affective status, is well reflected
in this meditation.
Maybe from as early as when you’re five or six, there’s been a whisper
going at the back of your head, saying: ‘‘One day, maybe not so long
from now, you’ll get to know how it feels.’’ So you’re waiting, even if you
don’t quite know it, waiting for the moment when you realize that you
really are different from them; that there are people out there, like
Madame, who don’t hate you or wish you any harm, but who nonethe-
less shudder at the very thought of you—of how you were brought into
this world and why—and who dread the idea of your hand brushing
against theirs. The first time you glimpse yourself through the eyes of a
person like that, it’s a cold moment. It’s like walking past a mirror you’ve
walked past every day of your life, and suddenly it shows you something
else, something troubling and strange. (36)
Otherness in this novel is empathic and clear at times, at others not.
That is the problem. The very existence of some, like the speaker above,
is borne of difference. The tragedy of this abjection by others is that the
very reason behind the speaker’s birth is to give life to others who
‘‘shudder’’ at the very thought of her, not because of her purpose, but
precisely because her ‘‘delivery’’ into the world is via a very precisely
different mechanism.
We can hark back to notion of seeing oneself through the eyes of
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others. In this instance, it is a deeply ambiguous phenomenon that
produces a profound sense of alienation. It puts the speaker ‘‘in her
place’’ and forces a re-recognition that will offer her a knowledge that is
at once comforting and horrifying. She knows her destiny more clearly
and more sharply than ‘‘others,’’ and it is indeed hopeless and troubling.
Still, what is perhaps even more disturbing is the relation between this
self and that other—what accounts for this dread and horror? In Never
Let Me Go it is the eerie mimetic proximity of the speaker, a ‘‘donor,’’ to
actual human beings, and the horrifying difference of their coming into
the world.
These children’s coming into self-knowledge takes place not by sim-
ply filling out a ‘‘coming of age’’ narrative, which Ishiguro insists is the
backbone of the story, but also via a growing recognition of the na-
ture of their institutional home. Ishiguro marks the acquisition of self-
knowledge not only against the shifting historical circumstances of the
narrative, but also within the specific institutional structures that deliver
recognition. In the following passage he slips from an individual charac-
ter’s reflection on her past and present, her changing perceptions of
herself and her classmates, to her reading of that perceptual change
against the backdrop of the institution in which the clones have been
placed, and their definition of self against those outside: ‘‘Thinking back
now, I can see we were just at that age when we knew a few things about
ourselves—about who we were, how we were different from our guard-
ians, from the people outside—but hadn’t yet understood what any of it
meant’’ (36).
It is characteristic of this novel to continually slide back and forth
between the narrator’s reflections on her particular life and her appeal
to the reader for some acknowledgment of common experience. Kathy
wants to feel some convergence between her childhood and that of her
reader—she constantly attempts to achieve a bond of recognition, at-
tempting to place her life fully into a generic, that is to say, shared
narrative of growing up. The passage continues, openly addressing the
reader: ‘‘I’m sure somewhere in your childhood, you too had an experi-
ence like ours that day’’ (36). But even as she makes that appeal, the
sentence next moves into a recognition of difference, only to finish with
a movement back to an appeal to the common, and that common
ground in this sequence is not in experience, but in feeling: ‘‘similar if
not in the actual details, then inside, in the feelings’’ (36).
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Yet, once again, as we come to expect, this moment is then swept back
into the specific case of the institution that houses the children. Even as
the narrator continues to use the second-person term of address, the
‘‘actual details’’ belie the intimacy of shared experience and shared feel-
ing: ‘‘Because it doesn’t really matter how well your guardians try to
prepare you: all the talks, videos, discussions, warnings, none of that can
really bring it home. Not when you’re eight years old, and you’re all
together in a place like Hailsham; when you’ve got guardians like the
ones we had; when the gardeners and the delivery men joke and laugh
with you and call you ‘sweetheart’ ’’ (ibid.). Even at this early point in
the novel we have started to suspect what the term ‘‘guardian’’ means,
and it is precisely not generic. The guardians’ efforts to ‘‘prepare’’ the
children are unlike anything one would expect at a typical boarding
school. ‘‘None of it can bring it home’’ not only because you are young
but because you are in a place ‘‘like Hailsham’’ and have qualitatively
different sorts of guardians than other children at other schools. This
sinister, or at least suspect, tone is closed off by a final evocation of the
universal and everyday, but by then it is too late. A ‘‘place like Hailsham’’
is clearly distinct from other places, and the relationship between those
who live there and those who live outside is defined by the nature of the
institution itself—it is home to particularly ‘‘produced’’ beings. But what
of the interactions between those beings on the inside?
Two discourses mediate this relationship. First, there is the discourse
of exchange: people give things to other people. The issue of reciprocity
here ranges from the complex to the nonexistent. Second, and attached
to the first, is the discourse of recognition: when exchange takes place, it
always does so as a gesture of recognition. The problem is, it is as often
as not a moment of misrecognition. Just as the children are and are not
human—exact enough to donate viable organs, inexact enough to kill
by so demanding—things are and are not what they seem to be. Mo-
ments of exchange and recognition occur over and over again, but
throughout the novel there is a sense of haunting, which troubles the
supposedly clean exchanges and clear moments of recognition: ‘‘When
you lift an arm, or when someone sits up in bed, you can feel this pale,
shadowy movement all around you in the tiles’’ (18).
But there is one critical difference in terms of the idea of exchange:
the children of Hailsham give, but what they receive in return is incom-
mensurate with their donation. At one point in the novel, one teacher
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finally breaks down and, troubled by the veil of ignorance that never
seems to lift for these children, she tells them of their fate. Critically,
her description of their fate is drawn by contrasting it to normal hu-
man lives.
‘‘I know you don’t mean any harm. But there’s just too much talk like
this. I hear it all the time, it’s been allowed to go on, and it’s not right.’’ I
could see more drops coming off the gutter and landing on her shoulder,
but she didn’t seem to notice. ‘‘If no one else will talk to you,’’ she
continued, ‘‘then I will. The problem, as I see it, is that you’ve been told
and not told. You’ve been told, but none of you really understand, and I
dare say, some people are quite happy to leave it that way. But I’m not. If
you’re going to have decent lives, then you’ve got to know and know
properly. None of you will go to America, none of you will be film stars.
And none of you will be working in supermarkets as I heard some of you
planning the other day. Your lives are set out for you. You’ll become
adults, then before you’re old, before you’re even middle-aged, you’ll
start to donate your vital organs. That’s what each of you was created to
do. You’re not like the actors you watch on your videos, you’re not even
like me. You were brought into this world for a purpose, and your
futures, all of them, have been decided. So you’re not to talk that way any
more. You’ll be leaving Hailsham before long, and it’s not so far off, the
day you’ll be preparing for your first donations.’’ (81)
The narrative momentum for this novel is thus largely taken up by the
question of how these donors will be redeemed. If not by some thing,
then at least by recognition as something less abject?
Art in this novel, art may be the key to human recognition, but it is
an ambiguous token: ‘‘ ‘Even you, Ruth, you didn’t dare boss Christy
around. All because we thought she was great at poetry. But we didn’t
know a thing about poetry. We didn’t care about it. It’s strange’ ’’ (18).
Christy is granted immunity from being ‘‘bossed around’’ because of her
reputed skill at writing poetry, but this efficacious token of exchange,
this product of energy spent, is not only misrecognized, but even the
object of indifference. How is it that human energy can be expended
and yet its value be unknown? How can things of value be at once acted
on and unknown? And, finally, how does art partake of both these
problematics?
The problem, of course, is, what is given in return? There are two
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answers. The children produce poems and artwork, and can either ‘‘sell’’
them for tokens or have them ‘‘taken’’ by the headmistress. In the first
instance, tokens can then be traded for other items. But if one’s work is
appropriated by Madame, it bestows both great honor and nothing, for
it is a mystery as to what happens to those works once they are appropri-
ated. This leads to ‘‘the tokens controversy.’’
The tokens controversy was, I suppose, all part of our getting more
acquisitive as we grew older. For years—I think I’ve said already—we’d
thought that having work chosen for the billiards room, never mind
taken away by Madame, was a huge triumph. But by the time we were
ten, we’d grown more ambivalent about it. The Exchanges, with their
system of tokens as currency, had given us a keen eye for pricing up any-
thing we produced. We’d become preoccupied with T-shirts, with deco-
rating around our beds, with personalising our desks. And of course, we
had our ‘‘collections’’ to think of. (38)
With this new acquisitiveness, rational economic behavior sets in, and
the vague pride which is given in exchange for having Madame take
away one’s artwork no longer is salient: ‘‘By the time we were ten, this
whole notion that it was a great honour to have something taken by
Madame collided with a feeling that we were losing our most market-
able stuff ’’ (39). Art, then, is ‘‘stuff ’’ to be converted to cash. When the
children ask what happens to the expropriated works, they are told by a
teacher that ‘‘it’s for a good reason’’ (40). Hence, ‘‘reason’’ or causality is
not for them to know at this point in their lives. The ‘‘conversion’’ of art
to something else is mystified. This in itself may not appear significant,
but coupled with all that we have discussed thus far, it becomes clear
that human effort, the expenditure of energy, the deployment of bodies
(and body parts) become transformed into an absented value that
forms the lure of the text—where does all this art go, and for what? Until
we can answer that, the ‘‘system’’ simply does not function; it always has
an aporia, and a calculated one at that. This aporia is founded on the
notion, again, of a scheme of recognition and identification that is
skewed, corrupted, and mimetically false. Donors seem to be one thing
but are not, and even though they give themselves entirely to others in
the most sacrificial way possible, recognition of this breeds repulsion,
not gratitude. A child can be good at poetry and earn the deference of
her peers, but they have no idea what poetry actually is. Art can be made
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and praised, and then the highest compliment turns out to be privation
and seeming exploitation. It is not just a faulty exchange system we are
confronted with, but a flawed system of human recognition and reward.
In other words, what is this all worth?
We seem thus to have come to an impasse. If we buy into the redemp-
tive narrative Ishiguro offers—that ‘‘they’’ are ‘‘just like us’’ and that art
and education are necessary to our relief from death, enjoyment of life,
and ability to act well toward others—we are still nagged by the ques-
tion, are they really like us? If we go to the second reading, that this
narrative is inescapably linked to issues of contingency, slots of possibili-
ties, and historical materialism, and that those issues affect strongly how
we relate to others and act toward them, we are forced to acknowledge
the inexactness of that formula (they are alike and not alike us), and that
that reading goes in exactly the opposite direction than that the author
insists on. If we are not satisfied with Ishiguro’s answer—that art cush-
ions us against the horrible knowledge of our death to come—then we
either have to come up with something new or adapt his point of view to
a new critical framework. I will do the latter.
My compromise, or perhaps evasive strategy, is to imagine that re-
demption nonetheless takes place, but only if we acquiesce to inexact-
ness, incommensurate exchange, and near equivalence. In sum, there is
a way that falseness is tied to misrecognition, and in this instance it is
redemptive. I have raised the question, if art cannot be exchanged for a
clear value, if it can’t even be recognized as such, or name a fixed and
certain thing, what good is it? The title of Ishiguro’s novel comes from a
song that the narrator hears and makes her own. She has no idea what
the song is really about, or rather she doesn’t care; its mimetic qualities
are absent to her, and what we find instead is pure affect, and, most
important, affect that is delivered via an imaginary narrative.
What was so special about this song? Well, the thing was, I didn’t used to
listen properly to the words—I just waited for that bit that went, ‘‘Baby,
baby, never let me go . . .’’ And what I’d imagine was a woman who’d
been told she couldn’t have babies, who’d really, really wanted them all
her life. Then there’s a sort of miracle and she has a baby, and she holds
this baby very close to her and walks around singing: ‘‘Baby, never let me
go . . .’’ partly because she’s so happy, but also because she’s so afraid
something will happen, that the baby will get ill or be taken away from
her. Even at the time, I realized this couldn’t be right, that this interpreta-
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tion didn’t fit with the rest of the lyrics. But that wasn’t an issue with me.
The song was about what I said, and I used to listen to it again and
again, on my own, whenever I got the chance. (70)
‘‘Properly’’ here means the entire song; the integrity of the whole is set
aside in favor of that fragment that is able to satisfy the narrative needs of
the speaker. It serves as a prompt for her desired text. What she has made
of it is a reflective text, for of course she cannot have a baby. But the
romantic notion that one is granted a kind of immortality through one’s
children takes on another color here. For Kathy’s entire existence is
much more determinately about ‘‘passing on’’ her life to others than even
‘‘ordinary’’ human beings, who may of course choose to or not to pro-
create. Her very coming-into-the-world is occasioned by the same no-
tion of ‘‘operativeness’’ that we saw in Jean-Luc Nancy: the battle against
death requires death. The horrible irony is that, unlike a mother who
might likely live to see her child born and grow up, Kathy’s fate is to
slowly give too much of herself to remain alive. So it is rather the
reverse—hers is not the voice of the mother asking that the child remain,
but rather that of the child, whose existence, in this case, will indeed be
set adrift, and whose existence has always already had that fate inscribed
in its body. Only an act of charity on the part of Madame and the society
she inevitably represents, despite liberal intentions, can save Kathy, and
to save Kathy would be to destroy the operative community of Hailsham
and other institutions like it. Something always has to be sacrificed into
the terrible logic of incommensurate exchange. But sometimes, rarely
and preciously, that inexactness is the source of beauty and love.
Kathy loses the tape of the song she loves so much; like everything in
the novel it is taken from her. Letting go is not the question—it is the
impossibility of hanging on. Yet in this scene, which takes place a little
over a quarter of the way through the novel, we find perhaps its finest
redemptive moment. Kathy’s friend Ruth has looked all over for the tape
Kathy has lost. She can’t find it, but she gives Kathy another: ‘‘ ‘Kathy, it’s
not your one. The one you lost. I tried to find it for you, but it’s really
gone’ ’’ (75). Kathy accepts the tape.
I saw how Ruth wasn’t to know that [the music was quite unlike that of
the song I loved], how to Ruth, who didn’t know the first thing about
music, this tape might easily make up for the one I’d lost. And suddenly I
felt the disappointment ebbing away and being replaced by a real happi-
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ness. We didn’t do things like hug each other much at Hailsham. But I
squeezed one of her hands in both mine when I thanked her. She said: ‘‘I
found it at the last Sale. I just thought it’s the sort of thing you’d like.’’
And I said that, yes, it was exactly the sort of thing.
I still have it now. I don’t play it much because the music has noth-
ing to do with anything. It’s an object, like a brooch or a ring, and
especially now Ruth has gone, it’s become one of my most precious
possessions. (76)
The music is meaningless, the gesture is everything; the exchange is
absolutely wrong, and perfectly right. But the gesture itself then yields
to something even larger: it is the trace of love and loss—Ruth is gone.
Ishiguro’s phrasing strikes me as a little odd; it is a characteristic of his
prose to sometimes miss the usual locution by a hair, and that simply
calls attention to it. First of all, rather than refer to the tape as such,
Kathy refers to it as ‘‘the music,’’ but it is music that is not listened to
‘‘very much.’’ The tape then becomes analogized as an object ‘‘like a
brooch or a ring,’’ a silent, mute thing, but one of greater value than a
simple tape recording that wasn’t the right music anyway. Its value
resides doubly: in the gesture of pure giving without expectation of
recompense, and in the fact of Ruth’s ultimate sacrifice—her body for
others. There is thus a chiasmatic movement, of exchange of recognized
value and at least the gesture of repayment (‘‘We didn’t do things like
hug each other much at Hailsham. But I squeezed one of her hands in
both mine when I thanked her’’), which militates against the unre-
deemed sacrifice of Ruth to some anonymous beneficiaries.
The End?
But I am not sure. Can we rest well with the ‘‘inexact exchange’’ theory I
have mounted? If this were one sort of world, or perhaps at certain times
during the day or night when one feels either particularly optimistic or
fatalistic, one might latch onto that. But there is a strong part of me that
says that if art is to matter as more than that (without, again, diminishing
my respect for and even love of such a notion), if we are to not set aside
materially produced and enacted otherness (no, ‘‘we’’ are not all alike in
this great stream of life) quite so easily, and rather attend to and call out
for criticism and remediation such violent acts of decidedly unsocial
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and indecent bioeconomics, then we should take our lesson from the
other side of Ishiguro’s novel, dwell, not sentimentally but with anger,
on its sad side, and hope that we are not mere victims of bad timing, a
slot of possibilities that does not include justice, or at least some recog-
nition of it. In that weird way, we might actually see that the Hailsham
project was not exactly wrongheaded—they, after all, wanted to recog-
nize the children as somehow human enough. We might rather fashion
other weapons than ‘‘only’’ art, such as art mobilized in a critical, not
apologetic, manner. We might struggle to invent a critical literary art
that takes into account our ‘‘slot of possibilities’’ and addresses art and
history, culture and race, in all their contingency.
In Ruth Ozeki’s My Year of Meats, we come full circle back to an
examination of how others are delivered to us via a different sort of
literary medium. Similar to Nancy’s and Ishiguro’s use of the body as a
nexus of self with other, Ozeki puts this ‘‘common ground’’ at the core of
her novel. But rather than seeing bodies meet through the transplanta-
tion of organs, she views the commonness created by the fact that
distinctly different bodies occupying divergent geocultural spaces in-
gest, internalize, and assimilate the same materials into their respective
bodies. While this can have positive effects, depending on the materials
we are speaking about, it can also have catastrophically negative effects
as well. It is in militating against the latter that Ozeki invents her poetics
of trans-Pacific solidarity, which itself offers an entirely different way of




Freud begins Civilization and Its Discontents with a personal tale: a
friend comes to his house and remarks on the book Freud has just
written, The Future of an Illusion. Agreeing with its skeptical remarks
about religion, the friend tells Freud that he has often experienced ‘‘an
oceanic feeling’’ that, all on its own, unmediated by any religious doc-
trine, provided a sense of transcendence. Furthermore, he surmises that
he is not alone in having this sort of feeling—perhaps, he says, ‘‘millions’’
have felt similarly. Freud writes,
I had sent him my small book that treats religion as an illusion, and he
answered that he entirely agreed with my judgment upon religion, but
that he was sorry I had not properly appreciated the true source of
religious sentiments. This, he says, consists in a peculiar feeling, which he
himself is never without, which he finds confirmed by many others, and
which he may suppose is present in millions of people. It is a feeling
which he would like to call a sensation of ‘‘eternity,’’ a feeling as of
something limitless, unbounded—as it were, ‘‘oceanic.’’ This feeling, he
adds, is a purely subjective fact, not an article of faith.∞
While Freud’s friend could hardly be more emphatic that this was a
‘‘feeling,’’ an affect, registering on his body, he also asserts that while it
is ‘‘subjective,’’ it is something millions of others feel as well, or so
he thinks. Unfortunately, Freud quickly presents himself as a counter-
example: ‘‘I cannot discover that this ‘oceanic’ feeling in myself. It is not
easy to deal scientifically with feelings. One can attempt to describe
their physiological signs. Where this is not possible—and I am afraid
that the oceanic feeling too will defy this kind of characterization—
nothing remains but to fall back on the ideational content which is
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most readily associated with the feeling.’’≤ From the empirical fact that
he himself has never had that ‘‘oceanic feeling,’’ Freud concludes that
it cannot be a universal feeling, and that whether it exists at all de-
mands scientific study. Yet even before that has been undertaken, Freud
presumes its failure, and prescribes instead that the object of study
switch from the feeling itself and its registering on the body to a psycho-
analytic study of the ‘‘ideational content’’ that one might associate with
that feeling.
Freud also makes the distinction between affect and ideational con-
tent in The Interpretation of Dreams in a way that highlights the way
dreams are resistant to being segregated analytically from everyday
mental processes precisely because affect can pass over borders that
confound ideational content: ‘‘Dreams insist with greater energy upon
their right to be included among our real mental experiences more in
respect to their affective than in respect to their ideational content.’’≥ As
André Green notes,
On waking, it is impossible to reject the affect of dreams as absurd, as
one might be tempted to do with their contents. Dreams allow us to
make a strange discrepancy between the representative content and
affective state that would correspond to it in a waking state. An exami-
nation of the relations between manifest content and latent content
forces us to acknowledge that the affect is right: ‘‘Analysis shows us that
the ideational material has undergone displacements and substitutions,
whereas affects have remained unaltered.’’∂
In contrast to ideational content, affects are something persistent as
themselves. Undistorted by repressive mechanisms that affect ideational
content, they stand outside the characteristic dreamwork and assume
an indisputable place in the psyche—they simply are, and are so power-
fully. The problem that haunts the endeavor to ascertain what, precisely,
this ‘‘oceanic feeling’’ is—its nature, its sources, it transmittability, its
scope—is the question of the gap between bodies which may or may not
be experiencing the oceanic reach of affect. It is relatively easier to see if
people share an idea, or the notion of an idea, but how in the world can
one see if others are sharing a feeling, one that is murky, indistinct, but
nonetheless real to oneself ? Is everyone swimming in the same ocean?
What does an oceanic feeling imply? To get to the point of this book:
how is the otherness that abides between people overwhelmed by an
otherness that touches all?
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Let’s take another example of an eerie feeling, this one emanating
more perceptibly from the space around one’s body. Teresa Brennan
writes,
Is there anyone who has not, at least once, walked into a room and ‘‘felt
the atmosphere’’? But as many have paused to wonder how they’ve
received this impression, and why it seemed both attractive and certain,
there is no record of their curiosity in the copious literature on group
and crowd psychology, or in the psychological and psychoanalytic writ-
ing that claims that one person can feel another’s feelings. . . . This is not
especially surprising, as any inquiry into how one feels the other’s af-
fects, or the ‘‘atmosphere,’’ has to take account of physiology as well as
the social, psychological factors that generated the atmosphere in the first
place. The transmission of affect, whether it is grief, anxiety, or danger, is
social and psychological in origin. But the transmission is also responsi-
ble for bodily changes; some are brief changes, as in a whiff of the room’s
atmosphere, some longer-lasting. In other words the transmission of
affect, if only for an instant, alters the biochemistry and neurology of the
subject. The ‘‘atmosphere’’ or the environment really gets into the indi-
vidual. Physically and biologically, something is present that was not
there before, but it did not originate sui generis: it was not generated
solely or sometimes even in part by the individual organism or its
genes.∑
No longer speaking in terms of an individual’s sense of a vague and
amorphous atmosphere that implicitly connects him to something
greater than himself, out there, Brennan’s case is based on actual physi-
cal proximity with the co-inhabitants of a spatially delimited affective
world. In that, it is rigorously interactive with real things (be they other
bodies, other things, or molecules of one sort or another). This inter-
action is more than physiological; it is eminently connected to others,
physically, socially, and psychologically. Brennan declares, ‘‘My theory is
an alternative to psychoanalytic theory or meta-psychology in that it
postulates an origin for affects that is independent of the individual
experiencing them. These affects come from the other, but we deny
them. Or they come from us, but we pretend (habitually) that they
come from the other. Envy, anger, aggressive behavior—these are the
problems of the other. Over tolerance, over generosity, these are our
problems.’’∏
Here Brennan begins by taking the view commonly held (at least as
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far back as Benedict de Spinoza) that the affects are amorphous, at-
mospheric things that easily pass from body to body. In terms of things
like the sentiments, this is not only a good thing, but something neces-
sary for ethical sensibilities when dealing in a social world filled with
other individuals. We need to be able to empathize, to feel as if their
experience were ours. However, this porousness means that we do not
know where the cycle of affect originates. In Brennan’s argument, this
lack of knowledge is exploited by the ego bent on exculpating itself from
the charge of being the source of bad affect. Nevertheless, while ‘‘bad’’ or
negative affect can be attributed to others, there is also the chance that
the origin of bad affect is actually within our psyches—it is simply that
that source has been disavowed. And while one would surely attend
to the ever-increasing contact with racial, national, cultural, and eth-
nic otherness (and more) that contemporary history has brought into
‘‘our’’ world, that is, the actual physical coming into proximity that we
now negotiate, it is this mechanism of disavowing responsibility for
negative affect that I want to dwell on.
Brennan draws our attention to the coping mechanisms the psyche
deploys to deal with adverse affect. For as much as one might celebrate
the positive ‘‘good spirits’’ that flow lavishly among people, there is also
the fear that bad affect can also travel like a bad virus: in that case it has to
be contained. One’s own body must have the intelligence to sense it and
the psychic strength to convert it into something harmless. Indeed,
throughout the various discourses that take the affects as their subjects,
one element appearing in all seems to be control and conversion. The
stability and energy of the body, of the psyche, have to be maintained,
and able to both exploit positive affect and ward off negative affect. What
is looked for is some kind of homeostatic mechanism to deal with affect.
The literary imagination serves this purpose. It is the imagination that
suggests a broad set of relations between the self and the other, and
specifically the relation between these two entities and the collective
system that delivers others to the self. In cycling through the various pos-
sibilities of the origin of affect (where did that affect come from, why am
I acting this way—in response to someone else’s affect, or to mine?), the
ego swims in a kind of affective ocean, something not dissimilar to
Lacan’s imaginary. In a way that echoes the idea of ‘‘stepping into the
other person’s shoes’’ that we saw at the start of this study, Terry Eagle-
ton argues, ‘‘the importance of Lacan’s lecture lay in its illustration of the
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imaginary—that strange realm of the human psyche in which subjects
and objects (if we can even speak of such a division at this early point)
appear constantly to exchange places and live each other’s lives. In this
play of projecting and reflecting, things seem to pass in and out of each
other without mediation, feel one another from the inside with all the
sensuous immediacy with which they experience their own interiors.’’π
We thus come back to the question of how much otherness is required
to make sure the body is vital, engaged in a social world, responding to
the human conditions therein, and how much otherness can reach
deeply into the individual’s mind and body and transform it in ways
that change its identity and modes of behavior—mental and physical—
beyond the pale. One way to avoid the ‘‘clash of affects’’ might be to
postulate a common goal or interest. After all, one cannot tread water
indefinitely. One has to act in the world, and acting means making
choices. If we are not members of the oceanic swimming club, paying
our dues to some God, or if we do not accept Freud’s alternative—
‘‘civilization’’—as that mechanism for balancing, directing, containing,
suppressing, and rechanneling drives and emotions, in the eighteenth
century something else arises to accept and house oceanic feeling. It is
the market. The eighteenth century is known as a time when ‘‘senti-
ment’’ flourished as a particular sign of humanity and civilization. It is
also recognized that sentiment found its way into a number of different
spheres, including the field of economics. Eagleton notes, ‘‘The cult of
sentiment was the feel-good factor of a successful mercantile nation, but
it was a social force as well as a state of mind. Feeling could oil the
wheels of commerce, allowing the Irish-born poet and novelist Henry
Brooke to write rhapsodically of how the merchant ‘brings up the re-
motest regions to converse . . . [a]nd just knits into one family, and
weaves into one web, the affinity and brotherhood of all mankind.’ ’’∫
And here let us not lose sight of what Brooke’s rhetorical sweep now
makes part of the promise: the global now extends to diverse popula-
tions that he assumes will fall into economic kinship naturally. This of
course has to do not only with economic sentiment, but also a way of
mapping common behavior and interests in general. People feel certain
ways and act on the basis of those feelings.
Variants of this coupling of economic behavior with human behavior
in an organic form continue into the next century. Most germane for
this study, Catherine Gallagher sees that both the discourses of political
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economy and of literary narrative share similar themes, rhetorics, and
narrative strategies: ‘‘Before novelists like Charles Dickens and George
Eliot incorporated them into extended narrative forms . . . political
economy’s organic premises were already structured as plots, as highly
consequentialist, if extremely schematic, stories about the processes of
life and death, pain and pleasure.’’Ω These ‘‘consequentialist’’ plots dis-
close a specific kind of realism. Gallagher divides these narratives into
two groups: ‘‘ ‘Bioeconomic’ plots of political economy [are] the stories
of how the economy circulates Life, with a capital L’’; alongside such
narratives are ‘‘somaeconomic’’ plots, whose accounts show ‘‘how plea-
sure and pain, happiness and unhappiness, desire and exhaustion, stim-
ulate economic activity and are in turn modified by it.’’ She continues:
‘‘ ‘Bioeconomic’ plots trace the interconnections among human life, its
sustenance, and modes of production and exchange; they track the
reciprocal effects of economic activity and life forms generally. ‘Soma-
economic’ plots describe more intensively feelings that are the sensual
and effective causes and consequences of economic extortion.’’∞≠ In
other words, both the issues of rational choice and of affect are pre-
sented respectively in Gallagher’s analysis. They are distributed differ-
entially, but essentially they tap into the same overall logic of em-
bodiment. Ultimately, and essentially, the market becomes pretty much
what Henry Brooke wants, although Gallagher’s description is much
less sanguine. Rather than a huge human family of sentimentally con-
nected economic actors, we have a ‘‘megabeing’’: ‘‘Capital looks like a
life form in another sense as well: it seemed to be the aggregate of
numerous individual persons responding—as all living organisms do—
to the stimuli in pain and pleasure. It was a megabeing whose telos was
expanding wealth and whose motive was believed to be the promise of
individual happiness.’’∞∞ Here then is the oceanic feeling of the bio-
economic sphere. Indeed, it is the argument of Albert O. Hirschman’s
classic study of ‘‘the passions and the interests’’ that the unruly passions
of human beings were tamed into, converted into, economic ‘‘interests’’
precisely during this period.∞≤
I will consider how the emotional and affective realms persist today as
another set of indices to human commonality. In particular, I will look
at how these things, supposedly shared by all, become mobilized to
guide human economic (and other) behavior across cultures—the as-
sumption being that certain affective chords can be struck and have
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resonance despite cultural and racial difference. These choices of be-
havior have profound consequences for the mind and for the body. In
fact, in the case of Ruth Ozeki’s novel My Year of Meats, cultural, racial,
and indeed national difference become leveraged in the attempt to
instill in the Japanese housewife the appetite for American beef, the
assumption being that American domestic norms can become more
attractive to those on the other side of the Pacific because there is
something still exceptional about the United States. One of the prob-
lems is that those pushing American red meat do not understand that
images of the American Heartland, no matter how well dressed, served
up, and resonant in their own affective sphere, simply don’t lead to the
intended effects, not only for some Japanese, but also for some Ameri-
cans. The key question thus becomes, is this attempt to transmit affect
tapping into something innate in all humans, or is it creating a feeling in
the Japanese audience? Looked at more broadly, how can affect spread
across national, cultural, racial, and other borders? What different sorts
of affect flow differently, and in what kinds of directions? Where is the
wellspring of global affect? How does the self, particularly construed,
absorb or fight off affect?
Indeed, since early on it is a well-established notion that affect is a
virulently contagious thing that knows no boundaries. Thus, in this
book’s discussion of the threat that too much otherness presents, affect
can be the prime delivery system of that crisis, or at least radical distur-
bance. How can we keep it under control, once it has been let free to
circulate in public? Eagleton’s Irish merchant looks at the bright, and
profitable, side: sentimental affinities can create a global family, perhaps
dissolving the divide between homo economicus and homo reciprocans. In
this sense, as attached to sentiment, ‘‘disinterestedness’’ meant the sus-
pension of self-interest for the sake of participating ethically in a larger
social sphere. Or, to use Gallagher’s term, individuals must happily
invest their affects in the ‘‘megabeing.’’ In Adam Smith’s imagery, the rise
of capitalism would lift all boats, the success of individuals would posi-
tively affect all. In this view of things, peoples remotely located would all
be speaking the same language. But what happens when ‘‘nonharmo-
nious’’ elements contribute their own disagreeable affect, or resist, or
are unresponsive to, the good feelings we attempt to keep in circulation,
investing and reinvesting in the socioeconomic sphere?
In Ozeki’s novel, affect is deployed toward specific and determinedly
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nonspiritual ends. Indeed, the novel’s advertising campaign is premised
on the idea that by viewing families in the American Heartland, watch-
ing them as they prepare beef and talk about their marriages and chil-
dren in positive terms, the Japanese will be infected with the same affect
and mimic that behavior: they will want to have lives just like the
Americans they see on the screen, and they will see the beef Americans
eat as a necessary element of that affective world. Indeed, perhaps by
ingesting the same material, integrating that otherness into their selves,
they will indeed become ‘‘Americans’’ not only in gesture and habit, but
also in essence. This scheme drives Ozeki’s novel in its transit across the
Pacific Ocean—this is the trans-Pacific oceanic feeling. In my reading of
this novel I not only address the idea of affect and otherness, but also
draw together the subjects of the previous chapters: rationality and
realism, the human and nonhuman body, and art. Furthermore, I will
ask how Ozeki’s works probe into a very specific historical moment in
U.S.-Japan trade, one which happens to coincide with a crisis in the
proliferation of the use of hormonal additives in food, but it is also more
than that. In terms of the ‘‘narrow slot of possibilities,’’ this novel marks
the historical coincidence of radical changes in pharmaceutical, genetic,
and media technologies, Asia-Pacific trade relations, global economics
and ecologies. My Year of Meats treats each of these issues within a
careful and deliberate critique of literature and media—it is these in-
struments of the imagination that deliver affect and prompt imaginary
identification with the other. Essential to this critique is a questioning of
the relation between truth and fiction, fact and fabrication. Ultimately,
these lines are blurred under the regime of affect. ‘‘Ideational content’’ is
inseparable from feeling.
In My Year of Meats all these questions are subordinated to the novel’s
specific historical context: the historical past of the American Heartland
is seen to be merely a simulacrum, one that needs heavy retooling to be
at all effective trans-Pacifically. Its supposed purity and authenticity
are exposed as barely there, as the real agents of farming—agribusiness
and chemical corporations—are disclosed to have drastically distorted
whatever nostalgic elements might remain. (This recalls the ‘‘slot’’ that
Coetzee notes between traditional animal husbandry and the modern
meat industry.) Affect now is as much driven by drugs that change the
neurological, physiological, and reproductive systems of the animal and
human bodies they enter as it might be by contact with others. Put
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another way, the room Brennan enters might well carry the feeling of a
chemical buzz, oozing out the pores of the other people in the room. If
the accoutrement of the ‘‘oceanic’’ religious world was incense, the per-
fume of trans-Pacific affect here is a sizzling steak, if the dreams of the
novel’s fictional multinational corporation, beef-ex, are to be realized.
The body and its registering of emotion, affect, and the materials it
takes into itself is thematized consistently in Ruth Ozeki’s work in the
1990s. In fact, My Year of Meats (1998) was preceded by her two impor-
tant films: Body of Correspondence (1994, co-written and co-directed by
Marina Zurkow) and Halving the Bones (1995). The former aired on pbs
and won the New Visions Award; the latter screened at Sundance, the
Museum of Modern Art, and the Montreal World Film Festival. Meat,
bodies, and bones work both figuratively and literally in each of these
works and across all sorts of boundaries: in Body of Correspondence two
dead lesbian lovers come back to life and take material form via a third
party’s discovery and reading of their love letters, written over the span
of a lifetime; in Halving the Bones Ozeki documents her trip to Japan to
retrieve the bones of her grandmother and her trip back to New Haven,
Connecticut, to share them with her mother, along the way narrating
her mother’s memories of her mother and even giving voice to Ozeki’s
grandmother via some grainy home movies Ozeki’s grandfather sup-
posedly took of her. In My Year of Meats, Ozeki draws together several
elements that are found in the films: the issues of media, representation,
and reception; of writing and reading; of bodies both ‘‘human’’ and
‘‘animal,’’ and the food and drugs they ingest; of race, gender, nation and
culture, and, throughout, history. And, of course, affect. If in Halving the
Bones we see the ways the materiality of a few remnants of bone set off a
series of meditations in Ozeki and her mother, meditations that are built
on a series of affective moments and loop into each other, sometimes
harmoniously and sometimes not; and if in Body of Correspondence we
find the written word itself not only conveying affect between the white
lover and her Eurasian counterpart, but also to and through the white
male third party, in My Year of Meats we find affect circulating via media,
bodies, food and drugs, between East and West, male and female, ani-
mal and human, in a narrative text that effectively uses that phenome-
non to blur the categorical boundaries between each.
The first-person narrator of My Year of Meats is a young Japanese
American filmmaker recruited to shoot a series of ‘‘sociological com-
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mercials’’ in the heartland of the United States, to be broadcast across
the Pacific and into the homes of Japanese housewives, instantiating
identification, desire, and appetite at once, not to mention purchasing
habits. The meat born and bred in the United States will thus be pre-
pared and consumed, processed, and assimilated into Japanese bodies,
or so the story goes. Add to this Ozeki’s prominent subtext of des
(diethylstilbestrol), bovine growth hormones, ‘‘mad cow disease,’’ and
animal and human reproduction, and you can see why I regard this
novel as ‘‘remarkable’’ in its fit into this study: we have in one form or
another precisely an address to issues of reason and rationality (the
marketing logic of the transnational beef corporation mobilizes ‘‘ra-
tionality’’ in the form of consumption, ‘‘inveigling’’ Japanese consumers
to make certain choices); to the issue of bodies (the global effects of
food and drug production, the effects of those on the animal and human
reproductive body, the ways alien materials are commonly ingested by
diverse human bodies globally); and, most especially here, the issue of
the affective power of the other. Furthermore, the novel’s dual focus on
media and ethics throughout helps us likewise to hone in on the abiding
concern of this study: how is it, today, that we can best understand the
nature of how the other is delivered to us, and we to ‘‘them,’’ and how
does literary narrative offer a particular mode of deliverance, of imagin-
ing the affective connections among others, different from the delivery
systems we have investigated and their assumptions of human same-
ness? Most specifically, how can literary texts capture the phenomenon
of system overload—how can we imagine otherness outside and beyond
the ‘‘delivery systems’’ that run on common units? What kind of alterna-
tive critical delivery system might literature be?
To set the framework for my analysis of My Year of Meats, I will first
move through some key ideas on otherness and affect, emphasizing how
the notion of affect historically has had at its core the idea of equi-
librium. Spinoza and others will convert unruly and destabilizing affect
into controllable substances so as to preserve the self. Looking back at
my initial discussion of rationality, I will take up Spinoza’s notion of the
affects as it engages the idea of reason and control and equilibrium. In
ways that echo the problematic I have outlined in this study, Spinoza is
concerned with the question of too much otherness, specifically, too
much affect produced by others. I then touch on the transformation that
occurs at the turn of the eighteenth century, as the emotions are no
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longer regarded as invaders from the outside world, but rather as some-
thing inherent in human nature. Nevertheless, in terms of the constitu-
tion of the self, this highlights the question of how much of ‘‘us’’ is
constituted from within, as we enliven and realize our inner natures, and
how much comes from without, through the integration of the affect of
others. It is precisely in the late twentieth century and in our con-
temporary age that increased and intensified globalization produces the
historical situation wherein affect is of such volume and mass that it
threatens to overflow the boundaries of acceptable and manageable
otherness, and the question of who ‘‘we’’ are becomes especially vexed.
With so much affective ‘‘data’’ flowing through the Ethernet, permeating
our senses through not only radio and television but also the handheld
devices, laptops, tablets, and whatever new and ‘‘better’’ devices are
invented, we have the constitution of a new sort of ultrapermeable
human being. I end my introductory section with a discussion of Teresa
Brennan’s work on the transmission of affect as it engages with the other
in the present day. In the end, this book is not so involved in champion-
ing the unbridled bursting forth of otherness, nor in adjudicating the
proper balance between self and other—I do not wish to draw some line
or standard. Rather, I see this as an emblematic problem of globalization,
and see contemporary literature as profoundly engaged in puzzling out
how the delivery systems that convey others as the same function, or not.
Affect, Others, Behavior, Equilibrium
These are the keywords for my consideration of the role affect plays in
managing the flow and stasis of affect within the body and psyche.
Affect here is a delivery system that is both the common ground of
sensation and reaction, and a mediating space for the circulation of
feelings, emotions, and the registering of otherness. The goal always is
to remain both active and vital, and to maintain at the same time a sense
of equilibrium. For one of the earliest analysts of affect, Spinoza, this
dynamic and imperative is felt at the core of the human being; affect is
both a necessary part of human life, and yet it may threaten to over-
whelm us with its energy and force, leading us to act in ways that go
against our self-interest. Affect in itself for Spinoza is not necessarily
bad—it’s all a matter of how we invest it.
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Whatever so disposes the human body that it can be affected in a great
many ways, or renders it capable of affecting external bodies in a great
many ways, is useful to man; the more it renders the body capable of
being affected in a great many ways, or of affecting other bodies, the
more useful it is; on the other hand, what renders the body less capable
of these things is harmful. Those things are good which bring about the
preservation of the proportion of motion and rest the human body’s
parts have to one another; on the other hand, those things are evil which
bring it about that the parts of the human body have a different propor-
tion of motion and rest to one another.∞≥
The essential thing to keep vital at all times, despite the buffeting of
affect emanating from the world and more specifically the world of
others, is our true nature. The affects that draw on our energies in bad
ways depress us, or take our eyes away from our forward-moving prog-
ress. Spinoza asserts, ‘‘We call good, or evil, what is useful to, or harmful
to, preserving our being, that is, what increases or diminishes, aids or
restrains, our power of acting. Therefore, insofar as we perceive that a
thing affects us with joy or sadness, we call it good over evil.’’∞∂ But here
Spinoza makes his essential move. These ‘‘whats,’’ these bodiless affects,
are managed precisely as they are brought into the realm of knowledge,
drawn away from being powerful things to which we stand as passive
beings. Our passivity before the passions can be reversed if we reify
these vital forces into conceptual knowledge and integrate them ra-
tionally and purposefully into our active being.
Take the example of pity, one of the key emotions we noted with
Aristotle. Are we not to be moved by it, seeing ourselves ‘‘in the other
person’s shoes’’? Is this not what the imagination is for, to present us
with the grounds for identification and sympathy? In Spinoza’s view,
pity is an evil thing, for it takes us away from ourselves and can indeed
harm us, turning us into its passive victims. It preys on us, disarming our
rational power and our ability to convert affect wisely.
Pity, in a man who lives according to the guidance of reason, is both evil
of itself and useless. For pity is a sadness, and therefore, of itself, evil. To
this we may add that he who is easily touched by the affect of pity, and
moved by another’s suffering or tears, often does something he later
repents—both because, from an affect, we do nothing which we certainly
know to be good, and because we are easily deceived by false tears.∞∑
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In the following passage, Spinoza draws all these elements together:
self-good, affect and its conversion under reason’s dominance, and a
transition from passively receiving affect to rationalizing it and deploy-
ing it in ways that actively promote the body (and this would of course
include jettisoning negative affect altogether).
An affect which is a passion is a confused idea. Therefore, if we should
form a clear and distinct idea of the affect itself, this idea will only be
distinguished by reason from the affect itself in so far as it is related only
to the mind. Therefore the affect will cease to be a passion. For the more
an affect is known to us, then the more it is in our power, and the less the
mind is acted upon by it.∞∏
In sum, harking back to Freud, this is the move from affect to ideational
content, a way of disarming affect’s ability to insist on its presence as
such in our lives. This tames affect, reining it in and transforming it into
an idea, an object of the rational mind that can be held at a distance and
abstracted.
Not only is this important in and of itself, but it is also the necessary
first step to building and nurturing something of even greater impor-
tance to the perpetuation of our ‘‘true natures’’—a community of people
like ourselves: ‘‘Nothing can agree more with the nature of any thing
than other individuals of the same species. And so nothing is more useful
to man in preserving his being and enjoying a rational life than the man
who is guided by reason.’’∞π We can see thus that in Spinoza the affects
act as the medium between individuals; it is their point of psychic
contact, and they act kinesthetically. People can be ‘‘moved’’ by them.
Thus, learning to deal with affect becomes a primary way to regulate
both oneself and one’s relation to others. Ethics in this sense is geared
toward the ‘‘good’’ of stability, and the positive, active, rational use of
energy. For the individual, it means that she will not be tossed about by
random stimuli; for humankind, it means the maintenance and growth
of a community likewise informed, and controlled, by reason. In the
eighteenth century, although the passions are turned into more benign
internal sentiments, the view that the affects are indices to sociality and a
key element in guiding behavior toward others does not change.
Amélie Oksenberg Rorty notes that during this period,
instead of being reactions to invasions from something external to the
self, passions became the very activities of the mind, its own motions. So
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transformed they become proper motives, and along with desires, the
beginnings of actions. During this period, emotions also ceased to be
merely turbulent commotions: among them appear sentiments, ways of
feeling pleasures and pains as evaluations, and so as the proper guides to
action. Some of these sentiments, those that are social in origin as
well in direction—calm passions and sentiments that we acquire from
others—make morality possible.∞∫
In this new scheme of things, the imagination takes on a different, and
critical role, for it facilitates the new, socially required ability to trace the
sympathetic links between people, and thus suggests a moral sentiment.
Pace Spinoza, Rorty asserts, ‘‘The imagination remains closely allied
with the sentiments even after it has become an active power; but now
instead of being a threat to justice and virtues, it provides the condition
for the possibility of sympathetic morality.’’∞Ω Thus, the imagination,
too, becomes enlisted to map out an ‘‘oceanic feeling’’ between bodies
mingling in social space, but here it exerts its power on affect, bringing
the affective body and the registering mind into proper contact, and,
furthermore, connecting bodies of a similar disposition together. The
imagination would bring into the mind ‘‘a train of thoughts that are
useful to the union of the soul and body, and they are useful to the body
as a member of that union.’’≤≠
The reasonableness of this plan of action is matched only by its
import. For the passions are not just over there, they are present in the
atmosphere the moment we enter into social space. And even though
the emotions were no longer seen as ‘‘invaders,’’ at this point in history
David Hume seems to continue at least one strand of Spinoza’s thought:
he, too, remarks on the ability of the emotions to pass easily, pro-
miscuously, among bodies and to affect others, striking similar chords
and, critically for our study, producing similar behavior. ‘‘The passions,’’
Hume comments, ‘‘are so contagious that they pass with the greatest
facility from one person to another, and produce correspondent move-
ments in all human breasts.’’≤∞ Commenting on this passage, Eagleton
captures some of the strangeness of this characterization of the pas-
sions: ‘‘There is something magical about this affect of contagion, as
though your fright or jealousy might literally infect my own innards,
pass like some emotional virus from your body to mine.’’≤≤ Thus, despite
the fact that the emotions were no longer thought to be external to us
and instigators of dangerous, irrational behavior, we still find the notion
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that their influence on us, whether it be to introduce something new
into our natures or to tap into something preexisting, requires the de-
ployment of both reason and the imagination to maintain the proper
balance in the affective economy of things. It is here that Adela Pinch
brings out an important paradox that will deeply inform our discussion
of otherness: ‘‘On the one hand, [Hume’s Treatise] asserts that feelings
are individual, and that philosophy itself as well as social and aesthetic
experience depends on individuals who can rely on the individual au-
thenticity of their own emotional responsiveness. On the other hand, it
also contends that feelings are transsubjective entities that pass between
persons; that our feelings are always really someone else’s; that it is pas-
sion that allows us to be persons, rather than the other way around.’’≤≥
The cycle of affect thus engages a similar doubleness in terms of who we
are and how we got to be that; ‘‘human nature’’ is both individually
manifested and produced from without, circulating in social space. It is
clearer than ever that this regulatory body has always to deal with the
amount of otherness that it can handle without being drawn out of its
healthful nature.
Up to this point, we have charted the transition from Spinoza’s con-
ceptualization of the affects as things to be mastered by conversion into
ideas. Reason is called on to do this. If we accept that one strong source
of affect is the other, then we can see that mastering its affective power
is key to self-preservation, the key ‘‘good’’ to be had. Later on, this
notion changes to one in which affect, as part of the sentimental and
emotional world, is accepted as part of human nature, but nonetheless
remains something that can be counterproductive, if not destructive, if
left to its own devices.≤∂ Here, it is up to the imagination to rein in the
equilibrium-threatening power of the sentiments. Thus, both concep-
tually and figuratively, we have a pair of powers to tame and enlist the
affects. It is not hard to imagine that literature might be precisely that
thing that can trace the pathways of affect in the formation of self and
other. The affects are a measure of not only the individual subject, but
also her relation to her social world, and furthermore, the production of
ever-expanding social worlds. The ways people affect each other, reach-
ing into the bodies and psyches of others and motivating them to act
similarly, for better or worse, is a constant element in all discussions of
affect, and this carries over to our discussion of the literary as a particu-
lar way of delivering affect.
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Modern Times: Ego, Affect, Imagination, Otherness
Affective responses seem to the individual to be aroused easily by fac-
tors over which he has little control, with difficulty by factors which he
can control and to endure for periods of time which he controls only
with great difficulty if at all. They are in these respects somewhat alien
to the individual. They are the primitive gods within the individual.
—silvan tomkins
I want to draw together the main concerns I have about affect and
otherness. If in Spinoza affect posed a threat to the maintenance of the
self, and in Hume and others it was contagious in ways that could either
facilitate sociability or threaten it, and in Freud it was an obdurate,
murky thing that lingered in the shadows of consciousness, in the con-
temporary age it has been read as similarly threatening the equilibrium
of the self but managed by particular psychic displacements. In this vein
I want to consider one key aspect of the work of Teresa Brennan on
affect. She ventures into similar territory as Silvan Tomkins in that she is
interested in both the ‘‘alien’’ nature of affect and its shifting and com-
plex environment, especially as it stands in relation to the system of the
drives. Tomkins notes, ‘‘The drive system with its relatively primitive
signal and feedback mechanisms will work well enough because of this
predictable and small variability of the internal environment. The affect
system of man operates, however, within a much more uncertain and
variable environment.’’≤∑
There are three things I want to draw out from Teresa Brennan’s
provocative study of affect. First is the notion that the ego is above all a
self-preserving mechanism, and furthermore one that uses all sorts of
sometimes devious mechanisms to do so. This is particularly so with its
regard of the other and the potential effect it can have on the ego. In
performing its acts of self-preservation, the ego draws on both real and
imagined memories of the other, mingling them together to adjust and
balance itself.
The ego, originally the arbiter of conflicts between one’s own good and
that of the other, is less able to discern this when the ego itself becomes a
distorted arbiter, an arbiter that judges in order to arbitrate. Each of the
affective constellations known to us as desires related to lack or sins is a
state of the ego in which its self-protective function has been distorted
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by imaginary factors. Thus, envy can result from an imaginary belittle-
ment, anger can result from imaginary insults, and so forth. The ego, in
other words, is not only a perceptive preservative function but also a
constellation of memories and desires associated with imaginary threats
to its prestige as well as its existence.≤∏
What is most striking here is that we find an inventory of relations to the
other not necessarily based on any real encounter, but often on a par-
ticularly imagined one, one based on the preservation and ‘‘prestige’’ of
the ego. Furthermore, it takes the form of not only a constellation of
memories and desires, but, I would add, a serial set of memories and
desires that become narrated (‘‘she did that to me and therefore I . . .’’).
One should also look at the obverse side of this scenario, where we
would be discussing not supposed insults, envy, and so on, but rather
ego-building imaginaries—one’s superior strength or intelligence fed by
flattering affect imagined to emanate from the other. In short, we have
a repertoire of narratives that support and enhance the ego’s sense
of well-being by imagining and regulating a certain affective relation to
the other.
A second point that I draw from Brennan is that the responsibility for
one’s negative affect often becomes projected on the other. Here I
would venture that this projection is in part made possible by an imagi-
nary invention of the other and one’s memory of one’s relation to it, an
invention that allows one to disavow the responsibility for negative
affect and instead attribute its source to the other. Guilt, shame, anger,
are all made the responsibility of the other in an effort to preserve the
ego’s positive self-image. This happens especially when one has gath-
ered into oneself a critical mass of negative affect: ‘‘The need to project
intensifies as the affects, and the drives promoting it, accumulate. The
person projecting the judgment is freed from its depressing effects on
him or herself. However, he or she is dependent on the other carrying
that projected affect, just as the master depends on the slave.’’≤π Criti-
cally for the present study, this equilibrium-making displacement pro-
duces as well a zero-sum economy of affect: the more I free myself up
from negative affect by projecting it on you, the more you are weighed
down by it, and vice versa, in essence producing an economy of psychic
health and illness, or, in Spinoza’s terms, good and evil. Brennan de-
clares, ‘‘If I take your aggression on board and turn it back against myself
as depression I have less energy and you have more, because you are not
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inhibited by a drive that limits you when it is turned inward. In this case,
the affect appears as the passive manifestation of the other’s active
drive. . . . This is true for narcissism, envy, inverted aggression or depres-
sion and anxiety, and the inertia accompanying all of them.’’≤∫ Finally,
Brennan asserts, ‘‘If the general thesis of this book is right, that evidence
also shows that the prevalence of these disorders is relationally and
socially exacerbated. We construct our own attractors, but the force of
what we attract varies according to affective circumstance.’’≤Ω
This last comment is critical for my study in that it introduces the
relational aspect of the transmission of affect, along with the social
dimension, and this is the third point I want to bring forward from
Brennan. She posits a hypothesis about the historical ‘‘affective circum-
stance’’ of the late twentieth century. She argues that the relation be-
tween self and other changed, and in fact became more intense.
In the 1990s, depression was the most rapidly growing disorder in Eu-
rope and the United States, while concern with boundaries was also
proliferating. Could these things be related? Have boundaries come to
matter because self-definition by projection is less available than it was
during the last few sexist and colonial centuries—there are now too few
willing receptacles—or because of an accumulation of environmental-
inflected affects? Either way, boundaries may matter now because there
is too much affective stuff to dispose of, too much that is directed away
from the self with no place to go. . . . But this increase of affects is also a
real thing, historically produced. The reality of the increase makes the
Western individual especially more concerned with securing a private
fortress, personal boundaries, against the unsolicited emotional intru-
sions of the other. The fear of being ‘‘taken over’’ is certainly in the air,
although the transmission of negative affect generally is not recognized
for what it is. Boundaries, paradoxically, are an issue in a period where
the transmission of affect is denied.≥≠
If Brennan is correct in her fundamental theorization of affect and
its transmittability, then the customary way that white, Eurocentric,
masculinist, and hetereonormative societies have construed their inner
‘‘bad’’ affect as emanating from the place of the other (raced, non-
European, feminine, non-hetero-normed) reached a point of tension in
the 1990s because the other pushed back, no longer accepting the narra-
tive of being the source of evil (here I employ Spinoza’s vocabulary:
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‘‘evil’’ is that which impinges on the health of the self ). Bad affect now
has no place to go except back into the self. According to Brennan’s
hypothesis, the Euroamerican subject, unable to recognize its own pa-
thologies, must resort to psychoanalysis to trace the roots of affective
damage, or to drugs to numb and dull the power of affect. I am not at all
sure I accept this conjecture—there are simply too many assumptions
built into it, most especially the notion that the resistance of the other,
its border-enforcing powers, were or are that great. Nonetheless, Bren-
nan raises an interesting point: how much of the affective relation be-
tween self and other is colored by this dynamic, this act of projection
that relies on an imagined relation to the other? How much of our self-
preservation is based on the affective economy sketched out here by
Brennan? And how does this mechanism include a complementary
dynamic—while we project on the other the responsibility for our nega-
tive affect, we protect ourselves from the invasion of the other’s affect
into our own psyches? And finally, how does this play out in terms of the
particular affective relationships that exist at particular historical mo-
ments? How do certain ‘‘slots of possibilities’’ open up when specific
‘‘delivery systems’’ come into effect?
I will argue here, via my reading of Ozeki’s novel, that the contagious
spread of affect lives on today not only because of its supposedly su-
preme survival powers, but also and importantly because new global
markets and the media that advertise them to the world tap into an
assumed base of common emotional and affective registers, and affect
and global media enhance one another in ever-increasing efficiencies.
We are now more and more opened up to, exposed to, and saturated by
media in multifarious forms, via a proliferation of devices that interface
with our lives and bodies nearly continually. And let us not ignore the
fact that these are paired with somatic and physiological appetites and
needs. A global economy relies in no small measure on the idea of a
global consumer society that registers the same affects (or at least seems
to). If they do not exist, then they must be instantiated. Here let me say
that I am under no illusion that there is or even can be an exact replica-
tion of need and desire, emotion and affect across borders of any kind.
But that does not really matter. What counts is the end result in the
behavior of people and the material conditions that enable them to
make certain choices—who will buy and consume these things, repeat-
edly, and who is able to? Therefore, we must account for both the
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material historical conditions of affect and the role the imagination
plays in the reception and projection of affect. In fact, I want us to note
the centrality of the imagination, and the imaginary, in dealing with not
only affect, but also with mapping one’s position or location in ‘‘oceanic
feeling,’’ one’s neighborliness with the other, and one’s position in the
flow of feeling. For it becomes increasingly difficult to see where affect
comes from, especially when the ‘‘rational’’ and the ‘‘real’’ are blended
into the fantastic.
Before I get to My Year of Meats, however, I want to delve into Ruth
Ozeki’s and Marina Zurkow’s short film, Body of Correspondence. I use
this film to introduce Ozeki’s ways of thinking about bodies and affect,
reading and writing. This schematic reading will both frame my reading
of the novel and also help us understand how Ozeki elaborates these
main issues in a complex and sometimes baffling fashion in her novel.
Body of Correspondence
There are three characters in the film: ‘‘O’’ is an elegant Eurasian woman
in her late fifties who teaches comparative literature in Japan; ‘‘N’’ is a
blond Jewish woman slightly younger than O who works at the Mu-
seum of Natural History in New York; finally, there is a paunchy, balding
man called ‘‘the Archivist,’’ who works in an unnamed museum in up-
state New York.
The Archivist has been asked by a colleague to help sort through a box
of items that the museum has been storing for many years, to see if there
is anything worth keeping. He takes the materials, which include a
number of letters between N and O, and goes through them, touching
the objects, reading the texts, and in the process slowly becoming drawn
to them.
Archivist: Inside the large box were two smaller boxes labeled N. and
O. Each contained a collection of papers. Careful to note original order,
which in this case was seemingly random, I began reading the docu-
ments. . . . But then, one night, as I was finishing up the catalogue of
ephemera, I happened to lay out several items on the desktop. Some-
thing about the grouping appealed to me, as did the way the light from
the gooseneck lamp struck the arrangement. I often make photographic
records, but the impulse I had at this moment was different somehow. I
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felt compelled to photograph these objects, not as evidence, but . . . as
illustration.
An illustration of what? I . . . don’t know. . . . Something . . . not evident.
Entirely narrative. I emptied the shoe boxes onto the bed and started to
interfile and reorder the documents. To violate the two fundamental
principles of my profession. I had to keep reminding myself that no one
cared. That everybody was dead. These things were meaningless . . .
unless I interfered. . . . I was aware, too, of a concurrent sense of power.≥∞
Here, the perceived ‘‘order’’ of the papers is disorder. Perhaps it is that
very randomness that yields a particular affect when illuminated by the
lamp. The Archivist is drawn to create something ‘‘entirely narrative’’;
the haphazard arrangement of things demands that they be made into
‘‘something.’’ He is given not only the right to do this (‘‘everybody was
dead’’), but also apparently the imperative to make meaning out of
meaninglessness. The issue of course is that these ‘‘meaningless’’ arti-
facts created by these dead figures are open to violation (a key theme in
the film). As in Brennan’s theory, the other is without a boundary to
protect itself from such violation, such projection of affect, at least not
at this point in the film’s diegesis.
What follows is a set of flashbacks and projections forward that tap
into the fantasies and stories within stories that the letters contain. It
slowly becomes evident that the Archivist’s own actions and the events
that occur in his story are mimicking elements from the letters he is
reading; the violation now becomes doubled over, as the stories and
commentaries of the animated other impose themselves back on the
Archivist, and elements from their stories begin to replicate themselves
in his life. But this affective phenomenon works in reverse as well—as
their letters move forward in time, the authors begin to disclose events
from their past that shed new light on their relationship. Yet these
disclosures are often not presented entirely as ‘‘real,’’ but as narratives
that contain a mixture of real and made-up elements. Crucially, they
evince not only the psychic displacements and fantasies of the young
girls, but also those of the Archivist, whose shadowy presence works its
way into the girls’ past, just as their stories begin to insinuate themselves
into his life.
The Archivist’s gaze makes its way back in time, but what is more, his
presence is felt retroactively in events that in real time preceded his read-
ing. It is precisely as these events become narrated that the presence of
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1. Body of Correspondence, 1994. Courtesy of Ruth Ozeki
and Marina Zurkow.
the Archivist is felt not only as an animating figure who is reading the
texts in the future, but also as an actual actor in the past. The affect the
letters produce in him is thereby thrown into a dystemporal circuit of
affect and animation, reading, seeing, and performing. N writes to O,
Anyway, a weird thing has been happening for two weeks. I’ve noticed a
guy on the fourth floor of the building across the street is looking out his
window with binoculars. One night I saw him standing there. At first I
was going to pull down the shade, but then guess what? I didn’t. I started
to get undressed for bed instead. I turned on the radio and did a little
dance. I got really sweaty and after a few minutes I thought I was going
to throw-up. I’m sure he was watching. If my mother knew she’d proba-
bly get jealous. Don’t tell anyone, or they’ll probably think your pen pal
is a perv. Does anyone see into your window?
One central event in N’s life is her rape at the hands of a traveling
encyclopedia salesman, ‘‘Will DeForest,’’ who is staying at the hotel
where she is working. N’s letter contains this narrative, whose status in
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the real world is uncertain: ‘‘Will DeForest comes rolling into a small
dust bowl of a town. He is a traveling salesman with a trunk-full of
encyclopedias. But his specialty is arson, setting brushfires in the hearts
of young girls well-versed in the art of Harlequin Romance.’’ Now was he
actually a traveling salesman, or someone else in another situation?
What sorts of ‘‘young girls’’ are aroused by Harlequin romances?
Then the Archivist’s own life starts to follow suit; during his reading and
imaginative reconstruction of the letters, their mixture of fantasy and
sometimes brutal realism carries over into his world. As he reads each
letter, its affective qualities reach into his mind and his body. Seeming to
mimic Will DeForest, he has sex with the young girl who is working at
the motel where he is staying. Similarly, O’s sexual encounter with ‘‘the
Shingon Monk’’ many years later in Japan is narrated in her letter fan-
tastically—the ‘‘monk’’ is dressed in loud golf outfit—and these fantasies
find affective and mimetic force in the world of the Archivist. During his
reading of this letter, the Archivist, seeming to borrow garb from O’s
Japanese story, sheds a kimono and immerses himself in a filthy bathtub.
The Archivist’s scene combines two elements from O’s letter—one in
which she tells how the Monk takes her to a bath, and one in which the
Monk tells his own story of building a fire in the woods:
It grew dark. He spoke in a low voice about the austerity of meditative
practices at the temple. How, in the hottest month of the summer, he
would strip to his loincloth and go into the forest to collect wood—hard
wood because it burns long and hot. He would build a huge fire and
when the coals were bright, he’d spread them on the ground in a burn-
ing carpet. Then he would walk barefoot across them. He took hold of
my foot and raked his long nails across the sole.
By scratching his nails across O’s foot, the Monk attempts to re-
produce for her the sensation of the coals on his foot. Just as the Monk
approximates the affect of his experience through this gesture, the Ar-
chivist’s affective reaction to the bath’s heat is his particular adaptation
of the Monk’s sensing of the fire’s heat to his own steamy environment.
In brief, the ‘‘realism’’ of the letters is compromised not only within the
letters themselves, warped by the distance between individual experi-
ence, reshaped by different media, distorted or displaced by the authors’
own workings out of their psychic conflicts, but also, affect flows in all
directions, emanating from both self and other.
2. and (below) 3. Both from Body of
Correspondence, 1994. Courtesy of Ruth
Ozeki and Marina Zurkow.
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We and the Archivist are put in the same position as N; we hear O’s
voice telling this tale, and each of us—viewer, N, Archivist—feel the
influx of affect. Not unlike Hume’s pronouncement about the con-
tagious properties of affect, we find that a narrative such as this can kick
off psychic responses, wherein each figure in the narrative becomes
affected, with emotion and affect not only brought into their lives, but
coloring their actions and thoughts as well in real ways. This, after all, is
how the Archivist begins this path off proper archival procedure. As we
are ourselves swept up in the diegesis, we need to remind ourselves that
while the textual elements are assumedly static (the voiceover conveys
the text to us aurally), the visualization is perhaps that of the letter-
writer, or perhaps the Archivist’s own. In that respect, as well as in
others, just as much as we do not know how much ‘‘truth’’ of whatever
kind abides in the tales that the girls tell each other, we do not know how
much of himself the Archivist is putting in. Here we find precisely the
dynamic Brennan mentions: how much positive affect is falsely claimed
as one’s own when it really originates in the other, or is said to come
from the other, when it is a matter of distancing oneself from the bad
affect in one’s own psyche?
This all results in reassessing the text, but be filmic or literary: in this
state of things, affect is not only worked out within the individual ego,
but played out dynamically with projections onto the other and intro-
jections into self. We find again and again the uneasy relation literature
has always had to ‘‘the real.’’ We can reconsider the old adage ‘‘All
literature is autobiography’’ with a keener sense of how the workings out
of the self engage the other in very specific ways. Critically, in contem-
porary literature there is a qualitative difference. Today’s ‘‘global’’ litera-
ture is especially attuned to the massive and intensive ways that affect
circulates globally, driven by all sorts of motives and goals, and comes
into different kinds of contact with distant others and their own senses
of affect.
This phenomenon is emblematized in the final scenes of ‘‘Body of
Correspondence.’’ If at the start we discover that the Archivist’s act of
reading has, in a super-phenomenological manner, actually ‘‘animated’’
the text—or, to be more accurate, conjured up and given flesh to the
dead—as the film proceeds, the narrative power is gradually placed in
the hands of the dead: they demand to be made flesh, not to encounter
him, but to be fully realized before each other.
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O: My dearest N., You’ve changed. I’ve changed. I’m afraid I wasn’t able
to explain why a meeting in the flesh seems so vital to me now.
N: What? You think we can be lovers, after all these years . . . ?!
/ . . . /
O: I don’t know. Call it intuition but, please, accept it with grace. This is
and is not about sex. This is about our corporeal selves. I do want. I
am sorely wanting. I want to see you. I want you to see me. I need to
reassure myself that I do exist, now, in the flesh, embodied. Eyes are
important. This is what I think. I think eyes are mirrors, and I am
reborn into the world through so many blinks and squints, as daugh-
ter, as mother, as teacher. . . . My longest gaze belongs to you. And I
need your eyes, because I’m growing older and without them, I am as
insubstantial as vellum. So, call it double reflex, but like a photograph,
I need a good shot of you.
This need for a ‘‘good shot,’’ for the actual bodily presence of her lover, is
a direct repudiation of the opening lines of the film, which narrate a
story of solitariness and death.
O: ‘‘An old lady lived alone and died . . .’’
N: Now that’s an approximate truth if there ever was one. . . . Here is how
that story would go: ‘‘An old lady lived alone and died. People came to
look for her, and they found: stacks of newspapers, carefully sorted
out by date; cardboard containers and Kleenex boxes and egg cartons
re-used to organize the refuse of a lifetime.’’
Instead, O and N plot their resurrection, and reunion. O says, ‘‘Of
course, we both hoped this excavation would come, and now that I have
access to my boxes again, I am triumphant at the stubbornness of my
acquisition.’’
Their ‘‘excavation’’ is initially in the hands of a person who might find
and open the box. Nevertheless, once opened, that individual is suscep-
tible and bendable to the affective power contained within. The Archi-
vist’s own loneliness, his solitariness, makes him especially vulnerable to
affective contagion: ‘‘I still, to this day, do not know what drew me to the
box. . . . I thought I understood her feelings. . . . I had no human ties. . . .
We had something in common.’’
The newly resurrected women enter the Archivist’s motel room while
he is in the woods, burning their letters. They steal their ‘‘ephemera’’
back from him, then go to the museum and steal what remains of their
Both from Body of Correspondence, 1994.




objects. In a neatly symmetrical way, as the Archivist destroys the items
that have entered too strongly into his life, N and O have preserved
those very things by taking them back into their world.
How does affect come to flow in this narrative space between minds
and bodies? While the contagion between individual selves is clearly
emphasized in this film, so too is the representative system: how do
stories themselves become archived, filed away and fit into a system of
preservation? How do we assume they will stay there, then emerge
intact and perfectly reiterable as they are exhumed each time by new
readers? The Archivist speaks the last lines of Body of Correspondence.
In regards and with respect. . . . This is where I started, and I come back
now . . . to those words . . . to explain my actions. As an archivist I have
an . . . abiding . . . respect for materials that manage to survive. It was my
intention only to breathe life into this correspondence.
It was precisely this regard that led me to . . . stare harder.
The gap to be closed is exactly that which exists between mere survival
and life. However, the intensification of his stare both animates the
materials and unleashes a reciprocal, if not greater, effect on him. Thus,
he ends up destroying the materials (or so he thinks). The final words
bespeak thus an utterly misplaced sense of control, of equilibrium-
making: ‘‘Its contents have been . . . properly assessed and . . . appro-
priately stored. And I am satisfied with the small role I have played
in this undertaking.’’ These last lines are uttered precisely as the two
authors, the now revivified ghosts, are stealing their objects back from
the museum.
The contagious power of affect, its tremendous ability to attract us
and yet also its ability to overflow the boundaries of self and other,
archivist and artifact, author and reader, is thus put before us in Body of
Correspondence. At the same time, in a commensurate fashion, the issue
of truth and fiction, authenticity and illusion, are insinuated into the
very delivery system of affect. To parse these out would seem to be the
imperative for any effort to mobilize affect’s suasive powers for ethical
good. And these intimately bound issues are indeed at the heart of My
Year of Meats.
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My Year of Meats
Ruth Ozeki’s novel attempts to ascertain the function of literature in a
world of globally networked corporate mediazation. She is especially
interested in the different ways in which people might be affected both
by literary texts and by media images so as to act ethically and with a
sense of being together. My Year of Meats tells the story of Jane Tagaki
Little, a documentary filmmaker barely scraping by, who is willingly
recruited by a multinational corporation, beef-ex, to create a ‘‘docu-
mentary series’’ that is actually an extended series of commercials de-
signed to hook Japanese consumers on American beef. The show will
send the crew out into the American Heartland to find ‘‘typical’’ Ameri-
can housewives, interview them about their lives, and meanwhile have
them prepare their favorite beef recipes to share with their Japanese
counterparts. Theirs is not only a pedagogical relationship, but also an
economic one—the company is anxious to ‘‘find’’ the ‘‘authentic’’ Amer-
ica, because its exoticism sells well. Jane ruefully confesses, ‘‘Although
my heart was set on being a documentarian, it seems I was more useful
as a go-between, a cultural pimp, selling off the cast illusion of America
to a cramped population on that small string of Pacific islands.’’≥≤ Asian
American relations are thus intensely and insistently mediated by both
national and transnational economics, playing off affect and sentimen-
tality at all levels: ‘‘Locating our subjects felt like a confidence game,
really. I’d inveigle a nice woman with her civic duty to promote Ameri-
can meat abroad and thereby help rectify the trade imbalance with
Japan’’ (35). Ozeki is interested in how advertising and media merge
together to produce hybrid genres wherein fiction and reality mix, how
‘‘illusions’’ of national cultures are used to instill trans-Pacific affect and
consumer behavior, and to do so at a specific juncture (‘‘slot of pos-
sibility’’) in Asian American history.
The depiction of Asia Pacific, and Japan in particular, as a central
market in the global economy was set forward in the mid-1980s, perhaps
most vividly in Ken’ichi Ōmae’s notion of ‘‘triad power.’’ Ōmae, a Japa-
nese employee of the American research company McKinsey, put for-
ward the idea of a tripolar world reality consisting of Europe, North
America, and Japan and the ‘‘four dragons’’ of East Asia. While the first
two ‘‘poles’’ had long been major trade partners, the inclusion of Japan
was attributed to, among other things, the flourishing of a new kind of
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modern subjectivity. According to J. R. Goodyear, ‘‘The Japanese, for so
long eschewing foreign goods in favor of Japanese products, [were]
embracing a new sub-group individualism (or, viewed globally, con-
vergence) and responding increasingly to the allure of foreign brands.’’≥≥
That is to say, the postwar era had yielded a Japanese consumer driven
by Western ‘‘individual’’ desires and geared toward ‘‘foreign’’ goods.
Two decades later, the centrality of Japan seemed just as strong, as
revealed in the title of the book Leveraging Japan (2000). The pub-
lisher’s blurb reads,
Japan’s current shift from a manufacturing to a consumer economy is
creating unprecedented opportunities for any company with the savvy
to exploit this, the world’s second largest market. Certainly, as the Japa-
nese economy continues to rebound, more and more companies will
continue to stake and build their presence there and use it as a spring-
board to enter other growing Asian markets. In Leveraging Japan, three
leading authorities on market strategy and Japan present the new rules
of Japanese marketing and discuss the evolution of other emerging
Asian markets. These experts then share the same strategies that they’ve
used to help American Express, Avon, Levi Strauss, and kfc, among
other multinational companies, successfully establish a presence in Ja-
pan and leverage that presence to enter other Asian markets.≥∂
The ‘‘strategies’’ include one of the core elements in Ozeki’s novel:
advertising. Armand Mattelart describes a transformation of that field
as well during this same period.
Advertising has become a central actor within the public space. It has
overflowed the cramped frame of the commercial break in order to
constitute itself as a mode of communication. From the isolated and
isolable product, it has become a diffuse environment, pregnant and
present in the every day. Yesterday a simple instrument, today a central
feature. Its field of competence is so diversified and branching that it
forms a social network which enervates media, economies, cultures,
political and civil society, international relations. Network of networks,
these systems of connection regulate the relations between individuals
and groups. The so-called communications society chases the so-called
consumer society.≥∑
Mattelart’s point here—that the generic and practical boundaries
between advertising and heretofore separate realms of public discourse
Pacific Oceanic Feeling 163
(media, economics, culture) have broken down, as has the boundary
between public and private, such that a globalized system of affect draws
on multiple sources, stimuli, and media at once to generate the desired
consumer behavior, nestled within this brand of ‘‘everyday world’’—is
one of the main features of both Mattelart’s study and Ozeki’s novel: this
is the present-day form of affective contagion. Instilling need or desire
for a commodity or service draws on both preexisting habits and newly
invented and imagined ones, which then are disseminated in forms that
include not only the customary ‘‘sound bite,’’ but also less clearly de-
fined media forms such as the infomercial, a ‘‘tweet,’’ or a Facebook post.
This very hybridity means that the usual ways of filtering and process-
ing information, heretofore relatively compartmentalized into discrete
spaces and habits of reading and viewing, are disarmed. ‘‘Information’’
flows through in many guises and enters into our decision-making in
myriad, sometimes invisible, ways. (This is the argument of the Vance
Packard’s classic study, The Hidden Persuaders, now celebrating its fif-
tieth anniversary, but of course without today’s sophisticated global
delivery systems in place.) An upshot of this is that our processes for
decoding discrete kinds of information are now outmoded, as generic
distinctions have lapsed and public and private spaces interpenetrate.
New regimes of sense-making have taken hold of us as our affective
world seems to have become more and more oceanic and borderless.≥∏
Nevertheless, the ‘‘newness’’ of the market did not mean that only
contemporary images were to be deployed. The particular East-West
historical context of the eighties created a strange anachronism. Jane
receives this directive from beef-ex.
Note on All-American values—our ideal American wife must have enough
in common with the average Japanese housewife so as not to appear
either threatening or contemptible. My American Wife! of the 90s must
be a modern role model, just as her mother was a model to Japanese
wives after World War II. However, nowadays a spanking-new refrigera-
tor or automatic can opener is not a ‘‘must.’’ In recent years, due to
Japan’s ‘‘economic miracle,’’ the Japanese housewife is more accustomed
to these amenities even than her American counterpart. The agency
thinks we must replace this emphasis on old-fashioned consumerism
with contemporary wholesome values, represented not by gadgets for
the wife’s sole convenience but by good, nourishing food for her entire
family. And that means meat. (13)
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The standard accoutrements of the modern kitchen are indeed more
likely to be produced in Japan than in America, and the latest models
more likely to be found in the Japanese kitchen than in the American
one. If the design and manufacturing of modern appliances, electronics,
and automobiles are now the purview of Asia, what can America offer?
The one thing Japan’s environment cannot produce en masse: beef. And
this resort to red meat as an essential and unique (albeit outdated)
ingredient of American history jibes well with what were considered to
be the most potent global advertising images. Recognizing the contem-
porary material history of East-West trade relations, and the futility of
selling to the Japanese products that they already possess, Jane’s ‘‘docu-
mentary’’ reaches back to a glorious past of the American Heartland, in
a gesture following precisely this campaign advice found in the 1985
annual report of the global advertising giant Saatchi and Saatchi: ‘‘Capi-
talize on universally recognized cultural symbols and references. . . .
[W]ithout tv and motion picture education about the virile, rugged
character of the American West, the worldwide proliferation of the
Marlboro brand would not been possible. . . . This cultural convergence
is manifest too in the worldwide popularity of films like Rambo or
Ghostbusters, pop music idols like Madonna, and books, both fiction
and nonfiction.’’≥π
The irony, of course, is that by that time the mode of meat production
found in the American West was gone, superseded by new technological
and chemically enhanced modes of production, which have created a
qualitatively as well as quantitatively different product. Furthermore,
not only has a mode of beef production been eclipsed by new tech-
nologies and agribusiness, but also the general program of ‘‘American-
ization’’ on the global stage has had its day. We have, in short, the weird
juxtaposition of a set of cultural icons rooted in an outmoded history
that still has global affect. It is as if the world of media and the world of
history have been delinked. Mattelart comments, ‘‘If the doctrine of
globalization is constructed on the ruins of the doctrines of American-
ization, it reveals no less a fascination for the products of the U.S.
culture industries, those ‘natural supports of universality,’ as a member
of the agency puts it.’’≥∫ That is to say, where the political potency of
‘‘Americanization’’ has flagged, the affective potency of its imagery has
not. If anything, it has remained insistently in the global consciousness
as a ‘‘present’’ thing: ‘‘authenticity’’ is thus detemporalized, separated
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into two components—the historical referent of the image set against its
affective power.
The point of all this is of course not to amplify the admiration and
perhaps even envy of the Japanese for things American, or even simply
to get them to ‘‘buy American.’’ It is to change their habits of food
consumption, not just their media intake. And this in turn converts
sentimental affect into economic behavior and physiological change.
Affect is linked critically to bodies, as well as to psyches. How do pat-
terns of consumption move from images and values to purchasing be-
havior and then to actually bringing those products into our bodies,
incorporating ‘‘them’’ into us? Here the full impact of ‘‘otherness’’ is felt
in all levels of being, in a network that reaches from the individual body
to collective material history, to global relations of production and
consumption and back again. This topic had already been the focus of
studies in the 1980s, especially in Mexico. The following passage tells of
the effect of food marketing not only on the consumer habits and
bodies of Mexicans, but also on its national agricultural economy:
The evolution of the food industry . . . leads to the conclusion that there
is a tendency to produce sumptuary foods. We speak of sumptuary
consumption not only because these products are consumed preferen-
tially by the rich but also because they form a market alongside the
middle and low sectors and are unnecessary for a good diet. On the
contrary, their acquisition indicates that the lower classes are sacrificing
consumption of the necessary basic foodstuffs. . . . Those who suffer
most are the poorest classes, whose diet is composed of maize, beans,
fats and oils. The consumption of fizzy drinks and desserts has increased
the intake of pure sugar with detrimental effect. In other words these
calories are ever more expensive.≥Ω
This transformation of the Mexican diet is thus not only more expensive
in terms of money, but also in terms of health, and ultimately it imposes
a change in the national agricultural economy: ‘‘This model of con-
sumption is also a model of production. The cradle of the civilization of
maize has been converted into an importer, at ever-increasing prices,
of what was previously exported.’’∂≠ The case of Mexico is not unique,
of course. Similar transformations of consumption and production
were found throughout the Indian subcontinent and Central and South
America during what was called the ‘‘Green Revolution,’’ which involved
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not only the high-density use of powerful and costly fertilizers and
pesticides, but also the tailoring of agricultural production to the spe-
cific needs of First World countries, such that often the environment
was ruined for native products.∂∞
Let us return now to the issue of the hybridization of genre, for it is in
a powerful mix of fact and fiction, of documentary and of commercial,
that we find a potent blending of the affective market imaginary that
instills these new appetites and preferences. Mattelart draws our atten-
tion to ‘‘the ‘fictionalization’ of advertising and the increasing presence
of the advertising mode in the production of fiction: two processes
which give each other mutual support and consecrate modern advertis-
ing as the paragon of mediatized modernity.’’∂≤ He notes the prolifera-
tion of neologisms that evince this phenomenon: ‘‘Infomercials, Adver-
torials, Pubbligiornalismo, Publireportage.’’ Such mixed genres ‘‘erase the
lines between news and commercials, advertising and editorial, pub-
licity and journalism, publicity and reportage, between promotional
surface and editorial content, advertising and the program.’’∂≥ Of course,
the situation today, decades later, has proven that this phenomenon has
only become more entrenched, facilitated by the easy dissemination
globally of both actual information and contrived ‘‘reports,’’ by the
blurring of the border between journalism and opinion pieces, and by
the production of social media platforms available to millions on their
cell phones. But this genre-crossing also disarms the ability to dis-
tinguish cleanly truth from fiction, or fiction from truth. Indeed, Ozeki’s
novel demonstrates how our habits of processing information no longer
dwell on such distinctions, if affect is the dominant key (how many
‘‘followers’’ do you have on Twitter? How many Facebook ‘‘friends’’ do
you boast?).
Critically, this isn’t merely a fanciful invention of new forms of com-
munication. Such devices are all geared to confuse the consumer, blend-
ing excitement, interest, ‘‘information’’ with either thinly veiled lies or
outright deceptions. The most infamous early case of this was when
Nestlé, between 1974 and 1976, sent personnel into Third World hospi-
tals to promote the use of its powdered baby formula. Salespeople were
dressed up as nurses, exuding the virtues of Western hygienic practices,
modern health and well-being, set against the ‘‘backwards’’ Third World
habit of nursing one’s own child. The company conveniently ignored
significant cultural and material realities. They distributed free samples
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of the product to new mothers, who mixed the powder with unsanitized
water, causing infants to become ill and even to die. Many of those who
survived were unable to be breastfed, since their mothers had stopped
lactating: ‘‘[Nestlé] was reproached with failing to consider the environ-
ment in which the products were offered for consumption: a cultural
tradition of prolonged lactation, closely linked to the natural spacing of
births, defective hygienic conditions, lack of drinking water.’’∂∂ Only a
worldwide protest halted this marketing campaign.
It is a similar attempt to revise the Japanese diet, to infiltrate ‘‘culture’’
via food consumption, that introduces Ozeki’s indictment not only of
the beef industry, but also of an entire range of interlinked corporate
interests that show no reluctance to contaminate our bodies as well as
our spirits. It is not simply a matter of eating meat; more important, it
involves consuming materials laced with additives and hormones un-
disclosed to us. Alongside of her indictment of the meat industry, Ozeki
pays equal attention to the historical use of the drug des, which was
widely prescribed in the postwar period to prevent miscarriages. Be-
tween 1938 and 1971, 10 to 15 million women and babies were exposed to
this synthetic estrogen. It was later discovered that the drug actually
created birth defects in babies. The Centers for Disease Control notes,
In 1953, published research showed that des did not prevent miscar-
riages or premature births. However, des continued to be prescribed
until 1971. In that year, the Food and Drug Administration (fda) issued
a Drug Bulletin advising physicians to stop prescribing des to pregnant
women. The fda warning was based on a study published in 1971 that
identified des as a cause of a rare vaginal cancer in girls and young
women who had been exposed to des before birth (in the womb).∂∑
In its own progressive version of an ‘‘infonovel,’’ My Year of Meats
contains an appendix with full information, research materials, and
articles on both the meat industry and des. In an interview included in
the book, Ozeki seems to echo Mattelart as she notes, ‘‘I see our lives as
being part of an enormous web of interconnected spheres, where the
workings of the larger social, political, and corporate machinery impact
something as private and intimate as the descent of an egg through a
woman’s fallopian tube. This is the resonance I want to conjecture in
my books.’’∂∏
This network draws on particular delivery systems, and Ozeki’s novel
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focuses on the complex one of affect production. Indeed, one of the key
themes of the novel has to do precisely with the blurring boundaries
between the real and the contrived, authenticity and art, the documen-
tary and the commercial, private and public. Breaking down these dis-
tinctions enables the flow of commodities. As Jane declares, in the
melding of the two we find the most potent forms of persuasion: ‘‘The
strategy was to develop a powerful synergy between the commercials
and the documentary vehicles in order to stimulate consumer purchase
motivation’’ (41). Critically, this motivation is built on the general affec-
tive system. No area of the Japanese ‘‘body’’ should be impermeable.
Ozeki registers the effect of Jane’s ‘‘product’’ not only on the general
forms of producing and perceiving images of difference, but also on the
microcosmic sensory perceptions of it as registered on the body itself.
In a fascinating passage we move the distance from the phonic to the
ideology of consumption: ‘‘She [Akiko] liked the sounds of the parallel
Japanese r’s, with their delicate flick of the tongue across the palate,
and the plosive pu like a kiss or a fart in the middle of a big American
dinner. She liked the size of things American. Convenient. Economical.
Big and simple’’ (19). In a similar fashion, the aesthetic of difference
prompts an attempt at mimicry: ‘‘What a beautiful name, thought Akiko.
Suzie Flowers [a person represented in one of the commercials] laughed
easily, but Akiko was practicing how to do this too’’ (21). Another
example is found in a country-and-western song that Akiko particularly
likes, even though she cannot understand the lyrics: ‘‘It felt like Bobby
Joe [Creely] was telling her a story and if only she could understand
the words she would be able to identify with it perfectly. Unfortu-
nately, there was no Japanese translation on the lyric sheet’’ (77). Both
these examples resemble nothing so much as what Teresa Brennan here
describes.
Nervous entrainment may also depend on body movements and ges-
tures, particularly through the imitation of rhythms (effected by sight,
touch, and hearing). In understanding the aural rhythmic component
evident in the vocal interactions of a parent and child, Richard Restak
suggests we attend to the study of prosody—‘‘the melody, pitch, and
stress of human speech’’—where auditory cues clearly have priority over
visual ones. Rhythm is a tool and expression of agency, just as words are.
They can literally convey tone of an utterance, and, in this sense, it does
unite word and affect.∂π
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Crucially, the efficacy of this contagious affect is borne out precisely
in Akiko’s subsequent behavior.
She’d heard the song on the My American Wife! program about the
Korean children in Louisiana. It was a good show, and she’d given it a 9
in Authenticity. She especially liked the music. She’d written down the
names of Bobbie Jo and also Rockin’ Dopsie at the bottom of the paper
where she copied the week’s recipe. The next day she took the bullet
train to town and found the cds at Tower Records in Shibuya. It took
her most of the day, but it was worth the trip. When she got home to her
apartment she put on the Rockin’ Dopsie cd and cooked the Cajun-
style Baby Back Ribs. They turned out exceptionally well and she gave it
a 9 in Delicious. (77–78)
As the novel progresses, we see a slow detachment from the obsession
with literal translation, and a greater indulgence in and sympathy for the
incomplete, and sometimes incommensurate. This has everything to do
with what we discover about affect and how the loosening of the de-
mands for ‘‘truth’’ (for lack of a better word) feed into affect’s particular
relation to dreams and the imaginary, as we saw in Freud, as well as its
ability to channel itself into a number of directions and forms: ‘‘His
songs made her feel reckless and even a little dangerous. . . . She’d never
seen heat rising before, or met a woman like the one in the song who
carried a straight razor. Akiko didn’t know what a straight razor was, but
suddenly she wished she could have one too’’ (79).∂∫ Thus the songs
create not only affective behavior, but also purchasing behavior.
In this highly commercialized environment, where art, truth, and
affect are put into the service of profit, all geared to integrating the
formerly other into new habits and behaviors, Jane tries to salve her
conscience: how can she accept complacency in ‘‘inveigling’’? She ra-
tionalizes: ‘‘I had spent so many years, in both Japan and America,
floundering in a miasma of misinformation about culture and race, I
was determined to use this window into mainstream network television
to educate. Perhaps it was naïve, but I believed, honestly, that I could use
wives to sell meat in the service of a Larger Truth’’ (27). Advertising is
thus the means to an end of her own invention; the commercials will be
her Trojan horse, delivering the truth. Nevertheless, how can truth
coexist with falsity? Are the very narrative strategies that deliver affect
incompatible with truth? That is to say, does affect, in its multiformal,
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multidispositional nature, submerge epistemology beneath the senti-
mental ‘‘hook’’? Is there a way to install and maintain a boundary be-
tween ‘‘bad’’ media and ‘‘good’’ content?
One of the first shows Jane tapes is of a Mexican family. If we look to
this segment in hopes that we will find some example of the ‘‘truth’’ Jane
wishes to convey, we seem to have just such material.
The boy, whose name was Bobby, lived there with his parents, Alberto
and Catalina Martinez. Alberto, or Bert, as he now preferred to be
called, was a farm worker. He’d lost his left hand to a hay baler in Abilene
seven years earlier, a few months after he and Catalina (Cathy) had
emigrated from Mexico, just in time for Bobby to be born an American
citizen. That had been Cathy’s dream, to have an American son, and
Bert had paid for her dream with his hand. (58)
While the story conspicuously attributes the cost of the American
Dream to one of the chief targets of Ozeki’s indictment—agribusiness—
what is actually foregrounded is the ‘‘immigrant story.’’ Alberto’s prefer-
ence for an Anglo name and the absence of any remark on his or anyone
else’s part about his accident remove any explicit critique; this ‘‘truth’’
disappears before the dominant narrative of the American immigrant’s
dream. The power of that story is what cements the affective bond
between West and East, as imaginatively triangulated through the Mexi-
can boy: ‘‘Bobby smiled at the camera, a little Mexican boy shyly offer-
ing his American Supper to the nation of Japan. Everything was in slow
motion. It was a surreal and exquisite moment’’ (61). And, indeed, this
image and narrative produces the intended effect thousands of miles
away: ‘‘Toes tucked neatly beneath her, she [Akiko] watched the screen,
where a young Mexican child stood in the middle of a waving field of
wheat. . . . Akiko felt the tears well up in her eyes as, pen in hand,
she smoothed out the sheet of paper, ready to take down the day’s
recipe’’ (63).
On hearing the favorable ‘‘reviews’’ of this segment, Jane writes to her
employers: ‘‘I was very happy to hear about the high ratings for the
Martinez show. . . . I will do my best to increase the Authenticity and
General Interest of the program’’ (64). She has successfully exploited
the mixed form of the ‘‘top seller,’’ invented in the mid-’80s.
The reader of the ‘‘top seller’’ has two expectations: the expectation of
pleasure and the expectation for enrichment. . . . How then to resolve the
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contradiction between expectations of enrichment and pleasure, the
tension between ‘‘serious’’ and ‘‘entertaining’’? In short, how to legiti-
mize pleasure? Answers: at the level of form, through what advertising
people call ‘‘indicators of authenticity’’; as for background, through
‘‘true references, consensual values, symbolic exchange’’; so that enrich-
ment occurs in counterpoint with pleasure.∂Ω
Advertising is thus most successful when ‘‘simple pleasures’’ are comple-
mented and legitimized by some sense of social value or ethical pur-
pose. Here, at the nexus of national cultures, ‘‘authenticity’’ yields un-
derstanding; a sad story, empathy; a hopeful one, optimism about the
world. The question then becomes, how we are seduced by such au-
thenticity? What kinds of otherness do we let overwhelm and pacify us,
and what others do we reject and ward off ? How are we predisposed
toward certain kinds of authenticity and not others? And finally, how
can one appropriate those instruments to deliver ‘‘truth’’ rather than
‘‘authenticity’’? That is, can Jane’s scheme really work, or will its very
delivery system obviate that chance?
Two kinds of cynicism emerge. The first has to do with the fact that
no matter how profound and even uplifting the affective delivery sys-
tem, the ultimate issue for some will always be the bottom line. This is
nowhere more apparent than in the segment Jane shoots at a Southern
church, filled with African American worshippers. Being present in the
church meeting seems to produce another transformative moment, not
only for Jane and her crew, but even for John Ueno, Jane’s misogynistic,
wife-abusing Japanese boss who has recently attempted to rape Jane.
The ladies on either side responded, grabbing Ueno and me and wrap-
ping us in their arms, then passing us off to another neighbor, to be
similarly embraced. Catharsis was close at hand. I dimly understood it,
felt it gathering all around me. And the miracle was, so did Ueno. . . .
All around him, people were dancing and writhing and singing and
shaking and speaking in tongues, and others were caring for them,
laying on their hands, supporting their frenzy. Sweat was pouring down
Ueno’s face, pure distilled alcohol by the smell of it, and he was sobbing.
(112–13)
Yet this affective ‘‘transformation’’ in ‘‘oceanic feeling’’ is quickly shown
to be only transitory, for Ueno ends up disallowing broadcast of the
show: ‘‘How could a Japanese housewife relate to a poor black family
172 Chapter Four
with nine children?’’ (130). Ueno’s dip in oceanic feeling does nothing to
change him. The personal does not have to segue the political; private
‘‘enlightenment’’ does not necessarily result in public betterment. To get
at the question of the effectiveness of affect in instilling ethical behavior
we need to delve deeper.
If we see this moment of cynicism as both a critique of capitalism and
Jane’s naïveté, it still does not seem to amount to much. Yet a second
kind of cynicism that comes into play in the course of the novel is
sharper and more devastating than this first, for it shows how even the
reputed victims of capital and the profit motive can be turned into its
agents. We find this in the story of the Bukowsky family, whose daughter
Christina is paralyzed, indeed comatose, having been hit by a Walmart
truck. As the company has refused to assume any responsibility, it falls
to the family to care for their daughter alone. But soon the townspeople
take an interest. They in fact begin a collective ritual of empathy and
transference: ‘‘Each person brought something that he or she loved’’
(134). These visits and the talismans that are brought for the girl to
touch create a communal affective ritual that gradually works a miracle:
Christina emerges from her coma.
Yet it does not end there, for Jane then tells us, ‘‘The media got hold of
the story and pumped it for all it was worth from every angle, including
the exploitation of small-town America by the corporate retail giants’’
(135). It is here that we begin to ask if this exploitation is at all different
from what Jane has been doing, complete with the reliance on stock
narrative devices that peddle certain models of affective ‘‘reality’’—even,
or mostly, mythologized ones.
The town of Quarry had discovered a new natural resource—com-
passion—and they were mining it and marketing it to America. Quarry
became Hope, and Mr. Bukowsky was elected mayor. . . . The towns-
people found jobs with the Center or started their own businesses as
affiliated service providers. . . . The Mayor and Mrs. Bukowsky starred in
a promotional videotape, ‘‘Welcome to Our Living Room: The Bukow-
sky Method of Compassion and Renewal,’’ and published a best-selling
book by the same name. (136)
The ‘‘affect,’’ and what is mimed, has nothing anymore to do with
compassion or sympathy, and everything to do with commercialism.
Are we to take this positively, is this some sort of poetic justice, has the
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family finally received its due? Not exactly, although, because of the
media attention, Walmart does take responsibility. All this is rather a
matter of profiting beyond justice, and commodifying what was origi-
nally an ‘‘authentic’’ act of compassion. Indeed, it seems that the senti-
mental world has here been infected by the contagion of capitalistic
behavior. Yet Jane offers no comment on this turn of events; instead she
focuses on the efficacy of her docudrama and her own perspicacity: ‘‘I
felt the warm smugness that comes over me when I know that there is
another heart-wrenching documentary moment at hand, being exqui-
sitely recorded’’ (175).
Ultimately, Jane recognizes not only the necessity to ‘‘manipulate’’
sentiment, but also precisely the need to be fictive: ‘‘I wanted to make
programs with documentary integrity and at first I believed in a truth
that existed—singular empirical absolute. But slowly, as my skills im-
proved and I learned about editing and camera angles and the effect
that music can have on meaning, I realized that truth was like race and
could be measured only in ever-diminishing approximations’’ (176).
Until the very end of the novel, Jane persists in rationalizing the need to
deploy the rhetorical strategies of storytelling within the frame of tele-
visual media, and in the process, the ‘‘real’’ becomes simply one ingre-
dient among others: ‘‘The program was a good one, really solid, moving,
the best I’d made. It could even effect social change. And so I continued,
taking out the stutters and catches from the women’s voices, creating a
seamless flow in a reality that was no longer theirs and not quite so real
anymore’’ (179). Here it seems we have the most explicit capitulation to
the ‘‘hybrid form’’ of media as seen in Mattelart.
We have thus far spoken about Jane’s gradual admission that creating
an effective story is a particular blend of myth and reality, affect and
aesthetics. But what is to be effected by this mix? I’d like to return to
these questions: how do stories do their work? Once affect has been
installed, how is it supposed to be harnessed to an ethical action? Criti-
cally, for this study, how is the ratio of otherness adjusted, amplified, or
‘‘smoothed out’’? First, Ozeki makes the argument that stories can shift
perspective and provide the opportunity for one to see oneself and one’s
world differently. In a key episode, we find Bunny Dunn, the mother of a
girl poisoned by hormones in cattle-feed, describing first her own com-
placency and then the transformative work the film has done. On seeing
Jane’s film of her daughter, Bunny Dunn is transformed from a silent
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victim to a witness: ‘‘You just get used to it. Until something happens,
that wakes you up and makes you see different. That’s what happened
when you all showed up. I saw her with your eyes, and everything
looked different. Wrong. . . . [I]t was like I finally made a choice, talkin’
for the camera, it felt good. Like I was takin’ a stand’’ (294–95). And
when she shows her husband the tape, it is ‘‘like finally he understood’’
(357). This reconfiguration of subjectivity comes about because the
mediated narrative has allowed the subject to achieve an exterior point
of view of itself. This in turn allows the individual to distance herself
from her immediate ‘‘interest’’ (in this case, one invested in denial), and
to take part in an ethical community, one that is constituted precisely by
a common experience of viewing both events and mediated images.
Thus, once her purely commercial skills at producing and controlling
affect at will are honed, Jane finds an ethical purpose for them. She
embarks on a project of finding historical facts, suppressed information,
and miscellaneous data, and then forging stories that transcend ‘‘mere’’
facticity, that dwell in the seam between information and affective fic-
tion. Jane’s final disquisition attempts to answer the question of form
and truth, that is, what formal properties are needed to make truth
attractive, persuasive, and affective. At this point, she has succeeded in
exposing the dangers of hormone-laced feed and the chemically in-
fested environment of the slaughterhouse. This takes place not through
the direct action she imagines, but, in a twist that is in keeping with the
nature of the narrative, via information leaked to the press. Jane works
backward from the ‘‘success’’ of her enterprise to a diagnosis of the
pathologies of the media and the public.
I had succeeded: I got a small but critical piece of information about the
corruption of meats in America out to the world, and possibly even
saved a little girl’s life in the process. And maybe that is the important
part of the story, but the truth is so much more complex. . . . Like all the
parts of the Gulf War that were never reported. That war was certainly a
Thing That Gained by Being Painted. And like Suzie’s tale, a small but
Outstandingly Splendid Thing. I mean, I take a Japanese television crew
to Iowa to film a documentary about this American wife, and we make
total fiction of the facts of her life, and now, a year later she tells me that
those facts have turned right around and aligned themselves with our
fiction. So go figure. . . . In the Year of Meats, truth wasn’t stranger than
fiction; it was fiction. Ma says I’m neither here nor there, and if that’s the
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case, so be it. Half documentarian, half fabulist. . . . Maybe sometimes
you have to make things up, to tell truths that alter outcomes. (360)
Armed with such perceptions of and conclusions about both audience
reception and the requisite rhetorical tools of the media, Jane’s question
about ‘‘who would want to see it’’ is transparently disingenuous. In fact,
as we have seen before, Jane possesses a sharp awareness of what kinds
of stories people not only want to see, but seem compelled to see. Fur-
thermore, she not only knows which buttons to push, but also has a
fairly good sense of what will happen when they are pushed. Jane’s
‘‘documentaries’’ are primarily geared toward eliciting interest and sym-
pathy from a broad moderate and liberal audience already primed for an
authentic multicultural moment that itself taps into a more traditional
American narrative of self-improvement.
Nevertheless, the episode in question, the one that actually might
have saved at least one life, the one that is the most graphic and disturb-
ing indictment of the meat industry, relies not on that multicultural
ideology, but on a weird mixture of horror and voyeurism. The young
girl’s body is proffered as evidence, and that evidence is compelling not
(only) because of the deformity of the body, but because of the par-
ticularly sexual and erotic nature of those deformities and the way they
are framed by her half-brother’s actions.
It is here that we need finally to address the multiple layers of narra-
tive point of view and authorial voice. We should not rush to assume
that Jane and Ozeki take on exactly the same point of view. For the
noted slippages should be evidence enough that Ozeki has set up a
sympathetic, but not perfect, protagonist. There are telling contradic-
tions between what Jane says and thinks about any one issue and her
actions and assessments at other points. If we can accept that point of
difference, then the book is at once more complicated and more inter-
esting. For it now appears that Jane cannot stand outside her own
critique of the media. To be sure, she makes critical remarks about the
media and even incriminates herself from time to time, but these in-
stances of explicit confession again run the risk of sounding both sancti-
monious and ironic. It is the unselfconscious contradictions that strike
me as most meaningful, as in Jane’s disingenuous question. And it is in
those moments that we might perceive an intelligence outside Jane’s. It
is this doubling that gives the book its true critical edge, a critical edge
that allows us to return to our basic questions with a different sense
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of how the novel works to problematize notions of literary form, the
media, ethics, and affect. It is a creative and critical perspective on its
own literary delivery system.
Ozeki claims: ‘‘By having Jane discuss the shortcomings of happy
endings right smack in the middle of one, I was hoping to invite the
reader into a more complex relationship with the ending. In essence,
I point an authorial finger at the very thing that I am writing, and
poke a hole in the seamlessness of the happy ending by making it self-
referential and reflexive. Ironic.’’∑≠ However, that is itself only half the
story. For while here she endows Jane with this self-reflexivity, at other
points she disallows Jane that capacity, and the ‘‘authorial finger’’ is
pointed not at the ‘‘thing being written,’’ but at the point of view that
guides it—that is, Jane’s own interior point of view. The novel thus
unabashedly raises the question of modern mediatized storytelling and
the ethical application of stories from a number of angles. It is in invent-
ing and deploying this metacritique of the media that My Year of Meats
shows the promise of a critical mode of reading and writing in our
contemporary age.
The final drawing together of these issues is staged in a juxtaposition
of Jane’s book and Sei Shonagon’s tenth-century text, The Pillow Book.
Throughout the novel, all three main women’s voices quote The Pillow
Book; Ozeki includes quotations from Shonagon, and both Akiko and
Jane respond to and play off these quotations. Adele Pinch makes this
observation regarding quotations:
Quotations, in other words, can be topographical features of the space
of the mind as well as of the space of a sonnet. Locating feelings else-
where, shifting between textual practice and the mental or social prac-
tice, quotation can serve as a name for the problems of this book as a
whole: the tendency of affective life to get located among rather than
within people, or in the interests to seize between different explanations
and stories of their origins, arising as much from rhetorical or fictional
situations as from the mind’s own motions.∑∞
What is of interest to me here is Pinch’s attention, both in this passage
and in her remarks on Hume, to the dialectic between affect as originat-
ing in the self and affect as originating in and circulating textually
among others. In Ozeki, this public circulation of affect is echoed in the
circulation of mass media, and partakes in the problematic of moder-
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nity. One problem with affect and ethical thinking again is this—where
does affect start? Who brings it into social space? This question goes
directly to that of the precise constitution of the individual as an ethical
being and social actor. But the other question is, why and how does this
matter, this search for origin? From Levinas to Nancy, and others, an
ethical self is ‘‘always already’’ ‘‘accountable’’ to an other, already con-
stituted in relation to an other or its trace. In this sense, ethics is not and
cannot be the sole property of one, but is inescapably that of ‘‘us.’’
At the end, after all the communal acts of reading and writing have
taken place, Jane finally decides that her stance toward her narrative will
be different from Shonagon’s—while Sei Shonagon hid her book, Jane
will bring hers forward into the public realm. As opposed to Shonagon,
who writes, ‘‘Whatever people may think of my book, I still regret that it
ever came to light’’ (354), Jane asserts, ‘‘Whatever people may think of
my book, I will make it public, bring it to light unflinchingly. That is the
modern thing to do’’ (361). Here we need to underscore the historical,
ethical, and aesthetic difference that this remark draws in order to
delineate Jane’s project. As opposed to what she sees as Shonagon’s
private text of the eleventh century, Jane insists on the obligations the
modern age places on her. It is modern to be public, revelatory of the
private. In particular, it is a specific kind of private knowledge that is to
be brought into the light of public scrutiny. Crucially, this information
and knowledge is to be conveyed in a particular affective form. In this
manner, in its own hybrid narrative form, which blends all manner of
communication and affect, My Year of Meats poses itself as an antidote
to the kind of melding of private and public, fact (or its appearance) and
fiction, perpetrated by global advertising that Mattelart decries. And yet
it is an uneasy and slippery remedy, always open to being converted into
what it is fighting against, precisely because affect is murky, untamable,
prone to be diverted or converted by the ego’s need to protect and
privilege itself. And it is here that we can broaden this notion to incor-
porate the general topic of this study: contemporary literature and its
deliverance of others. What Ozeki has made us consider, ‘‘unflinchingly,’’
is the border between literature and other media.
In a wonderful blurb for My Year of Meats, the director John Sayles
(self-identified, first, as ‘‘former member, Amalgamated Meat Packers
and Butcher Workers of North America’’ and, second, as ‘‘director of
‘Matewan’ and ‘Men with Guns’ ’’) writes, ‘‘This is a very cool book,
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satirical but never mean, funny, peopled by fully inhabited characters
who are both blind and self-aware. Ruth Ozeki’s My Year of Meats reas-
sures us that media and culture, though bound inextricably, will never
become one.’’∑≤ The question of course is where Sayles would place
‘‘literature’’ within this ostensibly separate (now and forever) dyad? I
would venture that it resides in both media and culture, if by media we
mean delivery systems that bring others into contact with each other,
and by culture we mean organic common-places that regenerate them-
selves. Literature brings us into imaginative contact with others, em-
bedded in media, and as an expressive form of ‘‘culture.’’ At least that is a
starting hypothesis. In the conclusion to this study, I want to see how
literature is challenged these days precisely to mean something in a
particular way that lets it reside in the space in between, and therefore in
a critical position that might yield ethical results.
Conclusion
In the course of this book, while I have focused in each chapter on,
respectively, rationality and realism as they confront new forms of oth-
erness in a new historical, technological, and political landscape; the
issue of the body and the possibility of its regeneration or preservation
via the implantation of or consumption of the other’s organs; and the
issue of affect as it manages the ‘‘oceanic’’ pool of affect shared among
those like and unlike ourselves, I have stressed that each one of these
moments, each one of these ‘‘slots,’’ partakes of a set of key issues. In
chapter 1 we asked, what is human? How do I behave toward others that
I now recognize, given the critique of the underpinnings of rationality
that dissolving the human-nonhuman dyad discloses? And as we find
ourselves pressed to question what kinds of affect overcome us as well,
given this new opening, we review the ways our bodies exist at the
expense of other bodies now not so different from our own. How to
represent that new connection, or the decomposition of the delivery
system of rationality and realism? In chapter 2 we see what happens
when the political contingency of ‘‘the interregnum’’ creates the need
and the imperative to rethink bonds of kinship, race, ethnicity, gender.
This brings us in touch with chapter 1’s question about literary form:
how do these newly cohered stories come to be told? What is the new
‘‘delivery system’’ that can adequately manage to narrate this historical
moment, and who can take ownership of it, who can claim rights to it?
Here, too, the affective realm is deeply involved, as loyalties, loves,
and appeals to ideals all push bodies into acts of suicide, betrayal, il-
licit passion. Chapter 3 takes up all these concerns, most obviously
Coetzee’s attention to how biotechnologies have changed the way meat
is produced on a mass scale, and how it is we determine what is human.
How do we breed creatures only to have them give their lives for us,
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unacknowledged and unrecompensed? How in Ishiguro’s novel is the
‘‘children’s’’ lack of affect assumed, and how is art, the one testament to
humanness, so easily ignored? What kind of rationality is applied to
produce these nonhuman bodies for the sustenance of the ‘‘human,’’ and
how does that distinction begin to crumble, once we let in the issue of
ethics? Finally, in chapter 4, we again find the issues of biotechnology,
the production of a particularly construed ‘‘other’’ for the service solely
of our bodies (whether it be the otherness of a drug, a hormone, or the
flesh and body of a ‘‘nonhuman animal’’ that itself is laced with drugs,
hormones, and other ‘‘nonorganic’’ feed), and the systems of rational-
ization that deliver them to us—media, technology, advertising—which
each manipulate and redirect the currents of affect that flow not only
across the Pacific, but also between mother and fetus, between women,
and between races. The same question comes back with intensity in
Ozeki’s novel: how to tell not only a story, but an ethically affective and
humane story, in the midst of a world where all boundaries seem blurred
purposefully? Here, in my conclusion, I will venture a broader frame for
this idea of ‘‘delivery systems’’ and end with an address to the notion of
reading literature in our contemporary age—an age marked, in its own
‘‘slot,’’ as one impacted on by new forms of communication—and to the
notion of decoding information.
In his seminal work, Fallible Man, Paul Ricoeur draws together the
issues of affect, self, the self ’s manner of connecting to others. He
schematizes this process within a triad comprising economics, politics,
and culture in a way that is not dissimilar to what I have been call-
ing ‘‘delivery systems.’’ By that I have meant the media and discourses
through which others are delivered to us as like ‘‘us.’’ In order for others
to move through those mediating systems, I have argued that a degree of
sameness has to be assumed. We assume that people think and act in
ways that display a certain degree of rationality that is within our nor-
mative definitions of reason; that people have human bodies that are
composed and function in basically similar ways; and that people regis-
ter affect in common manners. And yet the fact of the matter is that
these assumptions are often proven to be only partly true—otherness
and difference continue to abide in lesser or greater ways. What are the
consequences of this for these systems, and for our understanding of
what actually binds us?
I also have argued that in terms of our modern notions of literature, a
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degree of otherness is required in order that the ethical, self-bettering,
imagination-enhancing function of literature, instantiated in the eigh-
teenth century and still with us in at least a residual form, is realized. We
need to have some impetus to be more than what we were coming into
our encounter with the text. And yet at the same time I have emphasized
the fact that too much otherness can defeat those ambitions. Through-
out this study I have shown how literature—these days in particular—
has dramatized that problematic and thus is positioned in a critical
tension with the sameness that is supposed to inform and enable global
‘‘delivery systems.’’ The consequences of this tension are most visible
perhaps in the area of affect: we want to feel connected to something
larger than individual selves, we are instructed to engage in an ethical
relation to others that do not resemble us, yet we withdraw when we are
affected too much by unpleasurable, bad, affect. How to maintain that
equilibrium or growth without danger? Above all, I have insisted on
paying attention to the material practices of deliverance—the ways ra-
tionality, choice, the disposition and distribution of the body and its
affects are made manifest in our relations with ‘‘others.’’
Ricoeur similarly draws our attention to the ways that intersubjective
(self-other) relations are mediated by economics, politics, and culture,
but only insofar as ‘‘shapeless’’ affect is given objective form in and
through them. He sees people as inhabiting a shared pool of affect, not
unlike the ‘‘oceanic’’ feeling. The problem he sees here is not all that
different from the one we noted—the murky, unanchored character of
affect and its uncertain relationship to both self and other. Affect can
either join people together, as it is objectified in those three spheres of
human interaction, or retreat back into the self.
These are feelings which are essentially formless, moods, Stimmungen,
or, as someone has termed them, atmospheric feelings. . . . Through
their formless character they denote the fundamental feeling of which
the determined feelings are the schemata, namely, man’s very openness to
being. . . . All feelings are capable of acquiring form or of returning to a
formless state; this is a consequence of the intentional structure of
feeling in general: in turn, it takes on form in accordance with the
objects of knowledge to which fastens its felt epithets, or returns to
the formless in accordance with the law of interiorization, of introcep-
tion, of the plunging-back into the ground of life from which intentional
acts emerge.∞
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Here, then, is the problematic of ‘‘openness to being,’’ of letting oneself
be open to otherness: feelings can remain formless (in which case they
flow back into the self, retaining their murky shapeless quality) or ac-
quire form through contact with the objective world of others. Cru-
cially, the latter is possible only insofar as feelings attach themselves to
and take form in ‘‘objects of knowledge,’’ that is, in ways of knowing the
world that already exists—again, Ricoeur selects economics, politics,
and culture as specific objective and objectifying discourses.
It is not enough to simply ‘‘see’’ an other; it is critical to see the other
as present in an objective, human-made, intersubjective world in which
we appear as subjects also inflected by that encounter.
A reflection that would end the intersubjective constitution of the thing
at the level of the mutuality of seeing would remain abstract. We must
add the economic, political, and cultural dimensions to objectivity; they
make a human world out of the mere nature they start with. The investiga-
tion of authentic human affectivity, therefore, must be guided by the
progress of objectivity. If feeling reveals my adherence to and my inheri-
tance in aspects of the world that I no longer set over against myself as
objects, it is necessary to show the new aspects of objectivity that are
interiorized in the feelings of having, power, and worth.≤
That is to say, rather than having affect fall back into oneself and main-
taining a stance toward the objective world (in which others reside) as
outside oneself, one sees that the objective world of others is actually
interiorized as such into one’s own self as well, making oneself available
to others according to the same system of objectification. Rather than
ward off that ‘‘other’’ affect, one incorporates it into oneself, but as part
of an objective (that is, no longer shapeless) world.
Ricoeur describes in further detail this process of objectification and
mutual regard.
The truly human quests establish new relations with other persons at
the same time as a new relation to things. Strictly speaking, the mutu-
ality of seeing is a very poor intersubjective relation. The ‘‘difference’’ of
a Self from others is constituted only in connection with things that
themselves belong to the economic, political and cultural dimensions.
Consequently, we must specify and articulate the relationship of the Self
to another Self by means of the objectivity that is built on the themes of
having, power, and worth.≥
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In other words, we come into an understanding of and mutual affective
relation to others via a basic dyad of having or not having (the economic
relation)—this is how we see and feel their relation to us. In turn, the
economic relation is related to a political relationship—having things
that others don’t means having a dominant relation over them: ‘‘The
objectification of man’s power over man in an institution is the new
‘object’ that can serve us as a guide in an immense world of feelings that
manifest affectively the diverse modalities of human power according to
which it is exercised, opposed, courted, or undergone. All the social
roles the man may exercise initiate situations that political institutions
consolidate into an object.’’∂
But what about ‘‘culture,’’ and how does it connect with ‘‘worth’’?
Well, it is here that the very idea of humanity resides. What is crucial for
my study is that this cultural realm of worth-endowing remains objec-
tive, no less than the other two members of Ricoeur’s trio (economics
and politics). Culture does not remain at the level of the formless; it is
not something interiorized subjectively, unrelatable to others, that is, as
totally private and unexchangable ‘‘feeling.’’ Culture, in other words,
does not remain akin to the Lacanian imaginary. Ricoeur insists that art
is an objective thing, but, crucially, a thing of the world shared with
others, and works of art, no less than economic or political objects,
convey a sense of worth, this time a worth measured not by having or by
holding power, but precisely by being human.
It is necessary to add to this wholly ‘‘formal’’ objectivity of the idea of hu-
manity the ‘‘material’’ objectivity of the cultural works that express this
humanity. If the economic sphere is objectified in the goods and forms of
having, and the political sphere in institutions and all the forms of
power, then hyper-economic and hyper-political humanity is expressed
in monuments that bear witness to the search for recognition. ‘‘Works’’
of art and literature, and, in general, works of the mind, insofar as they
not merely mirror an environment and an epoch but search out man’s
possibilities, are the true ‘‘objects’’ that manifest the abstract universality
of the idea of humanity through their concrete universality. . . . Cultural
objectivity is the very relation of man to man represented in the idea of
humanity; only cultural testimonies endow it with the destiny of things,
in the form of monuments existing in the world: but these things are
‘‘works.’’ It is this formal and material objectivity of the idea of man that
engenders an affectivity to its measure: the cycle of feelings of esteem.∑
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It is precisely in the active (that is, not passive) character of art that we
find something close to what I have been calling the delivery system
of literature, which is able to reside as ‘‘hyper-economic’’ and ‘‘hyper-
political’’ humanity. Culture—and literature, as an objective form of
culture—exists both in contact with economic and political objectifica-
tions of humanity, and beyond them. It is a delivery system that is
characterized via its ability to be a metasystem reflecting back on the
ways ‘‘the human,’’ negotiated precisely in the rationing of self and other,
same and different, can be imagined as is, and otherwise.
To follow the attention Ricoeur appears to give the precise nature of
objective and objectifying forms (economics, politics, culture), it would
seem critical at this point to attend to the objective status of literature,
most particularly, how it coheres and delivers stories of others, and,
most crucially, how it is read. In this respect it is worth quoting at length
Mark Poster’s catalog of questions about today’s global media.
Increasing global relations catalyze the question of culture: are the basic
conditions of culture changed, diminished, or supplemented as a result
of intensified exchanges across national, ethnic, and territorial borders?
What are the major discursive regimes that have emerged in connection
with the phenomenon of global culture? What models of analysis are
best suited to examine these exchanges—translation, transcoding, mix-
ing, hybridity, homogenization? Do they appear to pose the most pro-
ductive questions in the present context? Do these concepts articulate
the challenges and opportunities posed for culture by the rapid inten-
sification of global exchanges? One might inquire as well, at another
level, about the epistemological conditions for framing the problems of
global culture. What discursive positions enable asking the question in
the first place? What are the conditions of writing/speech/word pro-
cessing that open a critical stance on the question of global culture? Is
the subject, the ‘‘I think’’ of the Western philosophical tradition, an
appropriate position of discourse in order to initialize questions about
global culture? Does the fact that a large proportion of global exchanges
occur only with the mediation of information machines incite a need to
redefine the notion of the other?∏
We have ourselves already raised several of these questions, directly, and
indirectly. In concluding this study, I want to narrow this highly useful
set of interests down to two: one regards the objective forms that texts
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which carry information take; the other is the way that those texts are
decoded or read. These issues press on the very act of making sense and,
in my study, specifically on the act of making sense of self and other.
Jerome McGann asks these questions: ‘‘Must we regard the physical
channels of communications as part of the message of the texts we
study? Or are the channels to be treated as purely vehicular forms whose
ideal condition is to be transparent to the texts they deliver? How
important, for the reader of a novel or any other text, are the work’s
various materials, means, and modes of production?’’π In asking these
questions, he taps into exactly the dilemma of reading literature today.
Not only literature is itself, as ‘‘it’’ is, already inflected internally in its
language by a new language of the Web and the social forms it connects
and produces, and the very materiality of the text is now variously
distributed across paper and screen (and multiple types of screens and
devices that have their own operating systems, formats, rhythms, lives,
and morphologies), but also, and critically for me, the modes of reading
through and in which we put together data, text, and aesthetic forms
have changed.
For many, the explosion of multiple forms, venues, and delivery sys-
tems, for both worldwide input and output, is a liberating and democra-
tizing possibility. Speaking specifically to the issue of writing literary
history, but also, I would say, to the issue of teaching literature in the
academy, Amy J. Elias asks, ‘‘might not the high seriousness currently
demanded of literary history blind us to the aristocratic coterie we form
to protect decorum—and to how decorum and seriousness are linked to
form in ways that protect disciplinary history from encroachment by
amateurs, the unapprenticed, the lumpen professoriat?’’∫ According to
her, the rise of affordable Internet technology has created a new de-
specialized zone for the dissemination of information, images, sound,
opinion: ‘‘Rather than merely the enclave of programmers or hackers
(though these are privileged netizens and may yet control this space in
the end), the Web is, in fact, evolving spaces filled with content pro-
duced by intelligent and socially engaged amateurs and experts in nu-
merous fields.’’Ω
If we accept this idea, then it is no wonder that in the following
passage Elias’s appropriation and update of Wolfgang Iser takes on a
‘‘radical’’ dimension as she leaves the cloister of the academy: ‘‘Dialog-
ism between text and reader and movement itself constitute the virtual
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reality created by reading. In writing that this convergence between
text and reader creates a virtual space somehow beyond both, a space
emerging from interactivity, Iser situates the ‘virtuality’ of the text in the
space of dialogic movement itself, in the space of interaction rather than
the space of identity.’’∞≠ Within this brave new world of infinite modes of
connection, there is less and less constraint, since ‘‘decorum and seri-
ousness’’ have been made optional. Elias cites approvingly Mark Poster’s
assertion that ‘‘technology . . . puts cultural acts, symbolizations in all
forms, in the hands of all participants; it radically decentralizes the posi-
tions of speech, publishing, film-making, radio and television broad-
casting, in short the apparatuses of cultural production.’’∞∞
But let us pause for a moment before we log on. What is striking for
me is how quickly and vastly Elias sweeps us past the ‘‘space of identity’’
and into ‘‘a space of interaction,’’ and seems to value interaction for its
own sake. Poster’s quote is only slightly less rapturous and naïve—he at
least cites the obvious ‘‘apparatuses of cultural production,’’ if only to
send them spinning off-center fairly quickly. He does, however, right-
fully draw our attention to the key question of symbolization. What I
want to emphasize is that not every person’s symbolic is everyone, or
anyone, else’s. I want to insist that the symbolic realm is not so easily up
for grabs. There is no level playing field, and it is a huge mistake to
imagine that sufficient ‘‘quantity’’—herein merely the potential of a
‘‘multitude’’ coming together sometime, someday, to ‘‘de-center’’ the
world system in politically efficient ways—can or will ever come about
merely because there is the technological possibility of it happening as
people ‘‘interact.’’
Rather than fetishizing difference, otherness, or, identity, my book has
tried to linger a bit with the question of the production of sameness and
otherness, and the ethical and political choices that go into that. I have
no clear argument with any of the above, and even hold open the
possibility that, yes, as many of their staunchest advocates argue, such
conceptualizations of the here and now might lead to a real increase in
democratic, self-empowering movements. But ultimately it does not at
all do away with two basic problems I have tried to wrestle with in these
pages. First, that all networks, open as they are, have an endpoint.
Elias notes, ‘‘Danah Boyd and Nicole Ellison define a social network
site as ‘web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a
public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a
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list of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and
traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the
systems. The nature and nomenclature of these connections may vary
from site to site.’ ’’∞≤ Here we see that each network has a set of prefer-
ences, or criteria for selection, for opting-in. What exactly this ‘‘connec-
tion’’ is that is shared (number 2) is irrelevant in terms of detail, but
important in essence. That people can be connected in any way in any
given social network is pretty true, yet to me it is a trivial point. What I
am interested in are the ways that the delivery systems I have treated in
this study aspire to (if not assume) universality and yet at the same time
reaggregate difference. And when we add in the issue of the presenta-
tion of other people’s lives and stories in literature, I want to see what
various modes of reading can yield that is different from decoding data
and information about others and their lives.
The issue for me is that, given the hybrid forms Mattelart alerted us to
a long time ago, and the ways that the lines between information, data,
propaganda, advertisement, art have been blurred, how can we imagine
that we can still apply our usual ways of reading onto texts that now sit
only partially within what we used to call ‘‘literary’’ form? Or, better yet,
how flexible are both literary form and modes of reading literature? In
terms of the readings put forward here, there is no doubt that they are
influenced by my own rootedness in the literary criticism of the late
twentieth century. But I’ve also tried to consistently infuse my reading
practice with the recognition of how the form and content of contem-
porary literature is imbricated with other delivery systems that present
their own representations of self and other, either directly or by implica-
tion. I want finally to return to Ozeki’s My Year of Meats, then consider
briefly Gary Shteyngart’s Super Sad True Love Story, as examples of
precisely my concerns with form and reading, affect and ethics in the
contemporary world.
In My Year of Meats, the actual nature of Jane’s ‘‘book’’ seems to belie
her claim to its ‘‘being modern’’—the novel seems rather an eminently
postmodern text. This can be seen, for example, in her repeated medita-
tions on the notion that fiction and truth are at one with each other, that
facts are randomly extracted from a mass of possible data. And yet the
novel ends up focusing on that alignment between the world of fiction
created in the ersatz documentary and the reality it seeks to expose, that
is, on a modern resolution. While one might dwell on the postmodern
188 Conclusion
world of the novel—the crisis of connection in an age of simulacra and
fragmentation, media imaging and just-in-time production of affect—in
this last statement Ozeki opens a historical question: is it only in the
modern, with all its baggage, that we can locate ethics? Is the postmod-
ern world of late capital actually unable to anchor a sense of belonging
and obligation? Can the fragmentation and loss of grounding associated
with the postmodern actually be exploited by and recuperated by the
‘‘modern’’?
In fact, Ozeki’s novel can easily be read as a calculated and persistent
rebuttal of the postmodern. We find the constant activities of piecing
together, which deploys a multiplicity of communication devices: the
novel is peppered with trans-Pacific faxes, telephone calls, answering-
machine recordings, cell-phone calls from jet airliners, video tapes, of-
fice memos. The printed page of the novel itself replicates that of faxes,
memos, and so on, but gathers those heterogeneous, objective forms
back into its dominant narrative space. What we end up with seems
therefore an eminently modern project. However, how is this ‘‘modern’’
project actually given form? It is not as simple as it may appear. Ozeki
constantly balances between Jane’s film and her novel, and her novel
and the texts and information that encase it.
Thus, when Jane says, ‘‘Whatever people may think of my book,’’ it is
here that Ozeki’s voice emerges most clearly as distinct from Jane’s—
after all, Jane has not written a book, she has made a film. As this is
the case, we can better understand at once Ozeki’s authorial distance
(which varies from moment to moment) from Jane’s point of view, and
the project of the novel itself. The very material form of the narrative
that delivers this important ethical message to us is decidedly not the
media represented in the narrative. And yet, the novel itself is embedded
within another set of documents—we are provided with information
sources on the meat industry, documentation on des, women’s health
resources, as well as sample study questions for the novel. If Ozeki
mocks the beef-ex series for attempting to blunt its sheer commercial-
ism by couching the programs as ‘‘documentaries’’ which purport to
present cross-cultural understanding (the segments include interviews
with the families about their lives and habits; there is a ‘‘sociological
survey’’ that asks the Japanese audience to respond to the programs), her
own text parallels these strategies. That is, it is ‘‘packaged’’ in a similar
fashion. There is a novel, but the ‘‘book’’ is not only a novel, not only
‘‘literature.’’
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Ozeki’s text is linked both by the logic and symbolic structure of its
diegesis and also through its surrounding texts, to the material history of
the contemporary. This complementarity can be appreciated as Ozeki
appropriating what Walter Benjamin called ‘‘technique’’ or ‘‘tendency,’’
that is, the particular mode of cultural production within a specific
social formation.∞≥ It may also be seen as suggesting that in this his-
torical age, neither of the two elements—what used to be called the
‘‘literary’’ and the ‘‘nonliterary’’—can efficiently stand alone to deliver
an ethically effective text. And we should be explicit here: the tension we
have been speaking of all this time is between the particular imaginative
function of literature and the global codifications and disseminations of
information. Ozeki’s literary narrative discloses her attempt to exploit
our current registering of globalization as information and literature’s
modernist ability to lend new forms of information an affective and
ethical content. This, then, would be a way to start accounting for the
objective and objectifying status of ‘‘culture,’’ through which, according
to Ricoeur, we come to see one another in ways other than the inward-
turning, shapeless form of affect.
But I’d like to press the question further, given the specific literary
texts we have treated in these pages. We need to ask, do these different
forms and their accompanying phenomenologies disable, or rather re-
vise, our capacity to imagine others? How is otherness available to us,
and what does it look like once it gets here? And how might the very
technologies that bring us into some sort of contact allow for any sort of
consolidated ethical action? Ozeki’s text is hardly a revolutionary one in
any formal sense. And yet its formal presentation raises critical ques-
tions about the persisting role of a literary genre, or, indeed, all cultural
forms in an age of increasingly extensive and intensive media.∞∂ But as
crucial as the objective form of literature is today, both the authors
whose work I address in this conclusion place equal attention to the
intimately related phenomenon of reading. How do readers today put
together information? How does this decoding stand in relation to read-
ing literature?
Shteyngart’s Super Sad True Love Story is aptly titled. The surplus of
affect, its authenticity as an event and as a felt thing, its questioning of
the capacity of people so connected by both ‘‘conventional’’ forms of
narrative and new forms of media (emails, texts, etc.) to love, and,
finally, the status of ‘‘story’’ are all in center place. Similar to the ways
Ozeki’s novel delves into the new, hybrid forms of communication—the
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things Mattelart drew our attention to: ‘‘Infomercials, Advertorials, Pub-
bligiornalismo, Publireportage’’ which, as noted in the previous chapter,
‘‘erase the lines between news and commercials, advertising and edi-
torial, publicity and journalism, publicity and reportage, between pro-
motional surface and editorial content, advertising and the program’’—
Shteyngart is concerned with the ways different media not only appear
to us in texts, but how these texts and information permeate our world,
therein creating a hybrid form of daily life wherein the private and
public are no longer separate.∞∑ In his novel, for example, ‘‘credit poles’’
adorn the sidewalks, flashing the credit scores of passersby. One’s cho-
lesterol scores, index of ‘‘sexiness,’’ income, employment, relationships,
and personal history—what used to be private pieces of information—
are broadcast publicly with abandon.
Despite the common concerns of Shteyngart and Ozeki, the structure
of Shteyngart’s novel is much less ambitious and complex than that of
Ozeki’s. While Ozeki fuses a number of media, and in their interaction
on multiple levels creates a way to critique each separately and also
together, Shteyngart’s novel is basically structured bilaterally, with the
split between two narrative forms: a journal kept by the male protago-
nist; and a series of text messages and emails mostly written by the
female protagonist, along with her friends’ and relatives’ responses.
Shteyngart’s chapters alternate between these two formats: on one
hand, a traditional, easily read, conventional form of self-narration; on
the other, a piecemeal assortment of comments, observations, asides.
Nevertheless, within this basic structure lie a number of important
distinctions. The journal, of course, is ostensibly addressed to the book
itself as a kind of proxy (‘‘dear journal’’), while the second set of narra-
tives are actual communications between people. On the surface, given
the extremely thin content of the texts and emails, we are inclined to see
them, rather than the self-reflective diary, as shallow. In fact, at the end of
the novel, we see that posterity has been kinder to the latter rather than
the former, which is read as self-indulgent and narcissistic. We thus need
to ask the question, is it a matter of form or of reading? Are conventional,
‘‘respected’’ aesthetic forms of self-presentation guaranteed better value
against forms of communication that aspire to no more than casual,
barely reflective thoughts or half-thoughts? The issues of form, and
process, go hand in hand: how do we see others, these days?
In Super Sad True Love Story the character Eunice Park describes (via
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email) her boyfriend’s attachment to books (which are regarded as
anything but aesthetic objects—they are thought to exude a disagree-
able odor): ‘‘Anyway, what kind of freaked me out was that I saw Len
reading a book. (No, it didn’t smell. He uses Pine-Sol on them.) And I
don’t mean scanning a text like we did in Euro Classics with that Chat-
terhouse of Parma, I mean seriously reading. He had this ruler out
and he was moving it down the page very slowly and just like whispering
little things to himself, like trying to understand every little part of it.’’∞∏
Well at least she recognizes this strange activity as reading. She herself
has not acquired that skill: ‘‘ ‘I’ve never really learned how to read texts,’
she said. ‘Just to scan them for info’ ’’ (277).
If Eunice has not learned to read texts, conversely Len has learned to
love the digital display of his ‘‘äppärät,’’ a kind of pda that is worn
around the neck: ‘‘I’m learning to worship my äppärät’s screen, the
colorful pulsating mosaic of it, the fact that it knows every last stinking
detail about the world, whereas my books only know the minds of their
authors’’ (78). Counterposed to the revelation of an other’s ‘‘mind,’’ that
standard deliverance of otherness that literature takes as its task, the
characters in Super Sad True Love Story are drawn to detail, particles of
information that float about, drawn into significance in random and
transient manners. The question then becomes, what to do with it?
Compared to Len’s sustained reflections, Eunice’s texts seem only very
loosely connected. A tension thus lies between how one reads the two,
what kinds of mental operations to place on them. In the passage below,
we find Len trying to figure out what kind of story to weave out of bits of
information he has acquired about Eunice’s family. The progression of
information and his reflections on it insert the data into different liter-
ary genres, from a private-eye story to an immigrant story to a love
story. As each of these genres comes into sight, it is in turn integrated
into a master narrative that conveys the desire and the need Len feels for
Eunice, and his deployment of his own immigrant story against the one
he has made up for them, out of these data.
My retro äppärät churned slowly with data, which told me that the
father’s business was failing. A chart appeared, giving the income for the
last eighteen months; the yuan amounts were in steady decline since
they had mistakenly left California for New Jersey—July’s income after
expenses was eight thousand yuan, about half of my own, and I do not
have a family of four to support.
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The mother did not have any data, she belonged solely to the home,
but Sally, as the youngest of the Parks, was awash in it. From her profile I
learned that she was a heavier girl than Eunice, the weight plunged into
her round cheeks and the slow curvature of her arms and breasts. Still,
her ldl cholesterol was way beneath the norm, while the hdl surged
ahead to form an unheard-of ratio. Even with her weight, she could
live to be 120 if she maintained her present diet and did her morning
stretches. After checking her health, I examined her purchases and felt
Eunice’s as well. The Park sisters favored extra-small shirts in strict
business patterns, austere grey sweaters distinguished only by their
provenance and price, pearly earrings, $100 children’s socks (their feet
were that small), panties shaped like gift bows, bars of Swiss chocolate
at random delis, footwear, footwear, footwear. I watched their Allied-
WasteCVSCitigroup account rise and fall like the chest of a living, and
breathing animal. . . . I beheld the numerical totality of the Park family
and I wanted to save them from themselves, from the idiotic consumer
culture that was bleeding them softly. I wanted to give them counsel and
to prove to them that—as the son of immigrants myself—I could be
trusted. (38)
Taking up the issue of affect, we see how this data is seen to both
disclose what the Parks are affected by—their desire for certain objects
and foodstuffs—and the way that in turn affects Len as he steps into
their shoes, so to speak, to imagine what kind of composite creatures
they are, that he is going to attach himself to. Not only objects and food,
but the very registry of their holdings, their Allied-WasteCVSCitigroup
account, is anthropomorphized, seeming to give off affect and receive it
as well. In the midst of this sea of affect, ‘‘awash’’ with data, we find
humans are read as behaving along the same systems of behavior—
Retail and Images (this is the often-referred-to essential dyad in the
novel). It almost seems as if these bits of data are struggling to be made
into something, or, more correctly, as if Len’s mind is relentlessly trying
to make sense of them, of how they can be put together variously to
yield different results. This, of course, is not terribly revolutionary—
narratology has variously formulated models that all show that fictions
are made up of information and ways of decoding it. What is different
here, and in Ozeki’s text, is that ‘‘narrative information’’ is presented
precisely as ‘‘information,’’ not aestheticized or symbolically coded, as it
is in sorting out how different media present information to us that
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these two novels emblematize the crosshatching of private-public, liter-
ary system–information system, and many other formerly distinct (or
perhaps less indistinct) spheres.
For Len, a traditionalist if nothing else, two things most conspicu-
ously bind data together: love and death. Eros and Thanatos are the big,
sad drivers of affect; it is they that cohere information. In fact, he is, like
all of us, fixated on acquiring and prolonging the first, and evading and
delaying the latter. The question becomes how they cohere data into
stories. Len hopes, in a process of ‘‘dechronification,’’ to postpone death.
But his attempt to qualify for this procedure seems doomed to failure:
‘‘My first stab at dechronification—gone. My hair would continue to
turn gray, and then one day it would fall out entirely, and then, on a day
meaninglessly close to the present one, meaninglessly like the present
one, I would disappear from the earth. And all these emotions, all these
yearnings, all these data, if that helps to clinch the enormity of what I’m
talking about, would be gone’’ (70). The trajectory of that catalog is of
course important here: emotions, yearnings, data. Affect, passion, is
declared, then intensified and made active, only to bow in expressive
and indeed affective power before that which is truly significant—data.
The question, once again, is how to put data together. If it is the thing
that draws attention and meaning, then what kinds of meaning come
out of its decoding? Similarly, as we puzzle out that question, we are
compelled to ask, how do we (still) read literature? Can literature work
outside data, and yield something different in its being read?
Len gets to find out the answers to these questions because the same
thing happens in Super Sad True Love Story as happens in My Year of
Meats: information is leaked, the private is launched into the public,
without acknowledgment or control: ‘‘When I wrote these diary entries
so many decades ago, it never occurred to me that any text would ever
find a new generation of readers. I had no idea that some unknown
individual or group would breach my privacy and Eunice’s to pillage our
GlobalTeens accounts and put together the text you see on your screen’’
(327). And, as in My Year of Meats, this leaking of information proves to
have positive effects. Where Jane’s ‘‘story’’ draws attention to the meat
industry’s dubious practices and the harmful effects of growth hor-
mones, Len’s ‘‘story’’ finds a new generation of readers. Nonetheless,
whereas Jane’s story ends relatively well, Len’s story ends, for him, as
one of loss, sorrow, alienation, without—to my mind—any particular
redemption.
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But as the Stateside critics have unanimously agreed, the gems in the
text are Eunice Park’s GlobalTeens entries. They ‘‘present a welcome
relief from Lenny’s relentless navelgazing,’’ to quote Jeffrey Schott-Liu in
his whorefuckrevu. ‘‘She is not a born writer, as befits a generation reared
on Images and Retail, but her writing is more interesting and more alive
than anything else I have read from that illiterate period. She can be
bitchy, to be sure, and there’s a patina of upper-middle-class entitlement,
but what comes through is a real interest in the world around her—an
attempt to negotiate her way through the precarious legacy of her family
and to form her own opinions about love and physical attraction and
commerce and friendship, all set in a world whose cruelties gradually
begin to mirror those of her own childhood.’’ I would add that, whatever
one may say about my former love, and whatever terrible things she’s
written about me, unlike her friends, unlike Joshie, unlike myself, unlike
so many Americans at the time of our country’s collapse, Eunice Park
did not possess the false idea that she was special. (327–28)
This means, it appears, that whatever value this text has is to be found
primarily not in the old-style, self-reflective, psychologically and spiri-
tually ‘‘deep’’ narration of Len’s life (addressed to itself ), but rather in
the pieced-together prose-like data of Eunice. According to the charac-
ter Schott-Liu, it is in Eunice’s set of texts that ‘‘writing’’ is to be found. It
is writing, nonetheless, that follows the same old thematics; it is, when
put all together, ‘‘an attempt to negotiate her way through the pre-
carious legacy of her family and to form her own opinions about love
and physical attraction and commerce and friendship, all set in a world
whose cruelties gradually begin to mirror those of her own childhood’’
—in other words, exactly the same themes as we find in Len’s journal
entries, but without the narcissism and self-absorption. Indeed, if we are
going to carve out any space for political hope here, it would certainly
not be with Len, but with Eunice and her sister, who, of all the charac-
ters, form political and human sympathies with the ragtag bunch of
revolutionaries camping out in Central Park.
Nevertheless, when all is done, the hopeful, and positive, aspects of
Super Sad True Love Story therefore reside not in an abiding value in old
forms, or in the glitz and innovation of scintillating ‘‘data points,’’ nor
even in a faith that people can, pace Eunice herself, still read, and still
want to read for the same things. Affect, politics, economic behavior all
deliver others to us, and, crucially, the mediating mechanisms of the
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Web and äppäräti do not meld everything into one simple grid. Shteyn-
gart gives neither new nor old forms of information necessary value—
it’s rather all in how we read. But how does he guide us toward that
reading? We abide Len’s narcissism and Eunice’s own not because of
their narratives, but, as in Ozeki’s text, because of the englobing narra-
tive. Like Ozeki, who shuttles back and forth between and among narra-
tive and non-narrative forms, between Akiko and Jane as her stand-in
narrators, Shteyngart does the same, with Len and Eunice. What we
emerge with is a ‘‘modern’’ text, but one whose modernity is pinned on,
Ricoeur has made us aware, different forms of objectification. We are
‘‘delivered’’ as ‘‘human’’ via this particular delivery system, one in which
we stand open to and saturated by information, yet our sense-making
appetites are still forming that information—about others, about our-
selves—in terms of narratives that do not (yet) look radically different
from the pre-information age. And yet the persistence of narrative form
alone is no guarantee of meaning or affect. What I want to draw our
attention to, as signaled both in the subtitle to this study and to the
critical acts I have undertaken throughout, is the essential and necessary
act of reading, and specifically, for me, reading with an attention to the
issues of otherness that I have made the centerpiece of this book.
It is precisely because of this that these novels carry their existential
weight impressively. The fact of the matter is that even in its compro-
mised, hybridized form, the ‘‘put together’’ text of Super Sad True Love
Story, cobbled together, still stands for something that outlasts death. In
this sense Shteyngart’s ‘‘text,’’ no less than Ozeki’s ‘‘story,’’ delivers us a
picture of reading that captures the reasoning, bodies, and affect of
others even as the overflow of each threatens to destablize the ‘‘system.’’
Literature, and a particular way of reading it for precisely this negotia-
tion of otherness, can (still) help us, through this particular animation
of the imagination, weigh out the ratios of rationality and action, and, to
take a page from Len, of bodies and affect, life and death, even if what
we read is about super sad love (or maybe especially because of that
fact). The sadness in Len’s life parallels the sadness in Eunice’s: the
former looks into his own mortality, wishing it could be otherwise; the
latter looks to connect with the world, still as young as she is. These are
age-old themes. What is critical here, as with all the novels we have read
for this study, is that we exercise our capacity and moral willingness to
see others not ‘‘as they are,’’ reduced to some standard data-point cali-
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bration of weight, age, wealth, or power so as to move through the
system efficiently, but framed within precisely those mediating and
objective structures that are exposed for what they are—non-natural,
human-made systems (or, as Ricoeur says, ‘‘works’’) that convey others
to us in ways that reveal our assumptions, beliefs, values, and politics.
That is to say, reading as I have suggested will be a self-reflective act that
puts the question of ethics before that of epistemology.
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